Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-95-015
Tuesday
24 January 1995

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Deputies Ask Berisha for Nano's Release

95P20379A Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 22 Dec 94 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Fatos Nano's Release Is Sought"—Pro Memoria From a Group of People's Assembly Deputies Addressed to the President of the Republic, Sali Berisha, for the Information of the Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly, Pjeter Arbnori]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Deputies' Pro Memoria] One and one-half years have passed since the arrest and emprisonment of Fatos Nano, Socialist Party deputy to the People's Assembly. This issue has exacerbated Albanian political life and diminished the international image of Albanian democracy.

The European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the Council of the World Interparliamentary Union have spoken out on this matter in various forms. The latter, upon the recommendation of the Committee for Human Rights of World Parliamentarians, based on four detailed studies it made of the "Nano Case" (the Geneva, Paris and Copenhagen studies and the 17 September 1994 study), has approved a resolution in which, in essence, the Council of the World Interparliamentary Union says the following:

—It cannot understand how Fatos Nano's actions or failure to take action, which are the object of the Tirana court decision, prove his guilt, and it expresses its doubts as regards the logical content and correctness of the aforementioned court decision;

—It expresses its serious concern about the claim that the court had a biased attitude in the handling of evidence and particularly the charges that important documents were removed, that irregular evidence or incomplete or untranslated documents and evidence were used by the court, and that the decision presents a distorted version of the testimony of the witnesses;

—It draws attention to the fact that Albania is party to the International Convention on Political and Civil Rights and the European Convention on the Protection of Basic Human Rights and Freedoms and is therefore obliged to respect and guarantee the right to a normal trial;

—It wants to know whether Mr. Nano has an opportunity to meet with his colleagues and attorneys and to know the prospects for his release.

[The deputies' pro memoria continues:] On the basis of our desire and obligation to see democracy develop normally in Albania; with the confidence that the resolution of the "Nano Case" will make an important contribution to the creation of the most appropriate climate for understanding, a peaceful society and the expansion of the human dimension; in the hope that the release of deputy Fatos Nano will make a contribution to improving Albania's democratic image in the eyes of international public opinion; we are asking you, dear Mr. President, to exercise your constitutional powers with a view to the release of Fatos Nano. [signed] Respectfully, People's Assembly deputies: Gramoz Pashko, Teodor Keko, Kosta Makarjadhi, Thoma Mico, Perikli Teta, Lush Perpali, Theodhori Bej, Shaqir Vukaj, Ermelinda Meksi, Musa Ulqini, Mehmet Loci, Fehmi Abdiu, Anastas Angjeli, Dritero Agolli, Ylli Bufi, Ndre Legisi, Sabit Brokaj, Alfred Paloka, Ilir Meta, Bashkim Caka, Tefik Ajazi, Pandeli Majko, Vladimir Metani, Miri Hoti, Bardhyl Agasi, Moikom Zeqo, Ibrahim Baci, Adem Zyberi, Bashkim Koci, Maqo Lakrori, Shkelqim Cani, Gramoz Ruci, Servet Pellumbi, Et'hem Ruka, Namik Dokle, Xhevat Lloshi, Bashkim Zeneli, Leontiev Cuci, Halil Lalaj, Luan Hajdaraga, Mitro Cela, Ridvan Peshkepia, Paskal Milo, Gjergj Rakaj, Vasil Gjika, Arben Imami.

Text of Program of Socialist Party of Albania

AU2001142495 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 8 Dec 94 pp 1-5

["Program of the Socialist Party of Albania"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Introduction

The Socialist Party of Albania [PS], founded on 12 June 1991, represents the alternative of democratic socialism in Albania. It entered Albanian political life with the advent of pluralism and of deep democratic changes.

The PS unites honest people who are dedicated to national interests and are inspired by social aspirations for freedom, democracy, equality, justice, solidarity, and peace.

As a party of the broad strata of the population, the PS places at the core of its program general social progress and basic human values, which it labors to realize through its policy of a radical democratic transformation of society and through reforms, joining the ranks of the European social-democratic left.

The PS's program relies on general principles that serve as guidelines for its policies and for the practical work of its members. These principles stem from the legacy of progressive Albanian social and political thought; from mankind's inherited historical experience, especially the philosophies of humanism, the Enlightenment, and Marxism; and from currents of a democratic socialist tendency in our times.

1. Socialists' Basic Principles

1.1. Our Fundamental Values

We Socialists aim at a better social order that will ensure the development of the human personality within the community, protect human dignity and labor, and pave

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the way for the continual transformation of society toward a democracy through socialism.

We want to establish in Albania the Socialist achievements of economic progress, freedom, human progress, and emancipation, and to eliminate oppression, exploitation, differences in the enjoyment of the benefits of life because of inequality of opportunity, social injustice, privilege, and discrimination. The fundamental values inspiring the guidelines of our program are liberty, equality, justice, solidarity, and peace.

1.1.1. Liberty

We are in favor of a free society of free people; in our history, Albanian liberty has both a national and social meaning. Without national liberty, there can be no social liberty. We wish to implant in the political awareness of our people trust in the future of a society in which the free development of each person becomes a premise for the development of everybody. Freedom becomes real when genuine opportunities are created for each person to properly understand and achieve a subsistence, to make his contribution to the development of political, economic, and cultural life, and to develop unhindered his personal talents. For this purpose, we seek general cooperation and understanding in social and political life, liberated from humiliating and enforced dependency. Liberty is defended through opposition to all form of domination or dictatorship, leaving scope for alternative solutions, autonomy and self-determination, different opinions and standpoints, and pluralism in life and culture. We support freedom of conscience and religious belief.

Socialists consider it vital that the proclamation of basic human freedoms and rights must be accompanied by the creation of material and social conditions that will secure that the basic needs of a life with dignity are met, in order to achieve freedom from poverty, ignorance, fear, exploitation, and all other forms of subjection.

1.1.2. Equality

Socialists defend the principles of the equality of human beings, equal opportunities for life and development of each person, and social and political equality. We are against uniformity and standardization through methods of administrative coercion, incomes, wealth, talents, and life-style. However, equality is achieved when everybody has the same social and civil opportunities and the same opportunities to share in the social wealth that is produced and distributed, and when all participate equally in deep economic, technical, and intellectual change and in the transformation of life-styles in contemporary society. It is exploitation, oppression, discrimination, backwardness, poverty, ignorance, and the marginalization and isolation of individuals or social groups that give rise to social inequality.

1.1.3. Justice

Equality is realized by social justice, which ensures the same dignity for people and equal rights in relations among themselves. Social justice means equal freedoms, equality before the law, and especially equality between men and women. Social justice implies that legality will ensure equal opportunities for everybody in the affirmation of their personalities, avoiding extreme polarization and discrimination. We Socialists are in favor of the democratic control of society in the distribution of power, property, and incomes, and of opportunities to receive education, training, and cultural benefits. We strive to restrict unjustified privileges and to secure a subsistence for those below a minimum level for certain reasons. We are in favor or justice that will guarantee social equilibrium among different groups, in order to advance through dialogue and mutual tolerance.

1.1.4. Solidarity

In a free and democratic society in which there is economic, social, cultural, and religious diversity and plural forms of ownership, common efforts are required for the rights of individuals and for lofty social and national interests, involving the active support of each individual for the improvement of the life of all. Our solidarity is expressed through readiness to unite around the same goals and ideals and to stand by one another, with feelings of responsibility toward the community.

Common responsibility and action ensure the freedom and self- determination of each individual, and are weapons with which even the weakest may successfully oppose and confront oppression and injustice, with which contradictions may be overcome between the richest and the poorest, between those who hold power, and between those who have in their hands information and science and those who do not meet the desired level, within legal limits.

Solidarity stimulates movements of the popular masses in the struggle for freedom and justice and guarantees the enforcement of democratization and reforms in postdictatorial Albanian society.

We struggle and labor to create economic, social and political structures in support of those who cannot protect themselves from violence, who have no means of solving their problems, or who are in difficulty because of illness, age, or natural catastrophes.

We are in solidarity with all the peoples of the world, opposing racism, chauvinism, fascism, intolerance, fanaticism, discrimination against minorities, and xenophobia.

1.1.5. Peace

Socialists are determined that peace will defeat war, and that victory will belong to the principle of the nonviolent solution of problems of the coexistence of individuals, peoples, nations, and states and their relations among themselves. Socialists seek to solve conflicts in the

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modern world on the basis of the principles of international relations, the self-determination of peoples, and the rejection of changes to borders through force. They seek for a greater role for international institutions in order to strengthen the method of dialogue and discussion. Socialists are convinced that peace is protected by confronting aggression actively and with international solidarity. All these values are important. Socialists are therefore determined to make them a reality, because they ensure for each person a life of dignity and freedom in democracy and progress.

1.2. Democracy

We Socialists are dedicated to the practical realization of the idea of democracy. We favor the free expression of the will of the majority and oppose the dictatorship of a minority. We oppose the oppression of minorities in the name of the majority.

We conceive democracy as a manner of organizing political and state life, as a body of rights that are exercised through elections, and as a permanent way of solving problems that arise in the process of the historical emancipation of society.

We are in favor of the ongoing democratization of politics, the state, the economy, and civil life, in order to overcome economic and cultural obstacles, narrow interests, and retrograde thinking.

We are the determined opponents of all forms of totalitarian dictatorship. We stand by the principle that democracy can be established and defended only by democratic methods. We oppose any hint of violations of democracy, any restriction of democratic rights, and any failure to respect constitutional guarantees.

We Socialists are opponents of political currents that violate freedom; we are against the bureaucratic stratum that exercises uncontrolled power; we are against privileges that lead to the oppression of others, and support with all our strength the free expression of opinions and the exercise of democratic rights of control as citizens and working people.

1.3. Democratic Socialism

We Socialists are convinced that a society of a market economy has not built a law-governed state and genuine pluralist economy exists [passage as published], built on the principles of a new constitution, and carrying out a series of reforms, also permits the affirmation of Socialist ideals, and the implementation of the alternative of democratic socialism. We call this the democratic progress of society toward socialism.

The society of democratic socialism is a society with plural forms of ownership. We support respect for legal limits on private, collective, public, and state ownership within a society with a social market economy. We favor the solution of any conflict that may arise among these forms of ownership in legal ways and through the conciliation of the interests of the parties concerned, giving priority, in cases of civil problems, to public and national interests. We call for the replacement of the domination of bureaucratic economic rule with democratic relations based on solidarity and cooperation. We call for the public sector and state, political, and cultural mechanisms to play an important role in the development of the whole of society and the protection of the integrity of the individual.

The society at which we aim is a society of freedom, social justice, solidarity, and peace; a society that frees human relations from oppression and exploitation; a society that improves the quality of life and makes general social security a reality, and which develops a diversity of ways of life, work, and creativity.

Democratic socialism is a society in which the level of economic and cultural development will guarantee and open new democratic prospects to citizens' basic rights, to the right to work and prosperity, to education, culture, and a humane environment.

The political foundation of this society will be a free vote and the sovereignty of the people; its permanent form will be pluralist democracy; its final goal will be the comprehensive development of the individual personality and general social progress.

2. The Society at Which We Aim

2.1. Democracy and Pluralism

Democratic socialism is not a political form of society imposed from above. Parliamentary democracy, a multiparty system, the autonomy of local government, and the political conscience of individuals who feel responsible for the community are important principles for democratic socialism.

Albanian Socialists work for the principles of democracy to become guidelines and tangible realities in all fields of life and work, because it is the materialization of these principles that makes genuine democracy. Genuine democracy lives and develops under the conditions of social, economic, and political pluralism.

We are in favor of the civilized and pluralist coexistence of social forces, and therefore struggle for this to become a way of life in relations among social classes, strata, groups, and individuals in our society.

Albanian Socialists aim not to exclude any individual or social group from democratic participation in the management of the state and society. We are in favor of a political democracy that presupposes a sphere of debate, within which conflicts on the basis of differences between programmed alternatives will be overcome by achieving a consensus among various parties and forces, respecting the law and conducting their activities and entering the face for power in accordance with the

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country's constitution. Albanian Socialists consider parliamentary democracy as the highest expression of political democracy and free elections under constitutional control as the sole method of attaining power.

We socialists are in favor of legally-defined democratic control of the domination of the majority and of respect for the rights of the minority in the parliament. We are convinced that the decisions of the majority are reversible in those cases in which their enforcement shakes the foundations of democratic coexistence or puts the existence of future generations in jeopardy. In such situations, in which the minority becomes the majority and the latter is reduced to a minority, we will seek for the repeal of the laws the earlier majority has approved.

We Socialists seek a democratic parliamentary regime that does not restrict or supplant the initiative and responsibility of every political force and of all citizens for the destiny of society and themselves. We are convinced that parliamentary democracy leaves scope for the expansion and consolidation of the pluralism of social and political alternatives. We are in favor of as broad a system as possible of social, cultural, and religious movements, and of the organization of popular referendums and plebiscites on important issues of democratic coexistence and the country's future.

In order to realize genuine social and political democracy, the Socialists demand:

—the expansion and consolidation of parliamentary democracy, by strengthening its institutions.

—the inculcation of a spirit of dialogue and democratic communication among different political forces by organizing roundtables about key problems in the country's life.

—the intensification of meetings between the electorate and deputies of the People's Assembly.

—the development of democracy in the PS's internal life and the further democratization of the procedure of selecting parliamentary candidates or members of the government.

—greater respect for democratic principles at local government level.

—more influence and participation on the part of citizens in the work of all levels of government, especially creating and supporting institutions that encourage direct democracy.

—the completion and continual consolidation of institutions of representative democracy, by creating mechanisms that implement popular initiatives in the interest of different social groups and especially of the whole of society.

2.2. Basic Freedoms and Rights

Dignity and human rights are at the foundation of the Socialist concept of humanism and a human life of value.

The PS struggles for a society and legal system that will ensure the exercise of human rights according to international standards, in accordance with the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human rights and the documents of the CSCE. The PS is committed to the practical exercise of freedom of conscience and belief, freedom of speech and the press, the right to choose one's place of residence and work, to free movement within and outside the country, the right to joint parties, organizations, and associations, and the rights of social and professional groups and minorities.

We Socialists strive to successfully coordinate the rights of the individual with social rights, so that neither will contradict the other, but, on the contrary, so that respect of individual rights to freedom of thought, work, food, housing, education, and culture will permit a human life with dignity and moral worth. We wish the realization of the rights of social groups to permit everybody to exercise individual rights.

We Socialists stand by the principle that dignity and human rights require that everybody should work together for social justice, with responsibility for the creation of conditions for a decent life.

The PS strives to ensure that human freedoms and rights according to modern standards will be ensured, while preserving spiritual, national, and popular values, our best traditions and customs, and by respecting the characteristics of social and ethnic groups, in the interest of the progress of culture on a national, popular, and democratic basis.

2.3. A Just State—The Democratic Legal System

The PS supports the strengthening and the consolidation of the law-governed state. By energetically participating in the formation of the political will of the strata they represent. Socialists call for the respect and enforcement of democratic concepts in relations between the party, society, and the state.

We ask for the basic principle of the supremacy of the law in society to be embodied in all these relations. In accordance with this principle, Socialists strive to ensure that ongoing efforts to consolidate and perfect the pluralist political state system and to construct and ensure the operation of state institutions at all levels should be supported by law.

—The state should be at the service of its citizens.

—The political reality of the division of the three powers and their mutual checks and balances in the interest of protecting and strengthening of democracy and citizens' human rights citizens should be respected and made tangible.

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—The role of elected representatives bodies as distinct from appointed executive bodies must be made effective, while relations between these two branches must guarantee the sovereignty of the people and political decisions of different kinds.

—The work of the state should be carried out only by authorized state bodies and always in accordance with the constitution and the legislation in force.

—There should be openness in the work of the state and the decision-making of the administration. Information and publicity should attract citizens into participation in the work of the state. Decisions should be made at the level where they are most effective and as close to citizens as possible.

—The organs of justice should be genuinely independent, and guided in their work solely by the law, without influence or interference from the executive organs, from party viewpoints, or the interests of economic groups.

—Relations between the state and individuals, social groups, organizations, and institutions should be regulated by publicity recognized legal principles.

—A democratic legal system that guarantees citizens equal rights and obligations, fundamental freedoms, and the inviolability of the person should be constructed and continually refined.

—Obedience to the law should become an indispensable democratic rule. Citizens should not be denied the right to contest a certain law, but this challenge and the change of the law must take place in a democratic fashion, through a legitimate public process provided for in advance and by a majority of votes.

—The unnecessary centralization of state and administrative competences, and the excessive concentration of economic power, the media, and other means of state pressure, should not be allowed.

—The concept of a state secret should be restricted, and individuals and social groups should not be excluded from participating in the running of the state.

—In order to guarantee democracy and citizens' freedoms and rights, all state activity must be based on the law, and the status of a civil servant and his work as a public official must be defined and regulated by law. The state must be responsible for the behavior of its own employees, while the latter must be responsible under the law for illegal administrative acts.

2.3.1. Citizens and the State

We Socialists believe that the welfare state, through its democratic shape and government, should always be close to its citizens. The experience of the world and the transition period in Albania show that many citizens, especially workers and small-scale peasants, feel abandoned and forgotten by the state machinery.

We support this social category, encouraging them to strengthen their willpower and to struggle to be an active force at all levels of the country's democratic life. We seek to make every citizen aware that all power flows from the democratic votes of the people and hence from himself.

The law-governed state, as one of the conditions for the enforcement of social justice, must not undertake to solve all the problems of society and the individual. The state must undertake only those tasks and services that are necessary for the progress of society as a whole and cannot be managed by individuals and social groups. In other directions, the state must encourage the initiatives of citizens and nongovernmental organizations.

For their part, officials have their own obligations and responsibilities toward the state. Those who consciously decide to break the law must also be prepared to suffer the legal consequences.

2.3.2. For a Democratic Administration

We Socialists are in favor of a legal administration that does not run counter to the basic interests of citizens, but ensures that they are realized within the law. We are in favor of an effective, flexible, and inexpensive administration that will solve people's problems. We will strive to remove from the state apparatus the corrupt, bureaucrats, parasites, and embezzlers. It is the task of citizens to denounce by legal and democratic means every sign of arbitrariness, corruption, and abuse within the administration.

We Socialists stand by the principle that every citizen has the right to receive information about issues that concern him and to seek access to the personal data about him that the administration collects, as well as the right to the inviolability of his person and protection from the arbitrary use of power. Regardless of his wealth, income, education, or social position, everybody must enjoy the unrestricted protection of the law, while refusing to permit discrimination, torture, and terror against the individual.

We Socialists stand by the principle that the administration must gradually be reduced, so that its work becomes comprehensible to citizens and can be controlled by elected representatives. The administration must be as accessible to the people as possible, so that citizens will not feel at its beck and call, but able to call it to account over its failure to do its duty, irregularities, or abuses.

2.3.3. Local Government

Socialists favor a form of local government that will enjoy autonomy and possess initiative and sources of income. The organs of local government must effectively enact the will of the electors, enforcing in practice the rights and duties defined in the constitution and other legislation.

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We are against any restriction of infringement of the competences of local government bodies on the part of the central administration of government-appointed bodies.

2.4. On the Full Equality and Free Development of Women

Despite efforts and progress toward the emancipation of Albanian women, we Socialists believe that marked disproportions remain between the real political, economic, and social positions of men and women. We will therefore continue efforts to ensure that women have equal rights to men. In pursuit of this goal, we will concentrate on the following objectives:

—Women will be encouraged in all fields of life, achieving real representation in all structures of political, economic, and social life.

—A policy will be devised that will ensure women equal pay, property rights, employment opportunities, and equal treatment and training, in order to prevent them becoming the first to be hit by unemployment and the inequality of economic development.

Socialists support all women's movements and social organizations that aim to defend their rights and affirm the personality of Albanian women in a market economy.

Socialists support all women's movements and social organizations that aim to defend their rights and affirm the personality of Albanian women in a market economy.

We ask the state to give priority to the socialization of household work, in order to achieve the necessary room for the increasing the role of women in society. In the process of economic development, especially of the country's rural areas, Socialists will devote particular attention to defending the rights of women in the countryside, and continually encouraging their emancipation.

2.5. The Participation of Young People

We Socialists take the view that it is society's duty to spend the financial resources required for the education, entertainment, and all-round intellectual development of young people. In building a living and open democracy with a view to the future, we rely on the principle of "making policies with young people, not for young people." According to this principle, young people's active participation in politics constitutes the best guarantee for the development of all aspects of democracy.

Socialists support every initiative that supports and elevates young people's personalities and their broad participation in all structures of the country's social and political life.

Socialists seek to create equal opportunities for the education of young people and for a modern upbringing that will permit their normal integration into life.

We are for a realistic appraisal of contradictions between age groups, and ask the younger generation to understand and respect the efforts and contribution of the older generation, while the older generation should understand and free the path for the various reasonable interests and demands of the younger generation. We want to increase solidarity between the generations so that the elderly too may take part in the country's social life.

2.6 The Right to Information and the Mass Communication Media

We Socialists are convinced that the mass communication media fulfill a public duty in a democratic society, granting citizens equal rights to information and a diversity of opinions. These media give the necessary scope to political pluralism, and thus the creation of the necessary background against which this democratic mission may be fulfilled remains at the core of our policy. This conception, alongside the equal right to information, offers citizens the opportunity to freely express their opinions, combating all forms of censorship on the part of the state of any misuse of the power of the media.

We are in favor of comprehensive legislation covering all spheres of the mass media, permitting private radio and television stations, and linking competition between them to an increase in professional competence. We oppose any press law that merely protects the state from journalists, obstructs their receipt and spread of information, or subjects them to intimidation. We are for an effective protection of private life from the intrusion of the mass media, and from the dangers that new electronic mass media pose for the individual or society.

Our policy supports nongovernmental organizations of journalists whose programs defend journalists' interests and strive to give the mass media the necessary leeway within the framework of democracy.

We are convinced that the structures of the mass media themselves must ensure a diversity of views, freedom of opinion, and a legal guarantee for journalists and their working conditions, qualification, and personal protection. We call on journalists to behave with personal responsibility to public opinion, according to professional ethics.

Socialists are convinced that the state radio and television must be dependent on parliament. Its managing council, elected by parliament and subject to parliamentary control, must guarantee its independence, in order to give space to all political views and to exclude all tendencies to apply censorship on behalf of the ruling party.

2.7. Democratic Socialism and Religion

Democratic socialism, as an international movement, has as its objective the establishment of a better society. At the core of its theory lie the finest achievements of mankind, including the values of religious belief. In this

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sense, democratic socialism and religion are not in opposition to one another. We respect an individual's intimate personal convictions in his belief or unbelief with regard to religion. We are against any practice that restricts freedom of thought and belief or that gives preference to or discriminates against different religious communities.

We support the drafting and approval of a law on religious communities that will ensure their autonomy from the state and their free organization on the basis of their own regulations. We condemn any interference from abroad fostered by religious fundamentalism of any kind, which threatens to the slightest degree the traditional tolerance among our country's religious communities.

Socialists consider religious education to be a matter for the communities concerned, while Albanian schools will remain secular.

2.8. Tolerance and Social Peace

Socialists struggle for the triumph of tolerance and an atmosphere of social peace in a pluralist society that presupposes differences among social groups and individuals, ideological and political differences, cultural and religious differences, and a diversity of alternatives, programs, and solutions. Socialists stand by the principle that political activity must be conducted with respect for the spirit of free dialogue and public discussion, ensuring freedom for the expression of opinions and for decision-making in accordance with special interests and the interests of democratic coexistence in society. Socialists support the principle that socioeconomic activity, while respecting the principles of a market economy with a social dimension, must be permitted, while economic and legal mechanisms and controlled public intervention will prevent the appearance and incitement of social conflicts and criminality.

We understand democratic socialism as a society that constructs and continually refines a system of legal, cultural, educational, and moral control mechanisms in order to solve social conflicts in the interests of social peace and the harmonization of interests among classes, strata, and social groups. We are in favor of cultural activities that respect cultural and ethnic pluralism and lead to the creation of a multicultural society. We aim at a society that will cultivate tolerance, free and civilized competition, and a culture of mediation in order to pacify and settle social conflicts of all kinds, while reducing to a minimum factors that encourage violence, aggression, hatred, and intolerance.

3. For a Social Market Economy

3.1. The Social Market Economy—Our Alternative

The Albanian Socialists are convinced that the model of the social market economy represents the best alternative for the country's economic development, an alternative that realizes the effective use of society's productive forces, ensures equal social opportunities and moderates the inequalities that arise in the market economy.

Under this model with plural forms of ownership, private ownership predominates and coexists harmoniously with public property and various forms of group ownership. These forms of ownership function according to the same conditions of the market economy, compete with each other, and include as an integral part elements of indirect state intervention and control. We socialists reject both the savage capitalism of the 19th century and the centralized economy kept entirely in the hands of the state, as in the former communist countries.

The PS favors an economy with human dimensions that aims at cooperation and solidarity for the sake of development and considers and meets social needs through long-term social planning. We aim to realize the basic rights of a democratic society such as the right to work, education, and participation in decision-making at local and national level. we also aim at price stability and an effective fiscal system, a protected environment, qualitative improvements in technology and production, and participation as equal partners in the world economy and market.

For us Socialists, the social market economy calls for comprehensive legislation guaranteeing a minimum wage and working hours and conditions, which obliges all parties to enforce the compulsory insurance of workers against accidents and gives public support to education, culture, health, social security, and the maintenance of certain important services such as housing and the supply of electricity, fuel, water, etc.

3.2. The Role of the State in the Social Market Economy

The PS supports a role for state intervention and control in the management of the economy, mainly through finance, currency policy, credit, investment, and stimulus for the activities of Albanian and foreign businessmen.

During the transition period, the main duty of the state must be to draw up a program of anti-crisis reforms, to intervene in those sectors and subsectors of the economy where imbalances arise in material and financial production factors, and where these factors clash with the human factor and fail to take into account social pressures that give rise to anxiety and unemployment.

We favor a social market economy in which the state will play a definite role in drawing up a strategy for the country's development, for investment in the most important sectors of the economy, and for making decisions of fundamental importance for the country's economy and the people.

3.3. Privatization—An Important Step in the Economic Reform

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We consider privatization to be a basic component of the economic reform, in order to create a market economy with pluralist forms of ownership. For Socialists, well-considered pluralism on the basis of the law creates the necessary scope and institutional framework for private ownership, free private initiative, competence between forms of property, economic revival, and improved economic effectiveness. We favor a relatively fast but lasting privatization.

The PS supports the drafting of an overall scientific strategy for the process of privatization, articulated and guaranteed by law, as a precondition for avoiding speculation, corruption, destruction, and social tension, and in order to boost productivity and create jobs.

We are against extending privileges to certain strata of working people during the privatization process, at the expense of others. We demand that the redress of past injustices should not cause new injustices and social tensions. We favor a mass privatization that also creates opportunities to realize commitments to certain strata such as the former proprietors and former victims of political persecution.

The PS favors the preservation of parts of the public sector in important and strategic areas of the economy and the infrastructure, such as the state forestry reserves, mineral and water resources, motor roads, large hydroelectric stations, and national ports and airports.

3.4. The Basic Objectives of the Anticrisis Program

The transformation of the economy and of structures of production and the administration of the crisis constitute for us Socialists the key to the profound structural changes of the economy and the easing of social tensions.

The PS's anticrisis program provides for the following main objectives:

—The maximum effective mobilization of all our resources and wealth;

—The continuing restructuring of the economy in order to adapt it as fast as possible to the demands of the market;

—Guaranteed activities and stable profits for Albanian and foreign capital.

3.5. Policies of Developing Economic Sectors: Agriculture, Industry, the Tertiary Sector

Considering the country's natural and climatic conditions, agriculture remains an important and competitive sector of the economy for us Socialists. The PS insists on real encouragement and support for rural farmers, with the aim of enabling them to successfully adapt to the conditions of the market economy.

We favor the priority creation of an adequate system of prices, taxes, credit, and stimuli for agricultural and dairy products, special preferential policies for undeveloped rural areas, and investments in infrastructure that will also guarantee the marketing and processing of production, as well as better living conditions in the countryside.

Socialists favor the priority development of light industry, the food industry, and tourism. For us, these sectors constitute the basis for the country's economy and the employment of the majority of the urban population, besides those that will become unemployed in the countryside. We favor traditional local products in these sectors, enabling them to become profitable and competitive.

The PS's alternative is for the revival of production in mining and the energy industries through accomplishing their effective reorganization according to the principles of the market economy.

We favor policies to stimulate the tertiary sector (retail and services) in order to encourage as fast as possible the employment of an important part of the population, especially those people who are losing their jobs as the economy is restructured. We also favor the significant improvement of essential services to the population. We support the immediate formu[illegible]n and implementation of a program to fight unem[illegible]ent and to create new jobs, as well as to retrain a[illegible] provide welfare for the unemployed.

3.6. The Better Harmonization of Monetary and Credit Policy With Financial and Budget Policy

The main objective of the PS's economic and financial policy is to keep control of inflation, to reduce the budget deficit, to encourage interest in the economic revival of the country's entire productive potential and to reduce unemployment through better harmonization of monetary and credit policy with a financial and budget policy.

3.6.1. We support the reform of the budget, by increasing its redistributive role through the strict use of national earnings and the reduction of state subsidies to the economy. At the same time, we favor public financial support for health, education, and culture.

3.6.2. In price policy, our priority objective is price liberalization, considering the changing relationship between supply and demand. We favor our national price system drawing closer to that of the international market, but without permitting the spontaneous, mechanical, and one-sided operation of the latter for purely financial and budgetary purposes. This would have economic and social repercussions, especially if unaccompanied by a moderate pay and pensions policy and a realistic exchange-rate policy. We seek for the combination of a system of free retail prices with a fiscal system and a table of procurement prices that will provide incentives, as well as a monetary and customs policy that will respond better to the country's agricultural and industrial conditions.

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3.6.3. The PS favors an effective fiscal policy that will encourage the development of the national economy and help to redistribute national earnings and the fiscal burden, while encouraging production, domestic and foreign investment, and not restraining the activities of Albanian businessmen. We favor the combination of progressive and proportional taxation, in which those with very high earnings and above-normal profits should contribute more to covering public expenditure, compared to groups of the population with relatively low earnings.

While implementing a policy of reducing the budget deficit, the PS will continue to aim at increasing revenue from taxes. However, bearing in mind the need to encourage and economically support young businessmen, this burden must be distributed better and more fairly between productive sectors and the retail and service sectors. For the present, we demand a taxation policy that favors the production and service sectors as against the retail sector, conditional also on the creation of new jobs.

The PS insists on the consolidation and strengthening of tax administration, improved financial control on the administration of revenue, and the strict enforcement of laws against tax evasion, false declarations, and nondeclaration of profits, closely tied to a bitter struggle against corruption in the state administration.

3.6.4. In monetary and banking policy, the PS aims to use the main monetary indicators in order to preserve the relative and real stability of the lek, and to introduce interest rates at a real level determined by the market. We favor an effective differential credit policy for priority economic activities, especially in order to reactivate the productive sphere.

The normal, comprehensive, and effective operation of the banking system requires the addition of new laws to the existing banking legislation, in order to respond better to the demands of the market economy. We support the creation of private banks, in order to restrict the banking monopoly of the state and to allow competition. These measures will also protect the independence of the National Bank from government intervention.

3.6.5. The PS supports a policy for incomes arising out of labor and the intellectual, technical, and professional skills of individuals and enterprises. Socialists oppose the extreme polarization of society arising from different levels of income and wealth.

The state must play an active role in the creation of a flexible and efficient labor market in order to help to harmonize supply and demand, must develop for the work force training programs directed toward professions in demand on the market, and must pursue a more moderate and rational pay policy in relation to the general level of prices and inflation, with the aim of gradually alleviating the relatively severe social situation, especially of those on fixed pay.

3.6.6. The PS considers reducing the external trade deficit and solving the problem of the foreign debt to be an important factor in curing the state's finances and successfully carrying out the economic reform. Our policy aims at reducing the foreign deficit by stimulating and expanding exports and reducing the import of agricultural products as a result of increased production at home. The PS's alternative creates opportunities to provide suggestions and real and convincing solutions to the negotiations with our partners about the foreign debt.

3.7. For an Open and Integrated Economy

The PS favors economic and financial integration in the European Union and cooperation with all the countries of the world, especially neighboring countries and those of the Balkan region. We value the economic, financial, and technical assistance that international organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development have given in the course of the economic reform of the transition period, and we consider cooperation with these institutions necessary for the country's economic development in the future too.

4. For a Free and Humane Society With Social Protection

For the PS, man is not simply a production unit. The dimensions of political, economic, and individual freedom are embodied in the party's program.

We support the path of development that aims at the elimination of poverty, more jobs, improved services, a qualitative improvement in the people's living standards, and the fulfillment of the individual's rights to housing, health and environmental protection, education and training, a cultured use of leisure, etc.

4.1. The Right to Work and Its Protection

4.1.1. The Right to Work

For us Socialists, every individual must be free, so that he may choose the work and profession he wishes within the framework of pluralist forms of ownership.

The PS's program demands that:

—economic incentives should be introduced for all employers, whether Albanian or foreign, state or private, in order to create new jobs;

—a policy permitting employment both at home and abroad should be devised;

—special problems of women, young people, and people with various handicaps should be borne in mind;

—large differences among different districts should be eliminated.

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Socialists are against every practice of economic or professional discrimination that encourages employment on the basis of political or national criteria.

The PS proposes training and retraining through a network of professional schools on either a full-time or day-release basis for the reemployment of those who are laid off as a result of new technologies or the bankruptcy of various sectors, as well as for contingents of young people reaching working age.

We Socialists demand that the lowest wage for any kind of work should not be below the subsistence level. We support the trade union movement as a protection of workers' interests.

Working hours and conditions, in accordance with the country's economic developments, must gradually be brought into line with European standards.

Socialists feel obliged to show concern for our citizens employed in other countries, so that they may enjoy the rights recognized and guaranteed by international law.

4.1.2. Humane Working Conditions

Socialist policy aims to mitigate the evident differences between conditions at work and in the home, between private and public life, and between work and leisure.

Our policy for humane working conditions centers on the principle that working conditions must be adapted to the needs of the employees, and not employees to working conditions. Work is part of a person's self-realization, and we therefore do not support technical development that transforms the worker into a simple mechanical component or a profit-making mechanism. We favor technical development that makes workers interested in their work and its results.

Our policy encourages all means that ensure a worker's health through rigorously scientific regulations, which must not only be applied, but systematically inspected. Gradually, and according to opportunity, night shifts must be reduced, especially for women. Collective transportation should help to avoid any waste of time or exhaustion of the work force in their travel to work.

4.1.3. Consumer Protection

We favor a guarantee of the freedom of the consumer, enabling the consumer himself to choose. Our legislative initiatives will aim at giving the consumer the legal right to information about and guarantees of the description of the products and services offered to him, with regard to quality, quantity, ingredients, and price.

At the present stage of the market, we give priority to the protection of the consumer from products that are potentially dangerous to health.

We favor open and honest advertising devoid of any deception of the consumer.

4.2. Housing

The PS calls for an urgent solution to the housing problem, creating a public and private housing stock. Our housing policy calls for the completion of legislation in this field and respect for our urban planning regulations. Granting bank loans at minimum interest rates would stimulate the construction of new housing and the extension of existing buildings. The PS supports the creation of building firms with joint public and private capital, with the help of foreign investors, or through private companies created with the investments of Albanian citizens. We ask for a special authority, which would sell or lease these dwellings in accordance with a definite social policy, to contract and administer the stock of housing built by these enterprises.

Socialists ask for local government authorities to concern themselves with the people's housing, and to secure lots for house- building, bearing in mind public needs for services, transportation, education, culture, green areas, and facilities for recreation, entertainment, and sports.

Housing legislation and new buildings should be subjected to strict control, in order to keep track of incipient social problems, especially on the outskirts of cities. We support full public information in order to avoid speculation with housing and building lots and also to avoid damage to public interests. Residents should have the right to have their say about the planning of buildings, the organization of services, and the exploitation of the environment. The fiscal system should prevent speculation with high house prices and rents.

4.3. Social Security

Social security forms a basic element of the PS's social policy. Through social security, we aim to ensure protection from the ravages of age, illness, accidents, invalidity, and unemployment, and to tackle the poverty that has enveloped certain social strata or groups.

For us Socialists, solidarity within the framework of social security is a mechanism that gives meaning to human life, freeing a man from the fear of want of his daily bread.

Our concept of social, public, and private institutions relies on a combination of individual willpower and ability and the economic capacity of society itself, and on personal responsibility and social solidarity.

We support a multifaceted structure of social security in order to differentiate between the security network and solidarity and aid for different age groups and professions. We call for this network to be spread throughout the country in order to give aid and advice to meet the demands of those in need, so that they will not feel abandoned.

4.4. Health Policy

For the PS, the aims of an up-to-date health service are:

—The prevention of illness through the elimination of the causes and conditions leading to them;

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—The fast diagnosis and treatment of the sick on a massive scale;

—Increased care for the health of mothers and children and a reduction in infant mortality;

—An extension of active life and of life expectancy.

The PS calls for the application of the principle that health care should be equal and applicable to all. In its health policy, the PS gives priority to the epidemiological recognition of illnesses and the fight against them, the immunization of children against most infectious diseases, the application of measures of hygiene, and the development of professional medicine and health education.

For us Socialists, the development and progressive improvement of primary health care and mobile clinics, the creation of regional hospitals, the creation of specialized units, and the development of university hospitals are urgent demands of health policy.

In order to create a better financial situation in the health service and better treatment of medical personnel, we call for the introduction of gradual, progressive, and differentiated social security payments, while encouraging and supporting private health care as well as the public health service.

The PS aims at a preferential health policy for children and the third age, free medicines for children under six, and invalids in classes one and two, and for reduced rates for invalids of classes three and four, veterans of the Antifascist National Liberation War, and all citizens over 70. The PS considers it an act of humanity to meet the expenses of these categories out of public funds. We call for increased public information about health issues, life-styles, and nutrition, about the dangers of alcohol, tobacco, medicines, drugs, and AIDS, as well as better information about mental illness and its treatment. The pharmaceutical industry and imported medicines must be subjected to strict supervision in order to ascertain their effectiveness and the dangers of pollution. We call for incentives for the domestic production of some of our medicines.

4.5. For a Society That Protects the Family, Children, and Marginalized Groups

4.5.1. Our Idea of the Family

Socialists conceive of the family as the basic institution of society and are committed to its preservation and development in accordance with the finest traditions and moral values of the Albanian family. Under the conditions of development today, the PS sees a real danger that certain traditions and achievements in family relations and the functions of the family may be eroded. The PS considers one of its main tasks to be to preserve and create genuine opportunities to further strengthen the family and its functions, especially in order to raise a health, educated, and cultured younger generation and to provide protection, care and solidarity to all family members.

We Socialists give special support to the education and employment of women and to easing their burdens of routine tasks. We consider a woman's right to divorce to be one of her victories, and aim to secure the approval of special legislation for women in accordance with international standards.

The PS supports a policy of family planning to enable parents to exercise their right to choose for themselves their number of children, to space out births, and to prevent unwanted pregnancies by providing the necessary means that guarantee the right to birth control.

The PS devotes particular attention to improving working and living conditions for women in the countryside, especially by expanding retail and communal services, supplying drinking water, and guaranteeing medical and social care for mothers and children.

We are in favor of a stable family in which understanding will prevail without physical or psychological violence, and in which vestiges and revivals of patriarchalism will be cleared away, ensuring the unhindered growth of the personality of every family member.

Socialists consider the raising of children and housework to be irreplaceable services to society. For us, both parents are equally responsible for these tasks, which they perform by agreement among themselves, raising the younger generation in habits of cooperation and solidarity.

4.5.2. Care for the Handicapped and for Children Without Parents or Born Out of Wedlock

We Socialists respect our traditional human values and demand that society should demonstrate its full humanity in its care for those categories of people with inborn or acquired handicaps and those left without family care.

We are in favor of improved conditions in the special institutions that deal with the mentally and physically handicapped and for special programs to work for their progress and their adaptation to society. In our policies, society has the same obligations for children that have lost their parents and those born out of wedlock, including humane treatment, a sound upbringing, and education and training for their total integration into normal life.

4.6. Education and Training

The PS values mass, secular, democratic and national education that aims at European standards as a necessary condition for the emancipation and continual progress of Albanian society.

The PS's educational policy aims at the mental and physical empowerment of every individual in order that

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he may participate, according to his skills and wishes, in economic, political, and social life.

The PS is for the reform and modernization of the education system at all levels, in curriculum and structure, and for the completion of the relevant legislation.

We Socialists demand that the school curriculum should inculcate a national spirit and should properly and comprehensively equip pupils to cope with modern society and the market economy, and that our school diplomas and certificates should be equivalent to those in foreign schools and recognized on the international labor market and by the institutions of other countries.

We call for the public and private preschool system to respect state programs and to be subsidized partly by the state and partly by local government, as well as by private contributions.

According to the PS's alternative, state schools financed by the state are the basis for the education of Albanian citizens. We demand that a level of compulsory education be guaranteed for everybody.

Albanians school are secular. Religious education will be conducted separately.

We favor a legal definition of the status of a teacher, which will include matters of qualification, housing, transportation, employment criteria, and the award of supervisory responsibilities on the basis of professional criteria.

We support an expansion of the autonomy of colleges, an improvement of the structure of subjects and specialities, and a reform of the administration. In other schools, we support reductions in the number of pupils in a class, the inclusion of practical and vocational demands in school subjects, an appreciation of the social sciences, artistic talents, and physical education, and improved methods of teaching and assessment in order to achieve the widest possible participation of students in matters that are decisive for their future.

We call for education to be supplemented by an adult education system, in order to help adults to secure employment and to assist those who lacked the opportunity to complete their education at the appropriate age. For this purpose, we call for the creation of definite educational and cultural centers, and support from the mass media for public libraries and for governmental and nongovernmental initiatives.

4.7. Culture and Science

For us Socialists, culture and science make up a source of vital values and ideas for the democratic transformation and progress of society. Socialists conceive them not only a creative work in art, literature, and science, but also as culture is all its manifestations in life and work, which leads to rising standards of civil life in the community, morality, and interpersonal communication. Socialists are aware that culture and science today are confronting many difficulties because of the transition to a market economy and large-scale privatization.

The PS favors a reform that will ensure the continual progress of modern culture and science, enriching people's spiritual lives and also their creativity and research. For the PS's alternative, the main principles and guidelines of this reform are:

—the freedom of creativity and research, publication, and communication as a vital precondition for science and culture to flourish in a democratic society. Ensuring equal opportunities and stimulating forms of competition will mean pluralism in creative work and a plurality of scientific viewpoints, a diversity of forms of expression, and higher standards of achievement;

—A legal framework ensuring the independence of artists, scientists, and institutions from administrative bureaucracy and party intervention, and from their politicization or subjugation to a dominant ideology. We favor regulations to ensure that cultural institutions will select their own scientific directors with limited terms of office, in order to prevent these directors from assuming autocratic administrative powers;

—With unhindered contacts and exchanges with the culture and science of other countries, we ask our state and society to preserve and support the national identity of our culture, literature, arts, and sciences, and to encourage their worthy representation throughout the world.

For this purpose, the PS seeks the cultural and academic integration of all Albanians, so that culture and science will be inspired by national aspirations and the ideas of freedom and humanism, serving spiritual progress and emancipation, and opposing the distortion of these values by consumerism and commercialism. We also favor cultural and academic integration with Europe and with civilized peoples, presenting the values of Albanian culture and science as a constituent element of European values and of world civilization.

—We Socialists demand that culture and science should be subsidized by the state, especially such central institutions of pannational importance as the Academy of Sciences, the National Theater, the Opera and Ballet Theater, etc. We aim for the film studio, the museums for this to be supplemented by cooperation between central institutions and private and state institutions and by agreements with international organizations and associations [sentence as published].

—We ask for priority to be given to protecting the artistic and cultural heritage and our historical and national treasures from theft, damage, and illegal export.

—For us Socialists, increased prosperity also means spiritual and cultural enrichment. We devote special

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attention to instilling in the younger generation cultural values and the desire to work and to engage in creativity and research, thus finding self-realization and joy in life.

—We ask for the state to recognize the demands of individual freedom with society's demands for urban planning and an attractive appearance of residential areas, to protect the environment and Albania's natural beauties, and to make it one of the tasks of local government create a cultured environment, and support for cultural activities based on local traditions and the demands of tourism.

—In the PS's cultural and scientific policy, the role of the intelligentsia in the life of society, their participation in social, economic, and political life, and the appreciation and remuneration of their work [passage indistinct] of the exodus of the most cultured intelligentsia constitute the main priority.

—We propose a cultural and scientific program in order to improve the image of Albania and the Albanians throughout the world.

4.8. The Arts

We Socialists favor the free development of all the arts and artistic activities regardless of their form or direction. We call for particular support for young talents and cultural minorities, for folklore, and for meeting people's spiritual needs for the cultivated arts.

We favor support for creative activities not only in special professional fields but as a means of expression for every person, at home, at work, and in the area where he lives.

4.9. Sports

The PS appreciates the social value of sports as an aspect of development, health, recreation, and even trade and industry.

We support a combination of mass and professional sports. The PS cares for the physical education of children, teenagers, and young people through schools and out-of-school activities at all levels. We favor the encouragement and subsidy of the amateur sports movement and the Olympic Committee, according to familiar international practice. We support local and national sporting events. We favor improving the standards of sports, creating public and private sports fields and facilities, and building up the economic resources and assets of sports clubs and federations, while maintaining their independence as non-state organizations and associations.

4.10. Preventing Certain Social Blights of Modern Civilization

We Socialists are aware of the complex nature of man, the long- term influence of historical factors, and inevitable shortcomings in the evolution of society that have led to the appearance of social blights even in countries with a high level of contemporary civilization.

We are convinced that educating people with the ideas of democratic socialism, building them toward a better life in a society of human solidarity and with lower social tensions, and eliminating suffering caused by a lack of basic needs and by fear, insecurity, and oppression are the most useful methods of preventing such social plagues, as opposed to mere punishment. We set the idea of individual happiness in a humane society against tendencies toward crime and vice.

4.10.1. Crime

Socialists believe that protecting society from crime is one of the main ways of securing the exercise of basic human rights and freedoms. We are in favor of an effective struggle against crime in order to safeguard citizens and their property at home, in the street, and at work.

Under today's circumstances, we call for preventive work and a professional struggle, especially in the following fields:

—against all forms of economic crime;

—against organized crime;

—against the revival of the barbaric rough justice of the blood feud.

We are for preventive measures and a struggle against corruption and other factors that lead to crime such as smuggling, alcoholism, drugs, and prostitution.

We favor an extensive system of rehabilitation for this convicted of crimes, so that they may return to society and not embark on the road of crime again. Such a system involves the humane treatment of convicts, the improvement of prisoners' conditions, and the creation of opportunities for useful work and reeducation, including assistance immediately after release from prison.

4.10.2. Drugs

We socialists consider drug addiction to be a dangerous illness that especially affects young people. The first part of our anti-drug policy consists of preventing drug addiction at its very beginning. We call for the preparation and enforcement of legislation identical to that of other countries that will prevent the cultivation, traffic, and sale of drugs. As a first step, we propose the creation of a police drug squad equipped with everything it needs, which would operate in combination with its counterparts in other countries in preventing and striking at all signs of drugs.

We call for medical institutions to improve their professional skills in helping to rehabilitate drug addicts back to normal life.

4.10.3. AIDS

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Both the world public and the public in Albania have been shocked by the appearance of AIDS. As long as medicine still has not succeeded in curing it, prevention remains the only course open.

We therefore seek to make people as fully aware as possible about the danger of AIDS and the paths of infection, while improving the control work of medical institutions, and developing their professional skills in the struggle against AIDS.

4.10.4. Against Prostitution

Our policy is against prostitution and pimping as a means of profit at the expense of human moral values. We favor drafting a special law to determine legal principles in this field.

4.11. Protection of the Environment and Urban Development

The PS will strive to increase interest and active involvement in the appreciation and rational use of the environment and its ecological balance. It will strive for its policies not only to be better reflected in the country's legislation, but implanted in people as a necessary and important part of their cultural upbringing. The PS will support and encourage work to prevent pollution and the destruction of the environment and well as to regenerate as fast as possible damaged areas, basing these projects on pilot studies.

The country's tourist potential both on the coast and in the mountains would be seriously reduced if environmental protection is not quickly brought under modern and rigorously enforced legislation. We aim for legislation of this kind to cover all prospective policies in land use, town planning, traffic, and energy resources, with coordination on Balkan and European levels.

5. National and International Policies

The PS's foreign policy is focused on the protection of national interests, of the country's independence, freedom, and sovereignty, and of peace and the freedom of all peoples. We wish for friendly relations with all states of the world, large or small, that offer us their friendship. In international relations, the PS is free of ideological, nationalist, racist, and geostrategic prejudices.

We stand by the view that relations between states should be regulated according to principles agreed by all the peoples of the world and based on mutual respect, noninterference in internal affairs, and fruitful cooperation to mutual benefit.

In a world with increasingly complex interdependency and tending toward integration, the PS aims for Albania, in its foreign relations, to have the role of an equal and dignified partner, preserving her independence of judgment and action, without becoming committed to agreements that lead to a loss of national sovereignty and of the right of the people to determine for themselves their present and future.

As a party with a socialist orientation, we favor solidarity with and support for all peoples struggling against oppression and social injustice, and for national liberation, economic progress, and the elimination of poverty.

5.1. The Basic National Issue

5.1.1. The Albanian Cause

The national interests of Albanians wherever they live constitute a main priority for the PS.

We unreservedly support the legitimate and indisputable demands of the Albanians in Kosova and of the Albanians living on their own territories in the former Yugoslavia and in the FYROM [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia]. The Albanians in Kosova are not a minority and did not settle on the lands of others, but are on their own territories. We support steps that lead toward an independent and autonomous Kosova, so that its people may enjoy all political, administrative, economic, and cultural rights, the right to self- determination, and the right to form their own state. The Albanians in the FYROM constitute a state-forming element. We consider the guarantee of such a right for the Albanians in the FYROM to be a factor of stability, understanding, and progress.

We consider the Cam issue to be an inseparable part of our national cause.

We demand the enforcement of international norms for the Albanians living as minorities in different parts of the Balkans, just as for the minorities living within the borders of Albania.

We support the activities of the diaspora throughout the world, so that they may cultivate their language, culture, traditions, and national customs.

5.1.2. National Unification and Conciliation

For the PS, the national cause cannot make progress without a free, democratic, economically developed, rich, and strong Albania. In order that all forces may unite for such an Albania, and in order to put pannational interests above everything, there is no other road for us Socialists but national conciliation. We want to cultivate a new kind of conscience, according to which the Albanians will no longer look at one another as opponents and fight among themselves. We call for all conflicts, whether old or new, to be settled with patience and tolerance, on the road of understanding and consensus, on the basis of democratic principles, and within the rule of law.

We support the magnificent initiative of a range of political forces for national conciliation and unification. We aim to create conditions to enable this initiative to grow in political and social life, becoming part of civil education and a source of inspiration for intellectual, cultural, and artistic activities.

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The PS makes its contribution bringing all political forces at a pan-Albanian level to an understanding on two key issues: first, a single national platform; and second, a long-term plan of action to fulfill our national cause.

5.2. Attitude Toward Minorities

For the PS, which aims at solidarity among peoples and integration on the basis of a communion of interests, minorities serve as a connecting bridge of fruitful cooperation and peace. We Socialists seek to make this concept prevalent in the Balkan region too. We see the traditions and characteristics of minorities as part of the country's cultural diversity and not as alien and unacceptable.

The PS pledges to implement and respect the rights of minorities in accordance with the demands of the UN Charter on Human Rights and all other internationally recognized documents. It will create the necessary conditions for preserving and developing the ethnic identity, language, and culture of minorities.

We are against any policy of ethnic cleansing and the deprivation of national identity, and are also against the use of minorities as pretexts for interventions in internal affairs or armed conflicts.

5.3. The Country's Security and Defense

Socialists consider the establishment of a permanent peace and of international understanding the sole solution in the interests of mankind. We are aware of the complications of international situations and the real dangers and threats posed to countries and peoples in today's world.

The main aim of Socialists in this field is the defense and security of the country and of national interests, society, and the principles of our lives, averting the danger of Albania becoming involved in armed conflicts.

Our aim is for the Republic of Albania to have an effective defense system.

We turn to all Albanians, asking them to shoulder their obligations for the country's defense and to be ready to make any sacrifice in the interest of the homeland's security. We see duties for the defense of the homeland in close connection with the interests of a democratic life in society.

For us Socialists, the armed forces are depoliticized and have no right to intervene in the definition or solution of problems of the country's political life.

The PS supports measures for the modernization of the armed forces and the improvement of their combat-readiness to match modern conditions and needs, and in the service solely of pannational interests. While demanding the order and discipline required by a modern army, we are for the enforcement of the status of servicemen and for democratic control, in order not to permit antidemocratic activities within the Army as an enclosed group. Defense relies upon the regular Army, civil defense, and economic measures to confront an external danger. We demand that the number and structure of the armed forces should be in proportion to the country's economic resources and the level of security achieved under military agreements with other countries and at international level.

We favor military cooperation with other countries and political and military integration with international organizations that do not have an aggressive character and do not encroach on Albania's independence and her right to a full role in joint decision-making.

We support every initiative that aims at disarmament and arms control, the reduction to zero of weapons of mass extermination, and the strengthening of measures to secure peace throughout Europe.

5.4. Albania's Integration into Europe

We Albanian Socialists consider Albania's active participation in the CSCE and her admission with full rights into all European organizations as a primary orientation of our policy. We approve of signing agreements for cooperation with Europe and are in favor of a united Europe. We are striving to create conditions for Albania's admission to the Council of Europe and her inclusion in the European Union.

Economic cooperation with an eye toward the country's integration into the multiform economic processes of Europe that are now taking shape represents a long-term strategy for the PS. The legislative framework that regulates foreign economic relations and brings us closer to Europe, property laws, and guarantees for foreign investments are priority tasks for the PS.

We are open to the European tradition and the cultural currents of our continent and the entire world, and to mastering and implementing the achievements of technical and scientific progress. We aim to create conditions for our people of culture, education, the arts, and science, to join these currents, developing extensive exchanges. The cultural transmission and consolidation of traditional and new common European values imply for us the preservation of our national identity and our cultural and spiritual distinctiveness.

5.5. International Peace Policy

For us Socialists, the ideals of democratic socialism mean a policy of peace and collective security opposition to war as a means of solving conflicts between countries, the protection of peace and the rights of the peoples, international cooperation and good neighborliness, and support for the work of international organizations.

5.5.1. Regional Policy

The PS appreciates the new geopolitical realities as facts that bring to the fore regional factors that call for a foreign policy marked by a dynamic equilibrium. For us,

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these factors are closely tied to non-regional factors of European, Atlantic, and world security.

For us Socialists, relations with neighboring countries constitute a constant priority for our country. We are for a new vision that will overcome the notion of the Balkans as a "powder keg" and of Balkanization as a concept in international politics. For the PS, the first step is not to allow the artificial creation of new problems, and to refuse to allow the revival of old ethnic, religious, and national conflicts, or the imposition of the frameworks of ideologies or empires that history has rendered obsolete.

The chauvinist-inspired war with its unprecedented violence in the former Yugoslavia makes it imperative to undertake every measure to avoid the creation of new flashpoints in the Balkans and the danger of the war spreading to other parts of the region.

We aim for the peoples of the Balkans to find common ways of preventing the traffic of weapons and drugs through their territories, and of preventing mafia-style organized crime, the dumping of dangerous waste, and all other activities that put at permanent risk health, prosperity, and the natural environment in the Balkans.

The PS calls for the peoples of the Balkans to live in peace, to work for progress and democracy, and not to allow antagonisms to arise because of national, religious, and cultural differences. We are for the reactivization of bilateral and multilateral Balkan cooperation in political, economic, and cultural fields, and of cooperation in technology, science, transportation, and communication. We aim for Albania to take realistic and concrete steps and to take the initiative in all these matters.

The PS expresses the conviction that interdependency and peaceful togetherness in the Balkans constitute a contemporary framework for the guarantee of independence and national identity, and therefore supports dialogue, mutual understanding, and cooperation among the peoples of the region. We are against miniature or one-sided alliances that lead to oppositions between states or the division of states into opposing groups on the basis of religion or any other such discriminatory concept.

5.5.2. Peace Policy

The PS is resolutely in favor of the defense of peace and the peaceful solution of political conflicts everywhere in the world. We support the activities of the United Nations, its agencies, and other international organizations, as well as every initiative that aims at the economic, cultural, educational, technical and scientific development of backward countries, the affirmation of the national identity of peoples, and the mitigation of contrasts between rich and poor countries.

For us socialists, the first step of every international initiative is to eliminate the causes that lead to tensions and armed conflicts. The road toward peace calls for a fairer international economic order.

We support development aid, programs for developing countries according to the democratic accords of international organizations, and regional development plans, from which Albania too benefits in order to achieve faster progress.

The peace policy makes it vital to inform the public as broadly as possible about international policies and to overcome the secrecy of traditional diplomacy.

We cannot consider the thrust toward Europe as the sole direction of Albania's foreign policy. We see Albania as open to the entire world, with stable and friendly relations not only with Balkan and European countries, but also with the United States as a democratic country with great economic, technological, and scientific potential, and also with China, the Russian Federation, Canada, Japan, the Arab countries, etc.

We appreciate and value cooperation with NATO, starting with Partnership for Peace as a step toward expanding the notion of collective security and creating an atmosphere of trust at a European and transatlantic level.

5.5.3. Cooperation With Left-Wing Forces

The PS is for the establishment of contacts and cooperation with progressive left-wing parties that are part of the Socialist international.

We are for realizing an initiative that will bring "round a table" left-wing and progressive forces of the Balkans, in order to draw up solutions in the interest of peace, democracy, and all-round progress in the region.

6. The Road of the Socialists

The PS's activities for realizing its goals stem from its policies and its organization, which correspond to a democratic conception of relations between a party, society, and the state.

6.1. A Party on the Basis of Democratic Principles

The PS takes a lively part in shaping the political will of the masses in all fields of life, exerting an influence through its program, political culture, an educational activities in order to shape progressive public opinion and to encourage people's participation in political life, assuming responsibility for the interests of the nation and of Albania.

We use for our purposes only serious democratic methods, and these are the basis of life within the party. The principles and structure of our organization are defined in the PS Statute.

Our political activity is conscientiously conducted through public discussion and free dialogue that ensure the free expression of opinions and alternatives, the

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explanation of measures taken, and the making of well-argued and practically applicable decisions. We establish honest cooperation among our ranks. Every member of our ranks has full rights, freedoms, and avenues open to him. He has the right to take part in decision-making and the election of forums. Every member has the right to free discussion and the receipt of full information.

Party offices do not have a bureaucratic character, do not bring privileges with them, and may not be misused for personal profit.

Decisions made according to the majority opinion are binding on all members, without denying anyone the right to express different standpoints and to explore avenues in accordance with the basic program. The party respects different personal opinions, religious beliefs, and cultural and creative talents, without subjecting them to party judgment or decisions.

The PS is organized and acts in accordance with the country's democratic legislation and constitution.

6.2. A Party Based on the People

The PS represents, defends, and promotes the political, economic, and social interests of broad strata from the ranks of urban and rural working people, small and medium proprietors, the intelligentsia, students, women, and young people, as well as the common state and national interests of all Albanians. Its members and supporters, regardless of their social and economic position, are united by the same beliefs in socialist ideals and national progress.

We aim to involve as many people as possible in democratic transformations and not to allow democracy to be considered the monopoly of a single group or party. Socialists feel responsibility for the fate of society and the country even while in opposition. Party members and officers must be in continual contact with people, be present when problems arise, and contribute to their solution. The success of democratic transformation through socialism requires the spread of a new form of awareness, in order to involve as many people as possible in the processes of social development.

The PS vehemently opposes and attempt to turn any party into a one-party state and to use the state apparatus as a tool for its wishes. The PS's elected or appointed representatives respond to the interests of the people and of voters who have expressed trust in the party's program and declared policies.

6.3. An Open Party of Left-Wing Orientation

We are a reformist party with a popular character that is working for a historical about-turn in Albania, and for a renewal of politics in accordance with the demands of people's real lives, while searching for an alternative way of governing the country and developing society in accordance with the guidelines of democratic socialism.

6.3.1. An Open Party

On the road of reforms and comprehensive change, we aim to achieve the unification of the forces of all patriotic and progressive Albanians. We are an open party, displaying our principles to everybody, and ready to explain and defend them in free discussion.

Our policies are open because they are motivated by the needs of an advancing democratic society and by changes in living conditions and people's awareness. They are nourished by broad, popular, pannational goals and interests, and by viewpoints shaped by the fee flow of socioeconomic information. An open policy, showing solidarity in thought and deed with a pluralist society, always setting itself new tasks and not confining itself to ideological dogma or a predetermined model, can succeed in becoming convincing, trustworthy, and inspiring without being imposed.

We are against a party of cliques, against oligarchical organization, and against elites, or the division of the party into separate currents. Every member sees that his rights, freedoms, and participation in decision-making are guaranteed.

6.3.2. The Eurosocialists

The Albanian Eurosocialist Youth Forum (FRESSH) [Forumi i Rinise Eurosocialiste Shquiptare], founded on the ideals of social democracy and national progress, represents the interests of the broad strata of urban and rural youth, the young intelligentsia, and high-school and college students for freedom, justice, democracy, and solidarity.

The FRESSH is included within the organizational structures of the PS. In this context, it has its own organizational structures defined by its statute.

While coordinating its activities with the PS program, it preserves its own physiognomy as defined in the FRESSH program.

6.3.3 Attitude Toward Other Parties

Under the conditions of political pluralism, the PS is for civilized and democratic coexistence with all parties and political forces that are guided in their activities by national interests and democracy. We aim for this to become a general rule for social classes, strata, groups, and individuals. We respect the political ethics of participation in the running of society and the state, on the basis of democratic practice and the demands of social life today. This constitutes the basis for the consensus among political forces during the political debate and race for power.

We see relations with other parties within a broad scope of consensus or joint action over particular issues, to the point of cooperation, coalitions, and alliances.

The PS is for dialogue and cooperation with all political forces on the basis of equality among the parties, regardless of the size of their membership and electorate, as

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well as mutual respect and trust, not transforming differences into obstacles, but making them incentives to reach a common understanding, on the basis of noninterference in each other's internal affairs.

We support the fair standpoints of other parties, welcome their stands in support of our alternatives, and are open to criticism or to other, more realistic alternatives.

The Socialists seek scope for cooperation with other democratic forces and particularly look for close relations with other parties of a left-wing orientation, with whom we aim to form broad and stable alliances.

For the sake of lofty national interests, we consider "roundtables" of the parties to be a necessary method of work in order to achieve consensus and respect for the spirit of understanding, tolerance, and cooperation. We wage a constructive political struggle. The Socialists see the clash of political forces as the competition of alternatives.

6.3.4. Relations With Other Organizations

The PS respects every organization, association, federation, or confederation that is officially recognized as a necessary element of democratic pluralist life. It is open and ready for cooperation with them both centrally and locally. We give priority support to organizations defending the interests of unprivileged social strata and minorities, associations encouraging national culture, scientific, artistic, creative, and sports activities, and environmental protection.

Socialists value the trade unions as natural allies in their day- to-day work for a democratic society, in which each person will live freely and honestly on the basis of his own work and property, and see them as active and irreplaceable participants in the enactment of reforms and social measures. We support the demands of trade unions that aim at an active role in economic decision-making and in other demands relating to collective contracts, questions of pay, working conditions, and social security.

The PS supports freedom of association in different trade unions and their right to strike.

Trade unions and other organizations have a role in overcoming inequality and social conflicts for economic and cultural reasons and arising out of opportunities for development.

6.4. Democratic Socialism—A Constant Goal

The democratic transformation of society is a permanent process in which Socialists participate with the aim of creating a new form of awareness about the role of politics in a changing society. This process will be successful if it includes as many peoples as possible and it is viewed with a critical eye in order to draw conclusions that can then be acted upon. People have the opportunity to take their destinies into their own hands and we offer them the program of democratic socialism, which places the human being and his freedom and dignity at the center of all its aims.

Society and the Albanian nation face historic tasks. The Socialists take responsibility for the ways in which these tasks will be performed, pursuing the dynamics of the social and historical context.

6.5. A Party With Vision for the Future, Which Preserves Historical Values The PS was born as a new political force in the period of the overthrow of the failed Eastern-European-style communist system. The political overthrown of this system is now complete and is an irreversible process. We think that the phase of transition demands a certain amount of time in order to transform all other aspects of life. In this phase, measures to overcome the crisis must be intertwined with the reform strategy and the laying of the foundations of a better and more secure future.

Socialists are for a realistic, objective, and critical appraisal of the recent past. The PS denounces the concepts and practices of totalitarian socialism. In its activities, the PS will always be guided by the concepts and practices of Western democratic socialism.

We resolutely condemn the communist regime and its social and economic policies that could not ensure the fast development of the country and greater prosperity for individuals. We reject the practice of the one-party state and the dictatorship of Enver Hoxha, which led to everything becoming ideological, to outrages to democracy and human rights and freedoms, and to persecutions in the name of the "class war."

We declare that our people, under all the grievous circumstances of foreign occupation and internal social oppression, have always found the strength to struggle and to work to promote the economy of the country, as well as to build, to maintain the purity of their national awareness, and to create cultural values.

Viewing with a critical eye what has come to us from the past, we respect and absorb into our values everything that is part of our national identify and serves efforts toward a fee, democratic, and progressive society.

We praise highly the National Liberation War as a historical epoch.

We consider everything created by the people's sweat and by Albanian labor, talents, and intellect to be a legacy of value.

Our vision of the future is of an Albanian society of democratic socialism, which must be naturally integrated into Europe, while bringing its own values to the European society to which it historically belongs.

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Videnov Completes Mandate To Form Cabinet

AU2301165495 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Zhan Videnov, the prime minister candidate of the Democratic Left parliamentary group, met with President Zhelyu Zhelev to inform him of the successful conclusion of his investigative mandate to form a cabinet.

The meeting lasted about 15 minutes, after which Videnov told journalists that he expects President Zhelev to inform parliament of the successfully completed mandate by tomorrow at the latest. Work is in progress at the moment on the final drafting of the program statement by the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] and its coalition.

Videnov stated that in its policies, the new government will not totally reject everything achieved by the caretaker government. At the very least, it approves of two things: the formation of foreign trade representations abroad and the previous cabinet's work on solving the water supply problem.

Alliance Official on Composition of Government

AU2401092495 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 20 Jan 95 p 7

[Interview with Ginyo Ganev, Fatherland Union chairman and Patriotic Alliance cochairman, by Vesela Doncheva; place and date not given: "Patriotic Alliance Continues Cooperation With BSP"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Doncheva] The government composition makes it clear that the cabinet is to include no Patriotic Alliance representatives. Can you comment on this?

[Ganev] It is true that the spirit of the agreement between the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] and the Patriotic Alliance, signed long before the elections, includes an intention regarding the participation of Patriotic Alliance figures in the future cabinet. What was meant was not so much the rights and obligations that spring from a signed agreement, but the necessity and importance of specifically implementing the idea of national consensus. This idea is the essence and permanent position of the Patriotic Alliance, rather than a provisional idea due to the elections. This applies to an even greater degree to the Fatherland Union and the Union for the Fatherland, of which I am the chairman. [sentence as published] Indeed, national consensus is not a concept that was simply declared, but an idea championed consistently by the BSP for years. We think that now that the BSP and its direct partners have an absolute majority in the National Assembly, the objective prerequisites for forming a broader coalition government as an expression of the idea of national consensus have emerged, within the scope possible under existing conditions. Naturally, the sovereign decision belongs to the majority, and in this context we respect the government composition it has adopted: a cabinet formed by the BSP election coalition alone.

[Doncheva] Will the Patriotic Alliance continue talks with the BSP on participating in the administration, although at a nonpolitical level?

[Ganev] The BSP position we received through official channels includes a proposal on continuing uninterrupted cooperation with a view to the possible participation of Patriotic Alliance figures at various levels of the administration, without the so-called ministerial posts. We have already expressed our readiness to conduct such talks.

[Doncheva] Reports have appeared in the press according to which the Patriotic Alliance has presented excessive demands for ministerial posts....

[Ganev] I also read those reports and heard suggestions that such demands prevented the participation of the Patriotic Alliance in the cabinet. The truth must be strictly spelled out: Two official meetings took place between the leaderships of the BSP and the Patriotic Alliance, and the issue of ministerial posts, their number, and the names of ministerial candidates were not even discussed. I even said jokingly that we discussed no seats, stools, or sofas, but the political composition of the cabinet, which is a much more serious matter than its furniture.

Tomov Views Relations With BSP, Videnov

AU2401092695 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 19 Jan 95 p 11

[Interview with DAR Chairman Aleksandur Tomov by Todor Tokin; place and date not given: "Usurping of the Entire Center-Left Space by a Single Party Is Absurd]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Tokin] Would you shed more light on the meetings between the leaderships of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] and the Democratic Alternative for the Republic [DAR], now that the Democratic Left parliamentary faction has decided to form a cabinet alone, without partners?

[Tomov] There were two meetings between the two leaderships. At the first, Yanaki Stoilov, in the presence of Zhan Videnov, offered us a certain kind of coalition government. Naturally we could not respond, because we did not know what kind of coalition he meant, on what program it would be based, or who would participate in it. Naturally we demanded to know all this.

At the second meeting, we were told that the answers were not ready. There was no third meeting, because we received a letter that clearly stressed that the participation of other political forces in the government was unsuitable in principle, except at the level of deputy ministers and departmental heads.

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This is a nonpolitical issue and we will not even discuss it. I must say that the DAR has never tried to impose its participation or demand ministerial posts. The initiative for the talks came from the BSP. This was absolutely logical.

[Tokin] Many BSP members do not view the DAR in a positive manner, because some of its leaders come from the ranks of the BSP....

[Tomov] This is a narrow-minded way of thinking. I see this as no more than the personal complexes and emotions of certain people. Such things should have no significance in politics. When personal relations in politics become dominant, the outcome is always negative. People in the BSP who for several years preferred to remain in the background are now issuing forth from their holes and loudly presenting claims and insisting they are the most loyal Socialists, and therefore deserve posts. I think I contributed enough to the BSP in its gravest period. I did this because of my principled and democratic positions. If the BSP continues to view those who think differently as a sect, it will find itself isolated and will lose public support.

[Tokin] By calling itself the Democratic Left parliamentary faction, is the BSP usurping the entire left?

[Tomov] That there is an attempt to do this is apparent. Their entire policy before and on the eve of the elections was related to this attempt. In 1990-91 the BSP came under massive attacks. These paralyzed the party and did not allow democratic processes to develop within the party, as was the case in Poland and especially Hungary. Subsequently, the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] came to power, governed in an almost ridiculous manner, and the right disintegrated. Throughout that period the BSP remained in the background, isolated in its own space. [passage omitted]

[Tokin] Is there a Videnov-Tomov conflict, as people claim?

[Tomov] There has never been a serious conflict on such a basis. I think that it is even natural (for a brief period) for a young leader to behave rather coldly toward people who have been in the BSP leadership before him and to suspect that they have excessive ambitions. However, I think it should be admitted that Zhan has developed into a party leader. He has yet to demonstrate his qualities as a statesman. The disadvantage in his case is that for the first time in his life he will be entering the cruel machine of executive power. However, he is young and thus able to adapt.

Georgia's Shevardnadze Discusses Treaty, Ties

AU2401094295 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 19 Jan 95 p 19

[Interview with Eduard Shevardnadze, Georgian head of state and chairman of parliament, by Dimitrina Gergova; place and date not given: "The Time Is Ripe for Firm Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Gergova] Esteemed Eduard Amvrosyevich, Georgia and Bulgaria are situated at the same geographic latitude and are connected by the Black Sea. Apparently, this is not the only thing that unites our two countries. What is the goal of your visit?

[Shevardnadze] Thank you for the warm words. As far as the latitude is concerned, this is a nice coincidence and I have nothing against using it as a symbol. I come to Bulgaria's capital, which has the wonderful name Sofia, to express, on behalf of my people, our sincere respect for the Bulgarian people and government and for your president, Zhelyu Zhelev.

We shall sign a friendship and cooperation treaty, on the basis of which we will develop our future state relations.

[Gergova] Bulgaria and Georgia have traveled a complex and difficult road in the last few years. Do you not have sometimes the feeling that we, the two countries, have lost our way and now find ourselves on a dead end street? Theoretically we have achieved our freedom, but now we find ourselves in a state of economic dependence....

[Shevardnadze] I definitely do not have the feeling that we have lost our way. However, how we are progressing along our path is a different matter.

During the years of USSR disintegration, Georgia obviously overestimated its possibilities. I mean the radical part of our national movement. At the beginning we had something that resembled the caricature of a government. The more the former rulers succeeded in ruining the country the better opinion of themselves they developed. However, destroying the monuments of leaders from the time of the dictatorship of the proletariat is one thing, while relinquishing established economic relations; neglecting your industry; robbing banks, enterprises, and railroads; and selling non-ferrous metals abroad is something completely different—especially when you rejoice at those "achievements." It was at that period that Georgian society became unrecognizable. The intelligent people had to suffer a horrible period of impudence and unrestrained attacks. They were ashamed of Georgia's isolation. The general politicization, struggle for power, and disrespect for the autonomy rights caused a split in our society. It appears that everyone forgot their work and hobbies, even soccer. Politics became the most prestigious, and, alas, accessible occupation. I arrived in Tbilisi in March 1992 and found a society still fighting. Afterwards, we had the war in Abkhazia and the civil war. This was the "inheritance" I received.

Nevertheless, we are not at an impasse. The people grasped the realities and understood who is who. We shall win the struggle for democracy with every available means. We have tasted the fruit of knowledge, if I may say so, and embarked along the difficult road. This road is lined with great difficulties, sometimes even with sacrifices, but we have no another alternative. The most complicated thing along our path toward the unification

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of our society and nation was to find the common policy and attitude that corresponds to the hopes and requirements of our population and of every single citizen. As far as material dependence is involved, this was inevitable.

[Gergova] How does Georgia plan to get out of this situation? It has been said that your inflation is very high.

[Shevardnadze] You mean our crisis—more precisely, our political, economic, and energy crisis. We will overcome the political crisis by resolving the Abkhazia and Ossetia problem. I think 1995 will be decisive in this respect.

Our economic reform has begun to accelerate. In this respect, as all other CIS countries, as well as Bulgaria, we follow the advice of authoritative international organizations. So far we have succeeded in stopping hyperinflation. The national currency—the coupon—has become firmer. This is a positive tendency that has lasted already six months. Generally however, our people have great difficulties. The situation with the gas and electricity is very bad.... The people are showing social heroism.... I am not exaggerating. I repeat: Nothing else could be expected in Georgia after what happened in the past. All former Soviet republics have suffered to a different degree.

[Gergova] In the 1970's the then-prospering Georgia conducted economic experiments that did not coincide with Communist values and dogmas. People used to talk of your legendary firm hand, skillful in establishing discipline. Do the Georgians now expect the same firmness from you? Is there a nostalgia for real order?

[Shevardnadze] There are contradictions in your question. Then, under Soviet rule, there was not, nor could there be, real order. As far as a real rather than imaginary democracy is concerned, the West has repeatedly demonstrated its ability and readiness to defend it. However, the people in the West have a better social background and orientation than our society.

I am prepared to use a firm government for a just cause that has a real, rather than imaginary, importance for mankind. The time is ripe for such a necessity. This year in the fall we will have parliamentary and presidential elections. Whoever wins will have to use a strong presidential government. Any other choice would lead to destabilization and serious new problems.

[Gergova] Is it not insulting that the mafia prevents you from functioning and compromises the state?

[Shevardnadze] It is not only insulting; it is a direct provocation against our state and society. However, we are not sitting idle. In 1994 the state organs unmasked several major clans. Dozens, even hundreds of criminals have been arrested and thousands of firearms, including even armored cars, have been seized. The drug and oil mafia suffered serious blows. On 13 January 1995 our security service arrested Tengiz Kitovani, who was considered the symbol of impunity. This is the chief mafia leader in Georgia, a former defense minister. His action, ostensibly aimed at returning Abkhazia, actually had a completely different goal: to legalize Kitovani's status as the leader of a major mafia group. Every mafia figure that is unmasked can anticipate the same fate. This is only the beginning of a very difficult process.

[Gergova] Eduard Amvrosyevich, in recent years the Caucasus experienced several wars. Even now, a fire rages in Chechnya, near the Georgian border. How do you assess the actions of the Russian authorities?

[Shevardnadze] An accelerated process of territorial disintegration began after the disintegration of the USSR. Simultaneously, the world encountered such phenomena as aggressive separatism. In besieged Sukhumi in 1993, I warned that supporting the Abkhazia separatists would become a boomerang against Russia itself. Even earlier, in 1992, I warned about the danger at a session of the Georgian parliament. Unfortunately, my words went unheard. At that time thousands of Chechnya fighters participated in the ethnic purge and genocide of the Georgian population in Abkhazia. The conclusion is that an undetermined, vague, and inconsistent policy is a very costly matter. This, precisely, happened in Chechnya. The thousands of victims, those who have been killed and chased away from their native places, suffer the consequences of delayed measures and underestimating the aggressive separatism from the moment of its emergence.

The world needs a united Russia, rather than a disunited country eroded by regional conflicts. The actions and assessments of certain Russian politicians who do not understand this, are puzzling. Today one can see separatism in Chechnya and Abkhazia. Tomorrow its metastases could penetrate other territories, countries, and even continents. Therefore, the policy of double standards is unacceptable. A united, coordinated approach toward this phenomenon, especially within the CIS, is necessary. A common illness must be healed through combined efforts. When the therapy does not help, the surgeons must begin to act. Unfortunately, not all surgery is successful. However, in all cases the attitude must be a uniform one, because separatists throughout the world must feel that their strivings are illegal and thus doomed. Most of all, this must not depend on the attitudes of the great powers toward the intentions and plans of the separatists. Now those attitudes are sometimes positive and sometimes negative, in accordance with certain considerations rather than on the basis of the principles of supreme justice and the norms of international law.

I think that 1995 will be a decisive year in resolving those problems.

[Gergova] How much do you think the ethnic conflicts in Bosnia and Chechnya are related to the religious factor?

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[Shevardnadze] As far as Abkhazia is concerned, this is a political conflict rather than an international issue, or, worse, a conflict between different religions. It appears that in Bosnia and Chechnya the political conflicts are exacerbated by the religious factor.

[Gergova] You are one of those noted politicians who personify the positive changes in the world, despite the fact that you continuously encounter many problems. However, unlike the Bolsheviks, who destroyed the Church and turned to Communism, you selected the opposite route, and found the way back to the Church in a manner similar to the final scene of the film "Repentance."

[Shevardnadze] Yes, I think that is what I did. Actually, this is why I returned to Georgia: in order to head toward the Church together with my people, when others wanted to lead it in a different direction.

[Gergova] You served as a consultant when Tengiz Abuladze made his film "Repentance." Abuladze, may his soul rest in peace, said that had you not returned to Georgia, the country would have headed toward the Middle Ages. What did the great director mean?

[Shevardnadze] He meant the disintegration and the darkness of isolation, as well as the triumph of sinister forces, moral perdition, and profound social shock. Yes, this is most probably what he meant.

[Gergova] Fortunately, this did not happen. We wish you a successful visit and thank you for the interview.

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Klaus on BIS Affair, Talks With Gaydar, Walesa

AU2401083295 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 19 Jan 95 p 3

[Interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Viktor Krejci in Prague; date not given: "I Have No Reason To Mistrust the BIS Director or the Interior Minister"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Krejci] In connection with the recent statement by Jan Kalvoda that the Security and Information Service [BIS] is allegedly monitoring the parliamentary parties and that it is even being controlled by someone, many people are asking whether this can really be true. I think people would like a specific statement on this matter. With the passing of several days, what is your view on this issue?

[Klaus] With the passing of several days, I view this issue the way I did without the passing of time. I am not convinced of it. I am not convinced of it even from the so-called evidence that has been presented recently. I do not think anything else can be said. The government yesterday appointed a four—member commission to look into this issue; it should inform the Cabinet on these matters because it is impossible to draw a serious conclusion based on such extremely vague statements. Without this, I have no reason to mistrust the BIS director or the interior minister; I have no reason not to trust them.

[Krejci] The establishment of this government body could be interpreted as betraying a lack of confidence in the parliamentary commission...

[Klaus] This is certainly not betraying a lack of confidence. The government is, after all, responsible, according to the law, for certain matters pertaining to the security and information services and just wants to clarify the issue. The issue does not involve any lack of confidence in the commission. This is not a government body but simply an ad hoc grouping that will not exist longer than is necessary, and, of course, it is impossible, for reasons of mere division of labor, for the 19-member government to deal with this matter, but it is quite enough for a couple of select members to deal with it.

[Krejci] Apparently, certain reports have appeared in the foreign press that the secret service in our country is not controlled. Have you received any such signals from abroad? It seems that Jan Kalvoda's pronouncement has led to such speculation outside the Republic.

[Klaus] I consider this to be extremely unfortunate, and I do not believe that any of those involved in this affair want to damage our country's standing abroad. I think that, from this perspective, the individual parties should consider things carefully and look before they leap. [passage omitted]

[Krejci] You held talks with Mr. Yegor Gaydar. Can you tell us what you discussed?

[Klaus] Mr. Gaydar and I know each other. I could not discuss anything other than the current situation in Russia, the situation in our country, and the political and economic situation. I consider it quite delightful when I hear from him that it was I who, more or less, spurred him toward the view that it is impossible to proceed without a standard political party, that it is impossible for an economist and reformer, no matter how good, to attempt to assert reform without having standard political support.

One of the major problems, perhaps even a bit bigger than the ones discussed in our country, is Russia's massive size. For this reason, communication is more complicated here, and the possibility of involving a broader group of citizens is all the more complex. Yegor Gaydar says rightly that, in Moscow, which has the same number of inhabitants as the whole of the Czech Republic, the position of his Russia's Choice is no worse than the position of the Civic Democratic Party in the Czech Republic. He described exactly where its position is stronger—in St. Petersburg and in the northern region above and around Archangelsk, in the Urals. He described where the situation is worse—to the east of Moscow, in the country oblasts. All communication there is dependent on standard television reportage, and the impact of reformers like Gaydar is not immediate. The election results, then, are quite the opposite [from those in the Czech Republic]. This aspect is not analyzed sufficiently by the media in our country, and more is said about tradition and the strength of the old structures, the communist mentality, and so on.

[Krejci] Before his visit to the Czech Republic, President Walesa criticized coupon privatization. However, he expressed himself far more moderately here. Did you discuss this subject with him?

[Klaus] Of course. I believe that his tenuous knowledge of this matter is really only superficial and that the words he used in the past were, I think, very strong. When I explained this to him, he, in my opinion, nodded his head.

Klaus Discusses Tensions in Coalition

AU2301213395 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 20 Jan 95 pp 1, 3

["Regular" interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Eva Martinkova; place and date not given: "Despite All Exchanges of Fire, the Coalition Will Prevail"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Vaclav Klaus answers in the regular column topical questions asked by correspondent Eva Martinkova.*

[Martinkova] Do you expect the coalition to last until the elections, if such tremors, like the case of Civic Democratic Alliance Chairman Kalvoda now and his suspicion regarding the activity of the secret service, proliferate?

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[Klaus] I will answer in the affirmative. What makes me believe so are such feats like the last government session. During the seven-hour debate on pensions—that is, on a very fundamental law—the coalition rivalry or disagreement almost vanished. Therefore, despite all of the exchanges of fire regarding the Security Information Service, I can assure everyone that, if I sit with Deputy Prime Minister Kalvoda on one side and Deputy Prime Minister Lux on the other, our conversation within the framework of the government session is completely normal, matter of fact, and free of any antagonism. The same applies to the other coalition ministers. Let us not view the situation through the magnifying glass of the media, which always enlarges some aspects out of proportion. I believe that the coalition will endure until the elections, and the occasional skirmishes are more likely to add wrinkles and gray hairs to politicians rather than to citizens.

[Martinkova] Is, perhaps, your working relationship with the president coming to a head? If a citizen listens to the Conversations From Lany [a regular "interview with the president" radio program], he may feel that some passages are dedicated to polemics with you.

[Klaus] I would say that our working relations are formally calm. Nevertheless, they are not as frequent as they used to be. Of course, I notice the occasional statements by the president, and I detect in them many points dissonant with what I am saying. I am well aware of this. I know that our opinions on certain issues simply differ. They have certainly always differed. This in itself is no tragedy. I do not believe we might reach the situation existing in some neighboring countries of ours. I take it as a completely normal situation.

[Martinkova] The situation in health care is reminiscent of a crisis. Does Health Minister Ludek Rubas enjoy your full support in this situation?

[Klaus] I believe that the health-care sector works normally, and there are only threats of a crisis. Even if a crisis occurred, however, it would not be through the fault of an individual but, rather, a problem of the system—that is, a more general one. Therefore, I consider the one-sided, tremendously simplified, and distorted attack against the health-care minister unfair, and I cannot agree with it. Moreover, I am not aware of the citizens criticizing the health-care system, which would be proof of a crisis. I know about the mutual criticism within the health-care system, and that is something completely different. It seems to me that the problem lies more in the fact that the health care in our country is rather grandiose, that we have too many physicians rather than too few, and that the same applies to hospital beds, hospitals, and medical schools educating the noble physicians. This quantitative pressure results in some problems, but more within the health-care community than in the relationship health-care community-public-patient. I am convinced that I can explain these reflections, which are not at all a marginal issue for me, to the representatives of the Czech College of Physicians.

ODS's Petr Cermak Withdraws Candidacy

95CH0093A Prague PRAGUE POST in English 27 Dec 94 p 1

[Article by Victor Gomez: "ODS Tosses Out Scandal-Wracked Number Two"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Karlovy Vary—The weight of public pressure came to bear at the leading Civic Democratic Party's (ODS) annual congress, where the rank and file threw out their scandal-hit executive deputy chairman and complained of the party's tarnished image.

Much of the two-day congress seemed surprisingly self-critical for a party basking in the glow of a substantial victory in this fall's nationwide local elections.

For the last two years, executive deputy chairman Petr Cermak had stumbled from one embarrassing public scandal to another with relative impunity. But on December 18, Cermak withdrew his candidacy after he failed to get a majority in three rounds of voting. His adversary, parliament member Libor Novak, eventually won the post in a separate round of balloting.

Both the party's rejection of Cermak and its acceptance of a plan to work out a new political program by September 1995 represented direct rebuttals of positions supported by Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus.

Delegates were reluctant to attack Cermak directly in their speeches at Karlovy Vary's elegant Grand Hotel Pupp, but many had a very clear idea of whom they wanted for the post of executive deputy chairman.

"I come from a small town and I work in a small town, and I see that, let's say, (Cermak) acts a bit too high-handed ... and he doesn't have a good reputation among the people and voters in the small towns," said Ladislav Mandys, an ODS delegate from Pardubice.

Aside from being the party's chief administrator, the executive deputy chairman is also seen as the ODS leader's political second-in-command for all internal matters.

Although Cermak's name has been almost consistently associated with scandal from the time he was first elected to the post at the 1992 ODS congress, the pressure has increased over the last couple of months.

Since October, the 41-year-old politician has twice been accused of attempting to manipulate the media, and it has also come out that he did not pay taxes on a free, two-year lease on a Mercedes he received from the beleaguered Helbig firm—a company whose owners are currently wanted by the police for tax and insurance fraud in Germany.

Now Cermak will be replaced by Novak, a largely unknown member of parliament who just celebrated his 32nd birthday. He is almost always referred to as "the

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younger," because there is another, unrelated and older ODS parliamentarian with the same name.

Novak, who has worked as an adviser to Klaus since early this year, has pledged to change the ODS style and the manner in which the party presents itself to the public.

Ironically, the only person to run against Novak in the new round of balloting that followed Cermak's withdrawal was Miroslav Macek, Cermak's predecessor in the post. Macek was voted out of the executive deputy chairmanship in 1992 after allegedly trying to use the position for personal profit.

The final vote registered 161 votes for Novak, 108 for Macek and 12 abstentions.

The election of Novak over Cermak and Macek—both high-profile ODS members who were tarnished with the brush of scandal—seemed to confirm the congress's buzzwords of "change" and "introspection."

Led by Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec, one group within the ODS managed to commit the party to setting down its policies and goals in a new political program that will take shape over the course of 1995.

While some dismissed the need for any serious talk about a new style, many ODS members at the congress seemed more openly critical of the party's various failings in certain areas.

Even Macek, a man whose name is still largely associated with the party's past, seemed to be gunning for a key role in constructing the ODS' new political program.

"For one part of the people who voted against Petr Cermak, it wasn't a question of personal aversion toward Petr Cermak but rather an expression of the aspirations for change," said Macek. "And, of course, not just personnel changes but also changes in the ODS's style of work."

While Zieleniec and other ODS members were critical of some of the party's recent "mistakes"—such as the November 30 fund-raising dinner that was partially supported by representatives of state companies—none was so censorious as Interior Minister Jan Ruml.

In his speech, the former dissident criticized the work of his local party organization in the Prague 7 district, the party's inability to be openly self-critical and the lack of an emotional tone to the party's leadership. He singled out the recent scandal over the fund-raising dinner as an example of the party's inability to deal with criticism.

"I distinctly see how we are often limited by our own selves; how we don't know how to listen, ponder, be more perceptive of our surroundings; how we don't know how to admit to errors and derive conclusions from them—which is so important for politicians," he said.

In addition to dealing with Cermak's post, the congress also overwhelmingly confirmed Klaus as party leader and re-elected three deputy chairmen: Zieleniec, parliament deputy chairman Jiri Vlach and Minister of Transport Jan Strasky.

Problems With Romany Integration Continue

95CH0093C Prague PRAGUE POST in English 27 Dec 94 p 13

[Article by Vaclav Trojan: "What Happened in Pisek?"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On December 2, in the south Bohemian town of Pisek, a trial took place. The case concerned an event that happened more than a year ago. A group of youngsters belonging to the skinhead movement—a movement that began to actively express itself and grow from 1989 onward—drove four young Romanies off an island into the Vltava river. The skinheads occupied the island and the river bank, and after 15 minutes, one of the Romanies drowned in the cold waters. The result of the trial more than a year later was that two of the attackers received a suspended sentence of one year.

Both the Romany community and the general public were tensely awaiting the result of the hearing, and for many it was a disappointment. Not only because the sentence was so light, but also because of the manner in which the trial and investigation were handled.

Not one of the skinheads was taken into custody. While three Romanies who were bathing in the same river and testified at the trial were tested (result: positive) for drugs, no similar investigation was made in the case of the accused. The mother of the Romany boy who drowned was dismissed from the courtroom, but the accused were only lightly reprimanded when they made comments about the testimony of the Romanies or even when they laughed. Although he denied that he advocates the ideas of Hitler, one of the accused described in court his admiration for some Nazi generals.

During the court hearing, graffiti of the German word Raus! (Get out!) appeared on houses where Romanies live. After the judgment (which has still not come into effect because it was appealed on the spot), another incident happened in front of the court building: A Romany knifed one of the accused. According to a rumor that quickly spread through the town, the skinheads were planning revenge. The Pisek mayor invited one of the defendants and a Romany representative to talk, and with the help of the chief of police, they drew up some sort of peace agreement.

Perhaps at first glance, this all looks like a local war. Unfortunately, this war is not only happening in Pisek, it is rooted in the very foundations of our society. According to public opinion polls, more than half of the inhabitants of the Czech Republic demand separate laws for Romanies. It is the general opinion that Romanies are the source of crime. After 1989, Romanies found

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themselves in a situation of veritable apartheid in Central Europe. Romanies, their traditions, language and culture differ from those of Central Europeans (even though they have lived in Central Europe for hundreds of years); for the majority of society, they are unacceptable and represent an uncomfortable weight.

Few Romanies manage to integrate into ethnically homogenous Czech society. Romany ghettos develop; the majority of those living there are unemployed. Thanks to the generally accepted stereotypes, language barriers and racist attitudes of a large part of the majority society, these people are thrown into a spiral of poverty from which there is no escape. In the years following World War II, no one bothered about the fate of the ethnic Romanies, the majority of whom came to Bohemia from Slovakia after the war.

The migration of Romanies was supported by the pre-communist and later also by the communist state as an effort to populate areas and, in so doing, to compensate for the more than 2 million Germans who left after the war—at this point, it is necessary to point out the fact that a large number of Czech Romanies were victims of the Holocaust along with the Jews. But neither the communist regime nor today's regime is prepared to bear the consequences of this relocation of inhabitants. On the contrary, after the separation of the Czechoslovak federation into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, a law was passed in the Czech Republic that more or less makes it impossible for many Romanies to become Czech citizens. For Romanies, this was a clear sign that they are not welcome in Bohemia.

Therefore, the Pisek case is only one of the manifestations of the hidden war in which not only aggressive racists and the so-called "unadaptable" Romanies are involved, but also the state, which should be a protector of minorities' constitutional rights. Let us hope that the Pisek case will spur the state powers to change their policies, which were criticized on an international level at the recent Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe meetings in Warsaw and Budapest. If this does not happen, the situation of the Romany minority could become a serious source of instability in Central Europe.

Kosovo Albanians Smuggle Narcotics

95CH0090B Prague PROGNOSIS WEEKLY in English 28 Dec 94 p 6

[Article by Richard Byrne Reilly: "Going 'From Nowhere to Nowhere'"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Kosovo Gang, a notorious and powerful Albanian heroin smuggling syndicate, has succeeded in turning the Czech Republic into the largest dumping ground for Balkan-produced heroin in the whole of Central Europe, drug enforcement authorities say.

As a result, heroin prices in Prague have plummeted as its availability and quality have risen. In the last four months, the price for heroin has dropped from about 2,500 Kc per gram to less than 1,000 Kc, and quantities of the drug tested from police seizures have registered an 80 percent purity rate.

Addicts and casual users are the first to admit that a potent new blend of heroin has replaced pervitin—the cheap speed derivative manufactured in homemade laboratories throughout the Czech Republic—as the hard drug of choice for both addicts and first-time users. Statistics from the Czech Police's Narcotics Division show that the number of Czechs using heroin for the first time, specifically those between 12 and 16 years of age, has increased by more than 200 percent since last year.

"People who used to do pervitin are now doing heroin. It's just more popular," said an addict who refused to give his name.

Jiri Komorous, head of the Narcotics Division, said the Kosovo syndicate has in the last year single-handedly cornered the Czech heroin market by smuggling tons of the addictive narcotic into the country in trucks and cars across the border with the former Yugoslavia. The syndicate is ruthless, dedicated and extremely well organized, he said.

Komorous, an imposing, no-nonsense man who sports a shaved head and a steely, penetrating gaze, attributed the success of the Kosovo gang to legislative restraints that have hindered undercover police operations, existing liberal drug laws and porous borders. For example, Komorous' agents are forbidden to make undercover drug buys, a tactic used by drug police the world over.

"We have a very unique drug situation here," Komorous said, recalling that before the political changes of five years ago heroin addiction was regarded solely as a product of decadent Western capitalistic societies. Heroin use under the Communists was virtually non-existent, he said.

The Kosovo syndicate differs significantly from their South American counterparts, such as the Medellin and Cali drug cartels, because the organization is controlled by many rather than a select few and thus identifying the top capos is difficult, Komorous said. The Kosovo organization gets its name from the region in northern Albania where the empire has its headquarters.

To meet the threat the Kosovo syndicate poses to the security of the Czech Republic, Komorous' division has initiated an offensive to stem the amount of heroin entering the country and to neutralize Kosovo Gang capos. Intensive investigations have been launched in conjunction with other European police squads, he said.

The Czech anti-drug forces in late November capped an 18-month sting operation in cooperation with Swiss and French drug police that resulted in the arrests of 99 ethnic Albanians, most of them identified as members of the Kosovo gang. Two months ago, the Narcotics Division arrested two Kosovo capos in the Czech Republic.

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Their assets, including bank accounts and extensive real estate holdings, were seized, and 50 ethnic Albanians are presently serving lengthy jail sentences in Czech prisons.

Throughout the world, heroin production and use has increased dramatically as the cocaine trade has slightly declined. The threat the heroin syndicates pose was recently illustrated in a speech by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters, Robert Gelbard, to the United Nations General Assembly in November.

"Heroin addiction is spreading in transit countries and remains the primary drug abuse concern in some other areas," he said. "We see signs of growing heroin use in areas that heretofore had only small heroin addict populations. And finally, there is the proliferation of increasingly complex trafficking networks, stretched across virtually every continent. Countries that were on the periphery of the trade now play important brokering and distribution roles."

It was only last year that the Czech police admitted that heroin smugglers had set up shop in the Czech Republic and were saturating the market with the highly pure narcotic and offering it at rock bottom prices. Previously, police maintained that the nation was merely a transit point for heroin coming from the Balkans and Turkey on its way to markets in Western Europe.

The numbers of those addicted to heroin in the Czech Republic is growing accordingly. Dr. Ivan Douda of the Drop in Clinic in Prague 1, puts the number of drug addicts at between 10,000 and 15,000. Douda said a majority of junkies seeking assistance at his clinic are now addicted to heroin.

As heroin use and addiction has spread, the social fabric of the Czech Republic has become threatened. Komorous, for example, expects drug-related crime to surge as dealers boost their prices and junkies become desperate to finance their addictions. Drug-related crime will likely mirror that of neighboring Germany, he said, where 50 percent of crimes committed are directly related to illicit drug abuse.

On a recent afternoon in downtown Prague, during an interview over cigarettes and chocolate bars, a group of addicts spoke at length about the availability and purity of the addictive narcotic that in the last year has found a steady and growing supply of customers.

Sascha said that since last winter the price of heroin has decreased while the availability has skyrocketed. An addict for the last five months, Sascha said he procures most of his heroin from foreign dealers, not Czechs. He said it was evident that foreigners control the trade here, but refused to divulge the ethnicity of his suppliers.

Stealing to support his habit, and living from day to day in squatted tenements and wherever else he can find a roof over his head, Sascha admits that he is a member of the first generation of heroin addicts in the Czech Republic. It is an admission that does not seem to bother the twentysomething man, who constantly fidgeted and touched his heavily scarred face during the course of the interview.

"I just go from nowhere to nowhere," he said.

Komorous and his men are anxious to dispel the notion that they are losing the war on drugs. He cautions that it will take time before his division gains the upper hand in its battle against drug syndicates like the one from Kosovo.

"I'm being realistic. The problem cannot be solved by the police alone," Komorous said. "However, we will succeed in getting it under control."

[Box, p 6]

Drug Ring Busted in "Operation Jaguar"

Czech drug police are claiming they have "paralyzed" the South American cocaine trafficking route to Prague with the bust of a drug ring's six-member "brain trust" and the seizure of 16 kilos of the narcotic.

Czech Police Narcotics Division chief Jiri Komorous called the nine-month "Operation Jaguar" one of his squad's most successful raids ever. His agents worked with police from Germany, Slovakia, Austria and Switzerland in tracking the ring during "Jaguar."

Komorous added, however, that the Czech Republic was becoming a "target country" for cocaine—and for heroin pushers as well—and not just a transit point for destinations elsewhere.

The cocaine had a street value of 50 million Kc ($1.8 million), Komorous said.

Komorous also announced the seizure of 4 more kilos of cocaine in "Operation Voyage" at Prague's Ruzyne international airport in early December. Police, working in conjunction with German agents, found a man carrying 1.2 kilos of cocaine in test tubes in his stomach, Komorous said.

Money-Laundering Law Called Nonstandard

95CH0090A Prague PROGNOSIS WEEKLY in English 28 Dec 94 p 8

[Article by Randall Lyman and Hana Lesenarova: "Money Laundering Law May Need Cleaning Up"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Czech Cabinet approved on December 7 a draft set of principles for a new law on money laundering intended to "inhibit" the legalization of income from illegal activities.

However, it is not clear yet whether the law proposal will be compatible with a European Union directive on the topic—something that could stand in the way of the country's entry into the pan-European super-state.

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"It is an expert matter and we highly appreciate that Czech Republic is dealing with it," said Gerhard Sabathil, the first secretary of the Delegation of the European Union in Prague. "Without seeing the text we strongly suppose that (the proposal) is relying (on the EU legislation)," he said.

However, EU legislation has covered the problem much more thoroughly than the Czech government's proposal.

Under the new law, a new "analysis department" will be established at the Ministry of Finance to record unusually large deposits.

Banks and financial institutions would have to report to the analysis department deposits of over 500,000 Kc ($17,000) or "unusual" transactions, meaning those which, "by their nature, content or exceptionalness apparently deviate from the usual size or character of transactions," Premier Vaclav Klaus told journalists.

He emphasized that the submission of such a report would not necessarily indicate suspicion that money laundering was going on, but was merely a signal for the Finance Ministry to keep an eye on things.

The reports would be secret in order to prevent their being used to scandalize companies making large deposits.

The principles differ in some important respects from a draft presented earlier this year by Justice Minister Jiri Novak which proposed a new financial prosecutor's office that would be responsible for tracking and prosecuting money laundering activities.

The need for and content of a "dirty money" law has been a topic of debate in Parliament and the Cabinet for over a year. In response to criticisms of government stalling, Klaus pointed out that Germany had finally passed such a law only last year.

"This (Czech) law is non-standard in the extreme, because if it were standard everything would be a crime," he said.

But European Union members passed a directive on money laundering as a part of the tax law three years ago, and it has been implemented by a majority of the member states, according to a EU official who did not want to have his name published.

He said each EU member deals with it individually by establishing a special unit. "It is a specific unit, in general there are several authorities, such as judges, police, and a specific authority which collects the reports on money laundering," he said.

He said the EU considers the matter to be too important to rely on one institution to control it, as would be done in the Czech Republic if only the Finance Ministry were made responsible.

"(The Finance Ministry) can be a possibility but generally it is not. (The unit) should have people from different backgrounds, because aspects of money laundering are linked to many fields," he said.

EU legislation establishes several obligations that financial institutions in each member country have to follow, such as keeping records of all identification documents and transactions.

Every financial institution also has to report on any suspicious transactions, and should have a special department dealing with this issue, he said.

"If financial supervisors detect an operation which refers to dirty money, they have to report on it," he said.

Government Deliberates Over Telecom

95CH0093D Prague PRAGUE POST in English 27 Dec 94 p 5

[Article by Julie Jette: "Industry Waits for Telecom Decisions"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Czech telecommunications industry is still on hold as the government deliberates over several important policy decisions.

Delays in announcing next year's phone rates and the guidelines for small telephone network operators have players in the industry biding their time.

At least one competitor for a 27-percent stake in SPT Telecom—PTT Netherlands—has postponed announcing its partnership with another telecommunications firm partly because of the delays.

Frans Menting, managing director of PTT Telecom, said his company had also not received several documents regarding the tender process of SPT Telecom that should have been issued in late November.

The company wants to make its partnership announcement just before submitting its initial bid, and the size of the tariff increase and the guidelines for small operators will figure into the bids of PTT Telecom and other companies.

Although the government still plans to select SPT Telecom's strategic partner by March, it will be unable to do so if there are too many holdups along the way.

The government has missed its self-imposed November 30 deadline to publish guidelines for the participation of small operators in local phone networks. The rules were slated to be published in mid-December.

New phone tariffs for next year had been expected, along with new tariffs for a number of other utilities. But now the telephone tariffs will probably not be set until after the Ministry of Finance approves a longer-term tariff policy. The ministry's deadline for setting the policy is the end of December.

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One source in the telecommunications industry, who asked not to be named, said that the government showed a draft of the guidelines for small operators to an unofficial meeting of the companies that are interested in developing local networks.

The participants in the meeting agreed that "the guidelines didn't go far enough," the source said, adding that the guidelines "put SPT Telecom in the driver's seat."

So many changes were necessary that those working on the document opted to develop it further rather than submit it to the Ministry of Economy by the November 30 deadline. Lubomir Stary, deputy director of the Ministry of Economy's telecommunications department, said the final version has now been completed and is awaiting Economy Minister Karel Dyba's approval.

Igor Sladek, a member of the board at Cable Plus, one of the companies that hopes to become a network operator, said that the longer decisions are delayed, the longer businesses and individuals will have to wait for improvements in telephone service. "It's causing a delay in the whole economy."

The guidelines are expected to include the geographic areas companies will be allowed to develop, as well as the limits of their activities.

SPT Telecom will maintain its monopoly on long-distance service until the year 2000 and will continue to maintain most local networks. But the government's so-called First Telecommunications Project, approved in August, allows for the participation of small firms in developing under-serviced areas.

The delays make it impossible for companies to develop detailed business plans to give investors or banks. Companies with plans to develop the networks usually set their expected costs from 500 million Kc to 1 billion Kc ($18.5 million to $37 million).

Cable companies such as Cable Plus are especially eager for the rules to be published, because they could already be providing phone service through their television cable networks. "It's just a waste of resources, money and time" if the networks aren't fully utilized, Sladek said.

Even when the guidelines are published, more definition will be needed. The stickiest problem is likely to be that of tariff sharing between the small companies and SPT.

Since long-distance calls will be initiated from the local networks, the network operators and SPT will have to decide how big a slice of the charges each company will get.

"We hope that the guidelines will be positive, but we also believe there will be more work to be done," Sladek said.

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Meciar Briefs NATO Head, Envoys on SR Policy

LD2301223195 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 2030 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar met NATO Secretary General Willy Claes and ambassadors of NATO member states in Brussels today.

As he said at the briefing after the meeting, its main aim was to acquaint the representatives of the alliance with the policy direction of the Slovak Government and its striving to intensify cooperation with all of the European security and economic structures.

Meciar went on to stress that the Slovak Republic [SR] did not feel threatened by anyone, nor did it threaten anyone. He added that he considered that threats to security might arise from the possible spread of military conflicts to Central Europe, international crime, and terrorism, as well as attempts to bring about the political isolation of Slovakia.

Meciar Foresees New Quality of Ties to CR

LD2301154195 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the press, Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar should meet Vaclav Klaus, prime minister of the Czech Republic [CR], in February. Asked by Slovak radio when the most complex issues of Slovak-Czech relations can be solved, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar said:

[Begin Meciar recording] As you have noticed, the preparations for my meeting with Prime Minister Klaus have been most intensive. The minister of labor, social affairs and the family has already made her visit, Deputy Prime Minister Kozlik has met Karel Dyba in Brno. There will be more encounters of this kind which will minimize the scope of the issues that have not been solved yet. There will be a meeting of the Customs Union Council so only matters left unresolved by the ministers will have to be dealt with by the prime ministers.

We are going for a new quality of relationship which means both new relations between us and new relations with our nearest neighbors and Central Europe. The offer of cooperation and a joint way forward will be beneficial for both parties. I rely on that, I know Prime Minister Klaus very well from many previous meetings, I have full confidence in him and respect for him because whatever we agreed upon we have always upheld.

The model of relationship we formed in 1992 has to be revised and a new model has to be designed for the coming period. There will be no radical changes, but life goes on and we have to adapt. [end recording]

Meciar Hopes For Improved Relations With Hungary

LD2401105795 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0600 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar is continuing his two-day official visit to Belgium. [passage omitted]

At a brief news conference held after the talks yesterday, journalists were interested to learn about Slovakia's relations with Hungary, particularly with regard to the imminent visit by the prime minister to Budapest.

Vladimir Meciar said these relations were important both from the regional and European point of view. Economic cooperation had decreased substantially. Its revival would help to overcome the difficult economic period.

According to Vladimir Meciar, the improvement of bilateral relations would result in improved stability in the Central European region affected by the war in the Balkans.

The prime minister maintains that the improvement of Slovak- Hungarian relations is a pre-condition for Slovakia to be admitted to the antechamber of European integration. [passage omitted]

SDSS Leader on Government Policy Statement

LD2001213395 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1414 GMT 19 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] During a debate in the Slovak National Council [parliament] on the government's policy statement on 19 January, Jaroslav Volf, the chairman of the opposition Social Democratic Party of Slovakia [SDSS], which forms part of the Joint Choice grouping together with the Party of the Democratic Left and two minor parties, responded to the opening speech by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar with the following concerning the economy and privatization:

Honorable chairman of the National Council, prime minister, ladies and gentlemen, the government is presenting its policy statement to the National Council of the Slovak Republic at a time when the population's social situation is not good, at a time when differences in the population's living standards are deepening, and at a time when there continues an unnatural and unjust division of an increasing mass of poor people and a narrow section of rich.

It would certainly be desirable for this unfavorable state of society to change. In spite of the fact that the policy statement includes a declaration of intent regarding this, in spite of the fact that it talks about economic prosperity and a socially just society, in reality it gives only very limited guarantees of achieving these goals. The policy statement is, you see, primarily and above all a collection of wishes, long-term goals, and bold ideas. There is a lack

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of concrete means and instruments to achieve these, and above all a lack of, and I emphasize this point, fundamental measures that would be binding, that would have a schedule, and which the citizens and the National Council of the Slovak Republic would have control over.

In connection with the proposed strategy for stabilization and development the government is well aware of the inadequacy of resources and savings, and that is why it is proposing to finance investment activity partly with the help of monetary measures by the National Bank of Slovakia. We consider such pressure on an independent banking institution to be dangerous and to lead to the threat of unleashing an inflationary spiral with all its consequences regarding the rise in the cost of living and on the population's standard of living.

Privatization is a problem in its own right. The policy statement talks about the government's wish to speed up this process. In reality, however, the brakes have been put on privatization. There is an intention to work out the fourth concept of privatization in four years, and there is a controversial and politically motivated amended law on large-scale privatization.

Preparations are in hand to replace coupon privatization, which despite all its faults gave every citizen of the Slovak Republic the opportunity to acquire a share in property, with a different form of privatization to serve a small group of people, an artificially created stratum of the rich, with no guarantee that these new owners of companies, often undervalued in terms of price and property, will be able to run them in the interests of society, of their region, and of our citizens.

The proposed sales format with gradual repayment has proved absolutely unsuccessful. The big privatizers, driven around in expensive cars, often with political influence, fail to repay the National Property Fund for their purchase of companies, and claiming back these debts through the courts can take up to several years.

Yes, we are in favor of employee participation in the companies they own, but not if they constitute a mere backdrop to the top management, which gains a majority stake in the company and absolute power, often for a minimal price and at minimal personal risk.

Only through legislation can a change be made allowing investments to be regarded as a part repayment of the purchase price. If that does not happen, we are talking purely of an instrument of discrimination and selection in the hands of the governing political grouping that is able to reward or punish on the basis of its own partisan considerations.

With its confused and deliberate law of December last year the government transferred a large proportion of its powers in the sphere of privatization to the National Property Fund. It fought hard for this law in parliament. Now it talks about the unavoidability of redefining the relationship between the National Property Fund, its founding ministries, and the Ministry for the Administration and Privatization of National Property.

My question is this: Does the National Council of the Slovak Republic genuinely have so few weighty problems affecting Slovak society to deal with that it has to devote time to amending one single law on three occasions in a short space of time?

People ask us—and the government should not leave this question unanswered—why the beginning of the second wave of coupon privatization is being artificially delayed. The new management of the National Property Fund has not founded one single joint-stock company during the time of its existence. Why is it reducing the amount of property included in it [the second wave]? Do they mean to say that the sum of 15,000 Slovak crowns, in other words less than half in comparison with the first wave, is a fair share for citizens of the Slovak Republic of the wealth which they, their mothers and fathers jointly created in Slovakia over the course of decades?

Volf then went on to state his party's views on aspects of the government policy statement concerning social policy:

The government policy statement is characterized by an imbalance between social policy aims and the opportunities afforded by the economic policy vision. It is certainly very good that the government is able to list the fundamental problems in the social sphere and that it has the resolve to make changes to the system. It is detrimental, however, that it does not specify what will constitute the government's development strategy for solving social problems.

Efforts to reduce unemployment are also to be welcomed. Unemployment really is an insult to the dignity of every person who wishes to work. However, even the most basic concept of how to reduce unemployment is absent, and in particular in connection with regional policy. It is too late to be fighting problems when they begin to take virtually catastrophic proportions, such as in Rimavska Sobota district [in eastern Slovakia, with 27 percent unemployment in October 1994]. How are we going to solve the equally severe situation in the districts of Roznava, Michalovce, Velky Krtis, and the Kysuce area?

The ideas about changes to the system in the social sphere during 1995 and 1996 are, according to people with experience, in themselves unrealistic. It is not enough to push these changes through on a legislative level, although the government naturally has the necessary majority in the National Council to do this, without the requisite preparation in the executive and practical sphere. The only possible result is chaos and daily problems for our citizens of the kind that we have experienced more than enough of in the recent past.

Volf then poses a series of rhetorical questions to justify his view that the government has not set out a definite

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timetable in its policy statement for implementing its various promises to individual groups of people. His next subject is foreign policy, followed by the restitution of former Social Democratic property:

It is necessary to praise the foreign policy section of the policy statement. The declaration of our orientation toward the European Union is certainly correct. At the same time, however, I cannot but point out that such an orientation is hardly supported by attempts to control or at least influence mass media policy, to set up a home guard, to consider incorporating civilian security agencies into the central security system, to interfere in deputies' mandates or to deliberately change the electoral system so as to gain an absolute majority in parliament.

We, the Social Democrats, are also startled by the part of the policy statement that talks about workers' meeting houses, in other words the former property of the Social Democrats and workers' sports clubs in Slovakia, being returned to some unspecified civic workers' associations. If the state wants to return confiscated property beyond the scope of existing legislation, it ought to return it to the genuine former owner or the former owner's legal successor. Cooperative associations and the Slovak Association of Antifascist Fighters with their legitimate claims should certainly not be left on the sidelines.

Our interest was very much aroused by the idea of the so-called clean hands program. We would like to believe that sufficient strength and courage will at last be found to stop corruption, tax evasion, speculation, and abuse of power. The power of officials and of bureaucracy is still, unfortunately, a reality, and we deputies are still somehow immune to this curse. We ought to find sufficient goodwill and courage to finally pass a law on conflict of interest. The people around us, our electorate, expect it of us.

The Social Democratic Party of Slovakia, in spite of these reservations and in spite of the personnel policy of the current governing grouping on the central and regional level with which we do not agree, is willing to cooperate in preparing all concrete measures for the benefit of Slovakia and its citizens. Just as we have shown by our voting in the past, we will support every government or deputy's bill that will be useful and advantageous for the development of our Slovak society. However, the policy statement that has been put forward does not unfortunately contain a sufficient quantity of such proposals and measures. Furthermore, as it fails to provide sufficient guarantees of achieving the intentions and aims of the new government, SDSS deputies will not support this policy statement. Thank you for your attention.

Moravcik: Elements of Dirigisme in Meciar Statement

LD2101193695 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 21 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The National Council of the Democratic Union [DU] held a session at Ulanka near Banska Bystrica today. Its members discussed topical issues of the internal political situation, preparations for the congress, and other matters of the party's internal life and organizational issues. Our editor Lubos Krno asked DU Chairman Jozef Moravcik for a short interview, just before the end of the session.

[Begin recording] [Krno] What is the most interesting and important point on the agenda of today's session, besides the discussion about the DU's internal organizational matters?

[Moravcik] Our National Council took a stance today on the fundamental, topical issues of the current political life in our country. It took a stance on the government's policy statement. The Council agreed with the stance taken by the DU deputies' club.

The DU National Council noted that a further polarization of political forces was under way in Slovakia.

As regards our assessment of the government's policy statement, we perceive many elements of dirigisme and etatism in it; very negative signals are coming above all from the administrative districts, as wide-ranging purges of personnel are under way there, which are not contributing to a favorable atmosphere at present.

As the policy statement the government presented to the National Council is demanding, it is necessary to concentrate forces—that means that full use should be made of our people's abilities, regardless of their political membership. [passage omitted]

[Krno] Is it possible to expect that once you merge with the National Democratic Party [NDS] you will form some sort of a shadow cabinet?

[Moravcik] We would not like to use this disgraced expression. I think that it concerns only an organizational-technical issue.

We intend to formulate our program clearly and to decide upon steps for its implementation. Our common interest is to stabilize the political situation—we are not interested in destabilizing the situation. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Schmoegnerova Asks Workers To Join Opposition

LD2001232895

[FBIS Editorial Report] Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak at 1305 GMT on 20 January broadcasts a 13-minute address by Former Deputy Prime Minister Brigita Schmoegnerova, a member of the Joint Choice deputies' club and of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL], given during a live relay on the parliamentary debate on the government's policy statement.

Reacting to the opening speech delivered by Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar on 19 January, Schmoegnerova says:

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"The economic goals set by the government for the coming years are demanding. These goals can be achieved if we allow for some realistic adjustment to the expected average growth of the gross domestic product to reach three or four percent, if domestic and foreign conditions are favorable and if the economic policy works.

"However, just as in 1992-93, it is again becoming obvious that the partial policies aimed at achieving these goals are not sufficiently interlinked. On the contrary, in some instances they even contradict each other.

"Let me, as an example, quote the contradiction between the fiscal policy aimed at cutting the state budget deficit and the social policy aiming to lower the retirement age, to increase social benefits, and so on.

"The policy statement allows for the possibility of using the resources of the National Property Fund for state debt servicing. In this respect it is difficult to understand today why the prime minister said that the budget drafted by the previous cabinet was totally unacceptable, since the draft budget and this provisional budget differ mainly in the way they tackle the issue of servicing the state debt.

"If, however, there is strong support for the sale of majority shares in companies, to be paid for in instalments, and in which future investment will be taken into account as a deduction from the purchase price, there is strong support for employees shares, and if the coupon privatization is not stopped and greater involvement by foreign investors in the privatization process is not considered, the funds the National Property Fund will gain will not be sufficient even to cover obligations from previous years.

"On the one hand, the government wants to continue the policy of stabilization. It wants to keep the state deficit at or below three percent of gross domestic product, to keep the growth of consumer prices under 10 percent, and so on.

"On the other, the government considers credits as the main source for the growth of investment resources.

"However, if the goals of the stabilization policy are to be observed these possibilities are very limited. The National Bank of Slovakia realized that unless it wanted to unleash an inflationary spiral, it had reached the limits of credit issue. This happened as early as 1994 when the currency indicator, the so called M2 index was up by 18.6 percent, the gross domestic product growth index was 4.2 percent, and the interyear inflation rate was at 13.4 percent.

"That is why it is necessary to support the proposal made by deputy Magvasi that the National Council should oblige the government to coordinate economic policy with the monetary policy of the National Bank of Slovakia so as not to endanger currency stability and to maintain the independence of the National Bank of Slovakia."

Brigita Schmoegnerova then says that the project for a so-called bank for development was under consideration as early as in 1994, but the bank would still not be able to resolve problems resulting from the general lack of financial resources. Speaking about the privatization policy she says:

"The privatization policy, based on the sale of majority shares to be paid for in instalments, is an unprecedented measure aimed at redistribution of resources, favoring a narrow circle of owners. This contradicts the social solidarity proclaimed by the government policy statement. It also goes against the efforts to stop the explosive growth of social differentiation which, unfortunately, has not even been identified as social evil by the policy statement.

"I want to propose that the National Council should make it obligatory for the government, in the transformation of ownership relations through employees shares, to create equal opportunities for all employees and not to give advantages to only one group. I would like to ask specifically the deputies from the Association of Workers of Slovakia to support this motion."

In conclusion Brigita Schmoegnerova says that the SDL would support only those government measures that accorded with the SDL policy.

Foreign Committee Head on Ethnic Minority Policy

AU2401084195 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 12 Jan 95 p 4

[Interview with Dusan Slobodnik, chairman of the Foreign Committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, by Oldrich Zabojnik; place and date not given: "The Slovak Republic Pursues a Correct Minority Policy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Zabojnik] What can one say about the status of minorities in the Slovak Republic?

[Slobodnik] Minorities are a part of life in Slovakia. Every Slovak citizen, regardless of his or her ethnic background, has his or her individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Certain representatives of the Hungarian minority, however, opt for an approach based on something that they apparently do not understand correctly.

[Zabojnik] Which representatives of the Hungarian minority do you have in mind?

[Slobodnik] Pal Csaky [Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement], for instance, joined this trend by his insults addressed to Slovakia and the election victors. I can also name Edit Bauerova [Egyutteles] and Miklos Duray [Egyutteles chairman], and their activities at various international forums, in this context. They are repeatedly attempting to convince the international public that ethnic purges against the Hungarian minority are being prepared in Slovakia.

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[Zabojnik] How would you assess these activities?

[Slobodnik] They are intentional steps aimed at distorting the actual situation. At the same time, they are deeply mistaken in believing that it is the path that will find the response they expect in Europe. We will make sure that the world public is informed objectively and correctly and that its representatives will be able to verify this in Slovakia without any hindrance. Certain politicians from the Hungarian Coalition are very mistaken if they believe that slander, smears, and lies about Slovakia will bring them some rights above those that are due to their minority. This path of certain Hungarian politicians in the Slovak Republic leads to an impasse that will certainly not meet with understanding. The route that is feasible for Europe and the world is understanding, the quest for things in common, not slander and blackmail—that is the only choice that can be implemented in Slovak politics. Until these people comprehend this, no dialogue can take place about mutual understanding. We cannot seek understanding with people who do nothing but deliberately destroy. We want to have them as partners in a dialogue. They should not be misled, however, and they should give up the idea that they can squeeze something out of us by lies about Slovakia and blackmail. If they do not give up their present approach, their situation can only get worse, because Slovakia is still well above the European standard of minority rights. That is both a legacy of Czechoslovakia, where the approach to minorities was correct, and our own policy, in which we want to build on all that is good and positive. Just, God forbid, let them not believe that they can deal with us by deception, force, and coercion. It is a path that leads to an impasse.

Existence of 'Secret' Mochovce Report Denied

AU2401093295 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 20 Jan 95 p 2

[TASR report: "No Secret Reports"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"The Slovak Nuclear Surveillance Office was established after the CSFR's partition, and its task is to perform state surveillance over the safety of nuclear installations in Slovakia. Since its inception, it has been concerned exclusively with nuclear safety and is neither working out nor releasing any secret reports," Jozef Zlatniansky, deputy chairman of the Nuclear Surveillance Office, told TASR in response to a report about secret reports on the Mochovce nuclear power station published by the Austrian Telefax [as published] the day before yesterday. He added that nuclear safety obviously affects the citizens of the surrounding countries, including Austrians, so it would be pointless to suppress any findings that suggest a decrease in the safety of nuclear power.

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Zagreb-Bound Iranian Plane Believed Carrying Arms

AU2301170095 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 21 Jan 95 p 1

[MTI report: "The Forced Landing of an Iranian Airplane"]

[FBIS Translated Text] An Iranian Air Force airplane carrying an unknown cargo carried out a technical landing at Ferihegy Airport in Budapest on 19 January. The plane's original destination was Zagreb; MAGYAR HIRLAP has learned that the plane was probably forced to land at Ferihegy Airport due to weather conditions, but it left Ferihegy on the evening of the same day with the intention of returning home. According to one source of information, there is a strong suspicion that the Iranian airplane was carrying weapons for Zagreb. The Hungarian authorities wanted to examine the cargo but the Iranian military airplane's crew would not allow it.

The Iranian airplane did not commit any violation of Hungarian airspace because, in flying toward Zagreb on 19 January, it changed its course due to bad weather conditions and landed at Ferihegy Airport near Budapest.

Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti informed MTI of all this on 20 January. Gyorgy Keleti told MTI that the cargo plane was flying from Teheran to Zagreb and that the Iranian airplane stayed in Hungary one day and left for Zagreb shortly after 1930 hours local time on 20 January.

Horn Meeting With Romanian Official Canceled

LD2401102195 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting between the secretary general of the Romanian Government and Hungary's prime minister and president, scheduled for this morning, has been cancelled.

It is presumed that Prime Minister Gyula Horn and President Arpad Goncz did not receive Hrebenciuc because Romanian official circles have recently sharply attacked the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania, while the Romanian Justice minister has raised the idea of declaring the organization illegal.

Interpreted as Disapproval

LD2401120295 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Hungarian Government's obvious disapproval is indicated by the fact that Prime Minister Gyula Horn canceled his scheduled meeting with the secretary general of the Romanian Government this morning. Levente Suekoesd reports.

[Suekoesd] Despite the agenda, Prime Minister Gyula Horn did not receive Viorel Hrebenciuc, secretary general of the Romanian Government, today. As far as I know, the Romanian delegation will not meet President Arpad Goencz either. Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs told "Chronicle" he would meet with Hrebenciuc at noon [1100 GMT]. According to unconfirmed information, Hrebenciuc will convey a personal message from President Iliescu.

I learned that Gyula Horn cancelled the meeting referring to his busy schedule. The president considered it unnecessary to receive Hrebenciuc, since a meeting at an appropriate level was held yesterday with Csaba Tabajdi, political state secretary [at the Office of the Prime Minister]. [passage omitted]

New Interior Ministry 'Policing' Position Created

LD2301215595 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] A new post has been established in the Ministry of Interior to carry out policing tasks [rendvedelmi feladatok]. Sandor Nyiri, 53 years old, has been appointed to the post. Deputy State Secretary Nyiri in charge of policing [rendeszet] will direct the planning, legislative, and supervising work of the new office, which will have a small number of staff members.

Defense Official Favors Professional Army

AU2401083395 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 21 Jan 95 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Imre Mecs, chairman of the Hungarian parliament's Defense Committee, by Peter Matyuc; place and date not given: "We Need A Professional Army"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Mecs] The previous government already had to reduce Army personnel from 150,000 to under 100,000, because the army faced different tasks after the abolition of the Warsaw Pact. However, these steps, like the reduction in personnel without any differentiation, were mostly necessary but were not thoroughly thought through. With the reform of the Armed Forces, we must create a smaller, modern, and mobile army suited to European norms and eventually made up of professional soldiers exclusively, an army that fulfills the demands of national defense.

[Matyuc] Debates about a professional army have been going on in the press for quite some time. From what you say, one can draw the conclusion that the issue has been decided: The goal of the medium- and long-term reorganization and development of the Hungarian Army is to create a professional army.

[Mecs] This concept stipulates a considerable advance toward the dominance of professional army personnel. A professional army may emerge sometime in the first decade of the next century, and it will probably have

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many supporters and opponents until then. I am convinced that a well-trained professional army is more suitable for Hungary's defense requirements than the current army structure.

[Matyuc] Professionalism, however, costs a lot of money: A professional army is much more expensive than the current so-called mass army.

[Mecs] If we analyze the budget section of the Hungarian Army, a professional army would indeed cost more. However, if we take a look at the costs incurred from the working days lost by conscripts or by the regular training and subsequent use of military technology, we come to the conclusion that a professional army is cheaper for society in any case, even if profits can only be seen years after such an army is set up. Of course, one should also deal with the fact that, in the case of a professional army, the largest "civilian control"—or the regular military service—will be abolished. However, abolishing universal conscription is only a long-term goal, and this can only be achieved in about 10 to 15 years; until then, the parliament and the various governments can create legislation that includes adequate guarantees.

[Matyuc] Setting up a professional army is perhaps even more expensive than maintaining one. Where can we find the money to reform our Armed Forces?

[Mecs] According to the ideas, we must create an army that is suited to European norms and can join NATO, because only this military organization can guarantee Hungary's security. We can only carry this out in conjunction with Hungary's ability to carry burdens. At the same time, all of us must accept the rational burdens of the costs of a smaller but more efficient army.

[Matyuc] A large-scale modernization is needed in order to join NATO, and this again requires money. Another question is whether the personnel of the Hungarian Army fulfills NATO's requirements.

[Mecs] The experiences of the joint military exercises with army units of the NATO member-states show that we must change—not regarding equipment and training primarily. The equipment of the NATO members is not uniform, and national armies have different military technology; there are NATO members that also use Russian equipment. It also transpired from these joint exercises that our professional soldiers need not be ashamed of their professional knowledge and level of training. However, we have a long way to go to catch up in the fields of telecommunication, organization, and cooperation, including the knowledge of languages.

[Matyuc] When can we catch up with these?

[Mecs] The Partnership for Peace Program is a good opportunity for training because it constantly conveys the requirements. This program in itself improves this region's security policy situation, because it is the goal of all the neighboring countries to become NATO members. In my opinion, the Hungarian Army will be suitable for NATO membership around 1998.

[Matyuc] The reform of the Armed Forces is currently under way, and the ministry and the Army will work out their own ideas, while the political parties will try to coordinate their programs. In the meantime, the defense minister would abolish the Kaposvar military district. Was this already part of the plan?

[Mecs] Of course this military district will not be abolished, because Parliament has not yet approved the Armed Forces reform.

[Matyuc] Does the society accept the fact that we must spend more on the army, today when the Army's prestige is so low?

[Mecs] In my opinion, there has been an improvement in the prestige of the Hungarian Army. In the past, the Amy was regarded as a foreign world that served foreign goals. The change in the regime here and the unfortunate war being waged in the former Yugoslavia have modified this image a lot. It has become certain that we need an army. My fellows of 1956, people who earlier hated the "organization of force," are now wearing the uniform gladly.

[Matyuc] As opposed to the officers in active service who prefer to wear civilian clothes since 1989. There are also military opinions according to which the decision of the defense minister to allow soldiers to leave the barracks in civilian clothes gives one the feeling that there is no Army at all.

[Mecs] I see officers in uniform with increased frequency. With the use of civilian clothes, Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti took a step in the direction of a "civil army." We would like to see the conscripted citizens have to change their everyday lifestyle as little as possible.

[Matyuc] The rights of regular conscripts are increasing. However, the new regulations would limit the right of free expression of opinion among the professional soldiers, and the Military Security Office would even "track down" the family members.

[Mecs] The professional soldiers are waiting impatiently for the new regulations. As far as I know, they have nothing against most of the planned restrictions. In the Netherlands, for example, every civil employee, and not only the professional officers, must submit to a national security test. There is a strong demand among the professional soldiers that the Army stay away from everyday politics, and government changes should not disturb the Army's life. In my opinion, in view of the results of the parliamentary elections, it is understandable that professional soldiers cannot be parliamentary deputies. However, I think it is a useless restriction not to allow a professional soldier to be a mayor or local

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government representative. The new constitution could take this into consideration, albeit in a differentiated way.

[Matyuc] Do you think that most professional soldiers will regard the changes as a new reorganization?

[Mecs] This time, the reform of the Armed Forces will be made up of medium-range and long-term concepts, concepts that the professional personnel will be able to comprehend and evaluate in time. The soldiers are also aware of the fact that we need changes in the Army, and we are striving to attain this goal with as little money as possible on the level of the society. As for the soldiers, the changes should be carried out with the least possible disturbance, turmoil, and movement.

Defense Minister Promises Pay Raise to Conscripts

LD2401095895 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2200 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The defense minister has said that the reorganization of the Army is really necessary because the Army cannot be maintained in its present form from the funds received from the budget. Despite this, Gyorgy Keleti promised that the pay of conscripts would be increased this year. The Hungarian Army's professional soldiers can expect a pay rise of 10 percent. Civilian employees' salaries, however, will rise by a maximum of 1 percent only. [passage omitted]

Discussions on Ethnic Party Yield No Results

LD2301212495 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Romanian Government's general secretary is holding talks in Budapest. Levente Sukosd reports:

[Sukosd] Both parties described the talks as a serious contest. Csaba Tabajdi, political state secretary at the Office of the Hungarian Prime Minister, considered the part of the negotiations that concerned the banning of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania [HDUR] to be unsuccessful. Viorel Hrebenciuc, general secretary of the Romanian Government, spoke of a scoreless game.

The three-hour talks behind closed doors were followed by a public duel—which is what the two politicians' briefing turned into. According to Hrebenciuc, the Romanian justice minister's statement that demanded the banning of the HDUR was a private opinion. Commenting on the Romanian Government's opinion, he said that it only calls on the HDUR to observe Romania's laws and Constitution.

In Csaba Tabajdi's view, this does not reassure the Hungarian Government and public opinion. On the contrary: It fills them with deep apprehension. He believes the anti-HDUR atmosphere is becoming more and more prominent in Romania, and it is also being promoted by government circles.

The HDUR's Council for Local Governments—which prompted the demands for the banning of the HDUR in Romania—operates in accordance with the Council of Europe's charter on local governments, which Romania, too, has signed.

Hungarian Slovaks Comment on Bratislava Government

LD2301214495 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian parties of Slovakia are of the view that the new Pozsony [Bratislava] government program does not give wide scope for good cooperation between Slovakia and Hungary. This was said by Miklos Duray, chairman of the Coexistence Movement, after his delegation had talks with Zoltan Gal, speaker of the Hungarian parliament, in Budapest. Duray said that the Hungarian parties of Slovakia disagree with the Meciar Cabinet's plans because they can see in them an attempt to revive a centralizing system reminiscent of the 1970's.

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Pawlak Discusses Potential Ministers With Walesa

LD2301133295 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1244 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 23 Jan—During today's meeting with President Lech Walesa, Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak told the president that the PSL-SLD [Polish Peasant Party-Democratic Left Alliance] coalition had discussed various candidacies for the vacant posts of Minister of National Defense and Minister of Foreign Affairs, when Andrzej Olechowski's resignation was formally accepted by the president. The prime minister has been meeting the selected candidates to obtain their consent for a formal presentation to the president, the government press office announced today.

The prime minister made a proposal to the president to hold a meeting with the participation of Aleksander Kwasniewski, SLD parliamentary party chairman, Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy, and Deputy Speaker Jozef Zych.

Daily Says Former MSZ Head Pawlak's Candidate

WS2301133895 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 21 Jan 95 p 2

[Article by Cezary Gmyz: "MSZ. Prime Minister Has Candidates for Foreign Minister; Olechowski Returns"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] One of the three candidates of the prime minister for the head of the Foreign Affairs Ministry [MSZ] is Mr. Olechowski; however, it is not Andrzej, but Tadeusz, ZYCIE WARSZAWY has found out from well-informed sources. Tadeusz Olechowski is not a relative of the incumbent minister. Pawlak's candidate headed the Polish diplomatic services earlier—in the late 1980's. Recently he was Poland's representative for contacts with NATO. The two other candidates are probably Eugeniusz Wyzner, under secretary of state in the MSZ, and Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, the government's plenipotentiary for contacts with the European Union. Also considered were the candidacies of Jan Borkowski of the Polish Peasant Party, head of the Sejm Committee for the European Treaty, and Andrzej Wieczorkiewicz, under secretary of state in the Office of the Council of Ministers. [passage omitted]

Belgian PM on NATO, EU Integration

WS2401121495 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 23 Jan 95 p 6

[Interview with Belgian Prime Minister Jean Luc Dehaen by Malgorzata Alterman; place and date: "Groznyy Has Pulled Us Closer to NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Alterman] Does the Russian intervention in Chechnya in any way affect the debate on NATO extension?

[Dehaen] We are extremely worried by the situation in Chechnya. The talks that we have held with Polish leaders suggest that they are also worried—perhaps even more than we are. We are not putting in question the fact that Chechnya is part of Russia. However, the method which the Russians are using in order to resolve this problem is contrary to what we have jointly established in CSCE.

It may turn out that in the future this will speed up the process of NATO extension. On the other hand, however, stabilization of authorities in Russia lies in our interests as well. It is very difficult to find the golden mean.

[Alterman] When are we going to be admitted to NATO, then?

[Dehaen] I believe that this will be possible in a relatively short time, in two or three years, let us say.

The economic integration will take longer—five or perhaps six years. It will depend on the efforts made by the individual countries aspiring to the membership, as well as on the time which the European Union [EU] itself will need to reform its establishments.

[Alterman] What impressions did you get during your visit to Poland?

[Dehaen] I left your country with the conviction that the Polish political class is determined to make every effort to help your country join EU and NATO.

I got the impression that Poland places greater emphasis on security issues rather than the economy. President Walesa seemed to confirm this when he said that "if we are integrated with the security organization, the rest will happen automatically."

[Alterman] Do you agree with the appeal made by President Walesa and President Havel, who stated that membership in NATO should come before membership in EU?

[Dehaen] I am an advocate of this idea myself. However, we have to make sure that the process of NATO extension takes place in a broader context of the overall architecture of European security. NATO extension does not depend on Russia; however, I believe that it is in the interests of all of us that the process occur with understanding on the part of Russia.

[Alterman] Can we hope that NATO will finally determine by the end of the year which countries can count on membership?

[Dehaen] I believe that this possibility cannot be ruled out.

[Alterman] Can the Czech Republic, for instance, join EU before Poland does?

[Dehaen] Yes, it can. This would be consistent with the logic of my proposal. If membership criteria are set, the

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country which fully satisfies them will be able to join EU. Each country will be evaluated in line with the same criteria and it will decide itself whether it will choose a tougher but faster road to NATO or an easier but longer road.

[Alterman] You have visited both Poland and the Czech Republic. You had the opportunity to make comparisons. Which of these two countries stands a better chance?

[Dehaen] It is hard to tell. One of the Belgian managers who is investing in Poland and in the Czech Republic simultaneously told me that the global figures suggest that the situation looks better in the latter. In practice, however, the situation more often looks better in Poland—I mean first of all the way in which the companies are functioning and the possibilities of their development. I believe that the potential of the Polish economy, its geographical location, as well as the importance of a market consisting of 40 million people open up enormous possibilities before Poland. In order to fully realize this potential, it is necessary to make every effort to see to it that the same political policy is continued for a certain period of time.

[Alterman] The Belgian press carried reports that neither Prime Minister Pawlak nor President Walesa had made a very good impression on you.

[Dehaen] Whenever there is something I want to say, I say it myself, not waiting for the press to do it for me. These were not my actual statements. The talks which I had in Poland clearly show that lack of political stability may negatively affect the speed with which your country will meet the criteria of EU membership. Everyone stressed the necessity of implementing constitutional reform, which is needed to precisely specify who is responsible for the elements of the decisionmaking process in the Polish Government.

As for control over the Army, you have three models to choose from: the German model, the American model, and the French model. The Polish model right now is very similar to the French one. It is obvious, however, that the French model is at the same time the most difficult to implement, especially in a situation when the president and the majority in the parliament do not support the same policy.

[Alterman] The Belgian press noticed even some kind of soul kinship between you and Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus.

[Dehaen] As far as the vision of Europe is concerned, I differ with Vaclav Klaus more than I do with the politicians whom I met in Poland. In Poland EU is regarded primarily as a European institution. Now, Prime Minister Klaus is mainly interested in the aspect of EU's free market. To me EU is more than just a common market.

I would also like to say that Prime Minister Klaus and I maintain very good personal contacts.

UOP Head Interviewed on Parliamentary Control

WS2301143095 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 17 Jan 95 p 12

[Interview with General Gromoslaw Czempinski, head of the Office of State Protection (UOP), by Anna Marszalek; place and date not given: "We Are Not Monks, but We Act in the Interests of the State"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Marszalek] The press carried reports that you are against parliamentary control over special services. In order to back their information, journalists quoted deputies.

[Czempinski] This was a manipulation. Right at the beginning of my letter to Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy I stated that I am in favor of exercising such control. I could even say that I am actually the father of this idea, because when I worked in the intelligence services, way back in 1990, along with Deputy Minister Jasik, who was the head of the intelligence services at that time, I was the one who submitted the idea of setting up a commission. We continued to submit this idea to each new minister. I believe that parliamentary control over the services would be an important complement of the state democratization process.

[Marszalek] Let me explain why some people think that you are against this idea. In your letter to the Sejm speaker, you submitted so many remarks that control would practically be impossible, and the only power the commission would actually have would be fighting for the budget of these services.

[Czempinski] The commission will be quite profoundly initiated into the issues which the Office of State Protection [UOP] deals with. It will become familiar with its problems, as well as with the difficulties that it encounters while performing its tasks. Therefore, it ought to help the services find resources. Good cooperation creates a chance to establish control. Also, the institution that is financed from taxpayers' money would meet all expectations. We must make up our minds: do we want to have strong special services, or would it be better to dissolve them?

[Marszalek] Sejm deputies questioned the right of the services to "impose their conditions on them."

[Czempinski] Why should we not voice our opinions on this matter? After all, it does concern us. It must be remembered that our opinions are not binding on anyone—the final form of the bill will be decided exclusively by the Sejm. Now is the time for discussion. Nonetheless, it is assumed beforehand that UOP is wrong, and that it should remain silent.

[Marszalek] What, then, should the role of the commission be and what powers should the deputies have?

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[Czempinski] What we need is a systemic solution and political culture, which is only emerging in our country. In a sense, special services are a separate world; however, this is what they should be, because otherwise their existence would not make any sense. The forms and methods of our activity should remain classified, or else this activity would be inefficient. The main institution that assigns tasks to us is the government; second comes the president, who assigns his tasks within the limits of his Constitutional powers. However, in fact tasks are assigned to us by the minister, who is also entitled to exercise considerable control over us. The Inspectorate of Supervision and Control in the Internal Affairs Ministry [MSW] has access to very detailed information on the activities of UOP. The minister can even give orders to individual UOP officers. The UOP head has the right to object, but this does not amount to much. Moreover, the possibility of making decisions in important issues, such as installation of bugging devices, cameras, or implementation of operational techniques has been worked out in such a way that even the system for obtaining permission to use the aforementioned techniques involves control. Control is also exercised in individual organizational units of UOP as well as in the institution as a whole. Apart from that, I also order control in the various sections. In addition, there is also the Supreme Chamber of Control, which carries out, among others, annual examinations of UOP's financial affairs.

[Marszalek] Are you assuming that the commission will leak information?

[Czempinski] We are not assuming that. Instead, it is others who are assuming that we are such a dubious organization that it is necessary to take a closer look at every aspect of our activities. This is borne out by the demand that the commission be entitled to investigate cases.

[Marszalek] Do you think that it should be assumed a priori that there are no faulty practices in your organization, and that if there are, it would be enough if they were examined by an interministerial control?

[Czempinski] Our internal control reveals certain faulty practices and, depending on what kind of practices they are, we either send the case to a prosecutor, or take disciplinary action, or dismiss our functionaries. However, it cannot be assumed a priori that we are a service which does not stick to the letter of the law.

[Marszalek] What should such parliamentary control be like, then? After all, it should reconcile the desire of deputies to know your secrets with the interests of the services.

[Czempinski] Everything depends on common sense and on how the generally formulated regulations will be put into effect. Certain issues will have to remain classified and inaccessible even to the commission, until the internal affairs minister, who will consider each case individually and who has access to all the operational materials, grants his permission. I want to emphasize that we are secret services whose activities are not conventional. If they were conventional, they would be doomed to failure. We must employ such methods which allow us not to be outwitted by criminal and intelligence organizations. We have performed several actions which were deemed controversial but resulted in spectacular advantages for our country. If the commission had been working at that time, there would not have been such a possibility because I would not have risked the safety of the people involved.

[Marszalek] What specific issues, apart from the so-called container affair, are you talking about? Have any of them come to light?

[Czempinski] Not the real versions.

[Marszalek] Did they involve drugs, arms, or anything else?

[Czempinski] Both drugs and arms. I do not want to discuss the others. I would also like to add that if any issues appear that may cause certain internal or external complications, we always inform the prime minister about them. Now, once the commission has been set up, I will explain things mainly to this body. I fear that yet another authority center will be created.

[Marszalek] Do you not think that this is exactly what certain political forces want to see happen?

[Czempinski] I get this impression. If the chairman of this special commission decides that he does not really like the UOP head for some reason, he may get rid of him—for example, by bombarding him with questions, by constantly ordering control, and by going deep into details. Every day this UOP head will have to make decisions whether or not to give access to something, whether or not to declassify an issue. Currently I spend 20 percent of my time pouring over operational materials, because I am at the same time "my own deputy" for operational affairs. The rest of my time is taken up by politics: paperwork, meetings, drawing up documentation for the supreme bodies in the state, and constantly preparing all kinds of explanations. The possibility cannot be ruled out that the UOP head's only task will be maintaining contacts with the commission.

[Marszalek] How much information would you provide to the commission if it were set up in line with the bill? Would you provide current information, information concerning ongoing affairs, or would your information reach the commission only after the press reported about some kind of "dealings"?

[Czempinski] So far I explained things only after newspapers carried the information. However, we have also had our internal problems which resulted from the implementation of our tasks. Let us take the Belarusian case, for instance: we had to make a careful analysis to determine whether this was our or somebody else's fault.

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Fortunately, I must say that for the first time I was surprised at the stand taken by our mass media, which could not have reacted more honorably. (Belarusian special services accused Polish intelligence services of penetrating their country. This was to be proved by an article published in the Minsk daily SEM DNEY, in which Vladymyr Malashkevich claimed that UOP had forced him to cooperate as a spy. Polish press put in question the reliability of his revelations, suspecting him of cooperating with the Belarusian services—note by Anna Marszalek). I was convinced that we were in for a bumpy ride. After all, it is not all that difficult to inspire the press to do something, which various services take advantage of.

[Marszalek] What kind of information should the commission receive?

[Czempinski] We like the civilized German model. In that country, submitted to parliamentary control are general activities of the services, happenings and cases which result from their activity of "special" importance, as well as budget projections and their implementation. Such regulations should not be more detailed. A man who is in charge of the intelligence services would find it difficult to precisely explain certain issues. For example, if we submitted our intelligence plans, we would immediately hear questions such as: In what direction is all this going and why in this direction? How much does it cost? Why do we want to employ such techniques? Now, how would I explain why we want to obtain a certain document. There would be questions such as: Well, do you really want to steal a document from an office? It is also no secret that we sometimes must reach certain persons. Even if someone is able to guess what is being done, he has no proof and no names can be mentioned. If, for example, we want to buy something, we cannot be primitive and simply offer money; we must try to devise an intricate plan, so that the man who agrees to sell it will maintain his dignity. No details of these cases must be disclosed.

[Marszalek] How do you imagine discussing such issues with members of the commission, who may not really know much about the work of the services?

[Czempinski] It is going to be difficult. When UOP was being established, I decided to perform a certain action. It was a success; however, the authorities stated afterward that if they had known about the nature of the action, they would not have given their consent. This is the convention of these services. If certain things could be swung in a different way, special services would be redundant. We are not monks. This is what we are trained for; we are not trained to simply fight against criminal organizations. We are trained for something unique, more sophisticated. If control is detailed, we will not be able to guarantee safety to our people or the conspiracy of our activities. When the head of the services and the internal affairs minister are appointed, certain trust is placed in them. A man at the bottom of our organization must have confidence in me; he must also have a certain feeling of security. Of course, if he fails, he will bear the responsibility; however, this cannot thwart all initiative. Frankly, I do not know how to explain this to politicians. All of this is something new to us, even though, as I have said, all the politicians who were in this ministry made the services employ more unconventional methods. However, people who spent many years in the firm mostly turned out to be "big brakes."

[Marszalek] Still, special services will never be fuliy trusted, either by the people or by politicians, as long as authority centers continue to compete with one another, and try to take advantage of UOP and the Military Information Services [WSI] for their own purposes. I have even heard an opinion that whereas the president and the prime minister have such a possibility, the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] is deprived of it, as a result of which it is trying to force through the parliament the bill on setting up the special commission, and it is doing this just to gain access to information during the election campaign.

[Czempinski] I have heard such an opinion as well. I personally am attributed to various configurations—it depends on who evaluates me. The president, the prime minister, and representatives of SLD have their separate opinions about our work and they submit their own reservations. I know the dubious opinions about the cleanness of the intentions of the services. It seems that the only solution is the appointment of their own head of the services.

[Marszalek] Who wants to see this happen, do you think?

[Czempinski] The UOP head is appointed by the prime minister. Of course, the decision should be discussed with the president, but, in line with the regulations, it does not have to be. Thus, the coalition can appoint its own head. Even though the candidacy of the internal affairs minister must be discussed, the prime minister can actually appoint his own man to the post. Yet another problem is the chairman of the special commission. Should it be a representative of the opposition or a representative of the coalition?

[Marszalek] The cards that have been dealt seem to suggest that it should be an SLD representative.

[Czempinski] That is, a man of the coalition. Therefore, we might find ourselves in a situation where the minister, UOP head, and the chairman of the commission are all persons related to the coalition.

[Marszalek] Yes, we might, theoretically. However, for the time being SLD supports the incumbent minister, and the prime minister probably is not thinking of recalling you, for fear of a deadlock comparable to the police chief affair.

[Czempinski] What about the Defense Ministry?

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[Marszalek] Well, yes, you are right. However, it is common knowledge that the president is a man of strong influence in the Defense Ministry, in the General Staff, and WSI. Is it not so that currently forces are rather equal there?

[Czempinski] The head of the services should be apolitical. He should not yield to any center of authority; he ought to serve the state. This is what I am trying to do. Fortunately, everyone—the president, the prime minister, and the minister—respects the principle that UOP should not be involved in any political games. This would spell the end of these services and this must be borne in mind. The police, for instance, remains far from politics. It is my great desire that the services be perceived in such a way as well.

[Marszalek] How, then, are you going to defend yourself from those who are saying that you are a supporter of the president. This also affects the opinion about the services.

[Czempinski] I do not even try to defend myself. First and foremost I am a civil servant. The president has certain powers. However, it is the internal affairs minister who assigns tasks to me. As a result, I feel very comfortable at heart. I do not even try to evaluate the president or the prime minister.

[Marszalek] So the president does not directly assign tasks to you?

[Czempinski] No, this has never happened to me. The minister never says that this particular order has come from the president. I do not prepare my information "specifically for someone."

[Marszalek] How about the prime minister?

[Czempinski] The prime minister orders me to prepare material for the Council of Ministers, for instance. He can always summon me and do it personally.

[Marszalek] Do you provide information directly to the prime minister and the president, not via the internal affairs minister?

[Czempinski] I never do that. Each time the minister is informed. Minister Milczanowski, when he headed UOP, ordered UOP to give information directly to the prime minister, the president, and members of the government, and that each time the minister be informed about it. Incidentally, these are often materials that are discussed with him.

[Marszalek] Who has more tasks for UOP: the president or the prime minister?

[Czempinski] The prime minister, definitely.

[Marszalek] There are rumors that since relations between you and Mr. Wachowski became cooler, the president has been more frequently assigning certain tasks, including "civil" ones, to WSI.

[Czempinski] I do not know anything about this. I hold meetings with Minister Wachowski; however, contrary to all opinions, I do not remember him assigning any task to me. He sometimes asks me for an opinion, and I do not always express opinions that someone might want to hear. The role of this office is to inform and to formulate opinions on the basis of facts, not to form them so that someone will like them. This would be the end of objectivity of the services, as well as the end of their nonpolitical character.

[Box, p 12]

UOP

UOP was set up by the law of 6 April 1990 in the stead of the Security Service [SB], which had been dissolved (the last chief of SB was Colonel Jerzy Karpacz). The function of the internal affairs minister was then fulfilled by General Czeslaw Kiszczak. The law obliged him to set up UOP within three months from the day the law became effective.

11 May 1990—the first chief of the newly established office was Krzysztof Kozlowski. His deputy was Andrzej Milczanowski (a prosecutor, then legal adviser, from Szczecin).

6 July 1990—Henryk Majewski, deputy chief of the Gdansk Voivodship police, became minister.

February 1991—Jerzy Koniecz ny became UOP deputy chief.

16 October 1991—Wiktor Fonfara became the director of the Investigation Board.

December 1991—Antoni Macierewicz became minister.

21 January 1992—Andrzej Milczanowski submitted his resignation.

1 February 1992—Piotr Naimski was appointed UOP head. Jerzy Koniec z ny resigned from the post of UOP deputy chief; on 1 March 1992 he was replaced by Adam Taracha.

1 April 1992—Henryk Jasik was recalled from the post of director of the First Board (intelligence)

2 April 1992—Janusz Luks was entrusted with the duties of director of the First Board.

11 May—Naimski dismissed Wojciech Garstka (former spokesman of Internal Affairs Minister Czeslaw Kiszczak) from the Office of Analyses and Information [BAI].

15 May—Wojciech Brochwicz was recalled from the post of deputy chief of the counterintelligence services (for some time he was without a job; after June 1992 he was an adviser to Minister Milczanowski; right now he is the deputy chief of the Border Troops main commander).

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29 May—Niemczyk resigned from the post of head of BAI.

June 1992—after the Olszewski government stepped down, Milczanowski was the head of MSW and UOP at the same time.

8 June—Professor Jerzy Konieczny became deputy head of UOP.

7 July—the position of the second deputy chief of UOP (in place of the recalled Taracha) was filled by Jerzy Nozka (Phd holder from the Jagiellonian University; prior to that, deputy director of the MSW legal office)

15 July—Konieczny became UOP head.

16 July—Konieczny was promoted to the rank of colonel.

15 October—Janusz Luks became the "full-fledged" head of the intelligence services.

31 December 1992—Gromoslaw Czempinski, deputy director of the Intelligence Services, was promoted to deputy head of UOP.

January 1993—Adam Aduszkiewicz became BAI head again.

1 December 1993—Professor Jerzy Konieczny was recalled and Gromoslaw Czempinski was promoted to UOP head.

6 December 1993—Zdzislaw Skorza became UOP deputy chief.

15 June 1994—Skorza and Nozka were promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel.

15 September 1994—Janusz Luks was recalled from the post of intelligence services chief, and Marian Zacharski was appointed to the post (he resigned after a few days, currently he is an adviser to the UOP head).

1 October—Bogdan Libera, representative of the Polish intelligence services in Vienna, was appointed to the post of head of the First Board.

Structure

UOP head: General Gromoslaw Czempinski

Director of UOP Head's Office: Director Andrzej Derlatka

UOP deputy chief: Lieutenant Colonel Jerzy Nozka

UOP deputy chief: Lieutenant Colonel Zdzislaw Skorza

First Board (intelligence): Director Colonel Bogdan Libera

Second Board (counterintelligence): Director Lieutenant Colonel Konstanty Miodowicz

Third Board (investigation): Director Lieutenant Colonel Wiktor Fonfara

Office of Analyses and Information: Adam Aduszkiewicz

Office of Archives Recording: Antoni Zielinski (he was the director of the MSW Central Archives, he left following a conflict with Majewski)

In addition:

Office of Observation

Office of Ciphers

Office of Technology

Office of Personnel and Training

Administrative-Economic Office

Finance Office

Office of Coordination and Prognoses

Presidial Office

(all these are divided into departments and sections)

On the motion of the UOP head, the internal affairs minister has set up UOP offices in 14 voivodship towns: Katowice, Szczecin, Gdansk, Lublin, Krakow, Olsztyn, Wroclaw, Rzeszow, Poznan, Lodz, Radom, Kielce, Bydgoszcz, Bialystok, as well as their field divisions.

Both the structure of UOP and the number of its employees are all classified information. SB comprised approximately 25,000 persons. Files revealed in the Sejm early in 1993 suggest that UOP consisted of 6,073 full-time functionaries. Right now the number may have increased to approximately 10,000.

Poll: Most Professional Soldiers Support SdRP

WS2301134495 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 23 Jan 95 p 3

[Article by Luiza Kowalska: "Whom Do Soldiers Like?"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Research reveals that most professional soldiers identify themselves with the program and activities of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP]. Second place, after the postcommunists, is occupied by the Freedom Union, followed by the Polish Peasant Party and the Labor Union.

The right is enjoying far lesser support. The Center Accord [PC] was the rightist party that was evaluated least negatively. The PC is followed by the Confederation for an Independent Poland. Professional soldiers are most critical of the Christian-National Union.

WIBS [expansion unknown] completed the research in December last year. Research was carried out between July 1993 and July 1994, with the participation of 560 professional soldiers.

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Prime Minister Views Results of Reform Process

AU2401071495 Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian 19 Jan 95 pp 1-2

[Interview with Romanian Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu by Carmen Radulescu, Radio XXI reporter; place and date not given: "1995 Is a Very Difficult but Extremely Important Year for Romania"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Radulescu] Please allow me, Mr. Prime Minister, to thank you for your kindness in offering us pertinent answers regarding certain issues that are preoccupying us all. First, I would like to ask you to sketch the phase we have reached in the reform process, as this is a key objective of the government program.

[Vacaroiu] The government's entire activity is carried out based on the government program and the strategy that has been sanctioned by Romania's parliament, although we are constantly adapting what we are doing to suit the concrete circumstances as we pass from one phase to the other—without, however, modifying the basic principles as well. One can say that since 1992, since the current executive has been in office, we have managed to overcome several difficult moments in the domain of reform. I am referring especially to the economic reform and to the measures we took in that sphere, some of which, as you know, were quite harsh but absolutely necessary. Such were the measures we took throughout 1993 and 1994, which of course were closely correlated with our monetary and financial policy.

If we were to review the years 1993 and 1994, we could say that we managed to achieve the principal objectives: namely that, beginning with the second half of 1993, we managed to halt the decline of material production and initiate economic growth, as our GNP increased by 1.4 percent and, judging from the preliminary data we have over 1994, the 1994 GNP amounts to 3 percent.

Similarly, the deficit in Romania's trade balance has been reduced substantially, as well as the deficit in its balance of payments. Comparing the situation in the years prior to 1992, when the trade balance deficit was around $1.5 billion, it currently amounts to only $300 million—which means that Romania's economy has started to grow. Besides this, we have made sustained efforts and managed to preserve the country's hard-currency reserves, which is a very important thing if one wishes to strengthen trust in our national economy under the circumstances of a free, interbank, hard-currency market. The exchange rate of our national currency has been moving within normal parameters and has been relatively stable, and—this is a very important element—inflation was cut from about 300 percent, as it used to be in 1993, to 60-62 percent in 1994.

These are the characteristics, in broad lines, of our economic-financial reform. I would say that a proper foundation has been created for Romania to get out of the crisis situation.

In the domain of social policy, however, despite the fact that, here too, we have taken a series of measures, especially in the social protection sector, the results are still far from what we anticipated in the restructuring program, which is a genuine social-democratic program laying emphasis on social policy. The results failed to meet our expectations. One should, however, note that such results also depend on the country's economic potential.

[Radulescu] As is known, during the transition to the market economy, there is a time period wherein the standard of living drops regardless of what is being done to halt this. Could one say, Mr. Prime Minister, that the course of our standard of living is now at least level, if not ascending?

[Vacaroiu] Let me tell you that over 1994, we registered a slight, even if not spectacular, increase in that domain. We do not have the final figures yet, but I believe the increase amounts to 8 to 10 percent. Of course, considering the level from which we set off, this is not very much. But here I would like to rebuff certain allegations to the effect that 80 percent of the country's population lives below the poverty level. It is true—I do not deny it—that life has been difficult. It has been a hard life, and we, the majority of the population, are far from living under normal, regular standard-of-living circumstances. Nevertheless, the important thing here is that they understood one thing—as I personally witnessed during my working visits, during my talks at the headquarters of various economic units in various counties: namely, that without proper work there can be no better living conditions; and without producing, no one can expect the standard of living to grow. And not just any production but a viable one, which can be sold on the foreign or domestic markets rather than kept in stock.

This is the positive signal I also detected during my recent visit to Arges County. I was even surprised that the trade unions of certain major companies have stopped demanding higher salaries, more living quarters, or better heating—although it would be natural for them to do so—but rather raised the following issue: We want to work; we want you to help us sell our products and increase production, because this will also lead to higher salaries.

So, I think something has changed over the past two years in the minds of the people engaged in material production. This is a very important element.

[Radulescu] Do you believe, Mr. Vacaroiu, that the managerial and property crises have been overcome in Romania?

[Vacaroiu] No, they are not over yet. Despite the slight economic growth, Romania is still facing an economic crisis with an extremely harsh social impact. If this year, and over 1996, we manage to achieve far more spectacular economic growth rates—which should amount to about 5 percent each year—we could claim that Romania is on the way to rapidly overcoming the crisis

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situation and using its production potential better. However, this also presupposes a better management of the economic companies, as we are still facing a management crisis. Here is some proof: We still have hundreds of economic companies facing major difficulties but still just waiting for someone to come place his order, or to tell them where to sell their products or purchase raw materials or how to ensure the salaries of their employees. Now this is something that no longer works, as all such mechanisms have disappeared. So I think this is an aspect in which we are still facing a deep crisis, although we are also in the midst of the restructuring and privatization process. Very little has been done in the domain of privatization.

Generally speaking, at the level of the entire country, we have, at pressent, somewhere around 30-36 percent of the GNP. Of course, if parliament passes the draft bill on boosting large-scale privatization rapidly, in just one year's time, there will be a substantial leap in this domain as well. I am referring to the activity of massively privatizing companies—which cannot alone solve the problems, because privatization is not something that can be achieved just by snapping one's fingers. First, privatization means that there should be a potential available, capital—be it domestic investment or a foreign financial infusion—on the basis of which we can proceed with the privatization process, because privatization should lead to an increase in the efficiency of material production. Otherwise we are merely deceiving ourselves. This goes especially for the large-scale companies, in whose case privatization is a long-term process using an array of various methods. The basic rule is that the company in question should not die. There are more than a few countries with advanced market economies in which the state-owned sector predominates, and very efficiently, at that. It quite often happens that private companies go bankrupt, in which case the state takes them over to avoid the social impact. The state revives them, after which it turns them private again. Privatization is a process having no end, even in the countries that have advanced economies.

[Radulescu] Don't you think, Mr. Prime Minister, that if the executive were more courageous and used the mass media better to explain in greater detail—as, let us say, a preventive method—the measures it takes as well as the sacrifice these measures imply on the part of the population—that is: if there were more openness—the population would be better able to understand the need for the measures?

[Vacaroiu] I believe that is an essential prerequisite, Mrs. Radulescu. What are the musts of the transition period and economic reform? Sacrifice, high social costs, and a not-at-all-too-good standard of living. Under such circumstances, it is essential for us to work in full openness. That is what we have been, and are, trying to do. We have always presented—in so far as we had access to the radio and television stations or the printed press—the real situation. Of course, we also have opponents who would always say a wall is black, even if it is white; nor, unfortunately, has the mass media displayed too much interest in the essential problems, the economic causes, of the standard of living, or the genuine problems in carrying out the reform. For instance, if I hold a news conference today, in two or thre days you will hardly find anything about it in the press. They want to sell as many copies as possible and therefore place greater emphasis on spectacular events, sensational news, instead of concentrating on the essential problems of reform.

We constantly try to be present in the mass media with concrete elements regarding the way reform is being implemented, as well as its possible impact.

[Radulescu] In conclusion, Mr. Prime Minister, I would like you to briefly refer to the actions and measures envisaged by the executive over the current year.

[Vacaroiu] 1995 is a very difficult, but extremely important year for Romania. It is the year in which we will concentrate our efforts to strengthen the macroeconomic stability thus far achieved, and, on this basis, to obtain a much higher speed in the restructuring of economic companies. It is the year in which we will concentrate our efforts on solving the problems causing financial blockage, and the year in which we hope to achieve higher economic growth than in 1993 and 1994, thus also establishing the basis for the further rise in the standard of living. We detailed the course we aim to follow over 1995 above all in the 1995 Draft National Budget, currently waiting to be sanctioned by parliament. That document defines very precisely the various elements of our strategy, and I would like the mention just a few of them here.

We will lay emphasis on agriculture, which is considered the priority branch in our reform process; and grant priority to the investment sector and the bettering of the infrastructure, such as telecommunications, roads, railway, or the putting into operation of Reactor No. 1 at the Cernavoda nuclear power plant and the continuation of work on Reactor No. 2.

Besides this, one should not forget that a reform program is also being carried out in the domain of public order, the Armed Forces, education, health care, culture, and science. The funds allotted for all the aforementioned sectors exceed those of the previous year.

I would also like to mention our projects related to protecting the environment; the beginning of work in the southern part of the country, where they faced much difficulty owing to last summer's drought; and, last but not least, building living quarters. For the first time, we allotted 200 billion lei of the state budget to build living quarters. And of course let me also mention our permanent objective: namely, the alert implementation of Romania's restructuring and privatization program.

[Radulescu] Mr. Prime Minister, thank you for your kindness.

[Vacaroiu] I thank you, too.

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HDUR Body Issues Statement Following 'Attacks'

LD2301231195 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 2000 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The operative council of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania [HDUR] held a meeting in Marosvasarhely [Tirgu Mures] this afternoon. The HDUR leaders discussed the situation that has evolved following attacks against the organization:

[Barna Marosi, live via phone or recorded] HDUR Chairman Bela Marko, Honorary Chairman Laszlo Tokes, Executive Chairman Csaba Takacs, and chairmen of HDUR national bodies attended the meeting. The council assessed the circumstances of the formation of Romania's four-party government coalition and its expected consequences. It was of the view that with the formation of the new government coalition, a new domestic political situation has evolved that makes it necessary for all responsible political parties and organizations to take a firm position.

The council has established that an extraordinary attack has been launched against the HDUR. This attack carries the implication of a real danger of the restoration of communism, extremist nationalism, and chauvinism. In our view, the campaign against the HDUR simultaneously implies an attack against legitimate endeavors of the Hungarian community of Romania and democratic endeavors in general, the statement reads.

Officials Seize 20 Kg of Heroin at Bors

AU2301203295 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 21-22 Jan 95 p 12

[Article by Vlad Pufu: "Bors Customs Officials Seized 10 Kg of Heroin"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Customs officials at the Bors border crossing [with Hungary] discovered 20 kg of heroine at 1100 on 19 January. The substance was hidden inside the back seat of a car registered in Bulgaria under license plate No. AB-7697 and driven by Resmie Koda Randelo, accompanied by three other Bulgarian citizens.

The heroin was hidden inside the back seat and was divided into 30 cylinder-shaped packages.

"What caught my attention was that the number of suitcases did not match the number of days the four persons in question wished to stay in Romania," said the customs official who discovered the substance.

The initial investigation showed that the heroin was destined for the black market in Romania.

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Contact Group Members Meet Zubak, Ganic

AU2301200995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Late this afternoon, Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and Dr. Ejup Ganic, member of the presidency and vice president of the Federation, received Contact Group members—the U.S. representative, Ambassador Charles Thomas, and the British representative (William Ermann). Due to transportation problems, the other Contact Group members did not arrive in Sarajevo today.

In a long talk, the president and vice president of the Federation emphasized that the peace process can only continue if Karadzic's Serbs accept the Contact Group plan.

Federation President Kresimir Zubak pointed out once again that, in the hitherto peace process, the Serbian aggressor's side rejected all plans of the international community so far with constant sidetracking and obstruction. For this reason, it is mandatory that the Contact Group avoids any similar traps regarding the latest plan, which is backed by the five most influential countries in the world.

The arrival of the complete Contact Group at the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency is expected tomorrow morning.

Karadzic, Thomas View Peace Process

LD2301173495 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1528 GMT 23 Jan 95

[Item received by fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 23 Jan (TANJUG)—[Bosnian] Srpska republic President Radovan Karadzic and Foreign Affairs Minister Aleksa Buha held a two-hour-long meeting in Pale today with Charles Thomas, the U.S. member of the Contact Group for former Bosnia-Herzegovina, with whom they discussed the possibilities of continuing the peace process.

"We had very intense talks, but I am afraid we are not yet in a position to be fully confident about restarting negotiations," Thomas said after meeting the representatives of the Srpska republic.

Asked by a reporter what the likelihood was of the warring parties returning to the negotiating table, Thomas said he "does not like to predict."

"We are here for talks, and we are full of hope," Thomas added.

"We worked thoroughly yesterday and today on the possibility of restarting the negotiations, so we hope that certain improvements have been made," President Karadzic said following today's meeting with the U.S. member of the Contact Group.

The president of the Srpska republic hinted that it was possible that the whole membership of the contact group for former Bosnia-Herzegovina would arrive in Pale this week, following its talks with the Muslim side in Sarajevo, so a basis could definitely be set for restarting peace negotiations on the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

'Tactical Adjustment' to U.S. Policy on B-H

LD2301155395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1526 GMT 23 Jan 95

[By Stevan Cordas]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 23 (TANJUG)—The announced direct U.S.-Bosnian Serb talks are not a sensational turn in the U.S. policy, but its "tactical adjustment" to the situation in Bosnia and the relations within the "Contact Group," observers in Belgrade assessed Monday.

The NEW YORK TIMES on Saturday cited a letter by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic as saying that the United States, in the light of the four-month truce accord which took effect on Jan. 1, would initiate direct talks with the Bosnian Serb republic authorities.

Observers in Belgrade said it was certian that U.S. President Bill Clinton, under strong pressure from the Republicans, was trying to find a solution to the Bosnian crisis before the expiry of the four-month truce on May 1. They said if Clinton succeeded in doing this, he would significantly moderate the pressure from the Republicans and avoid a real danger of being forced to veto "Dole's Bill" on the unilateral exemption of the Bosnian Muslims from the U.N. embargo on arms deliveries to the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia.

Numerous comments in Europe and the United States on Monday said that, in any event, the latest U.S. move toward Bosnia could give initial positive results within the following few days. To achieve these results, the U.S. officials will have to convince the Bosnian Muslims that direct talks with the Bosnian Serbs would be useful.

The "friendly persuasion" could be completed in the next few days, when Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic is to arrive in Washington. There are assessments that the new move has placed the United States in a situation to take the lead in the "Contact Group" (which comprises also Russia, France, Great Britain and Germany) and renew the Bosnian peace process according to its own scenario.

Earliest close analyses of Christopher's letter to Izetbegovic imply that the United States has finally realized that a solution to the Bosnian crisis can hardly be found without meeting the basic interests of the Bosnian Serbs.

The United States is now facing a new task—to reconcile the Bosnian Serb with the Muslim interests, which means that Washington has the next move.

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Karadzic: Sufficient for Serbs, U.S. To Agree

BR2301150495 Milan IL GIORNALE in Italian 23 January 95 p 14

[Interview with Srpska republic leader Radovan Karadzic by Renato Farina in Pale; date not given: 'Give Us Sarajevo and We Will Give You Dalmatia']

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Farina] When will the war end?

[Karadzic] The war will stop when the whole of Europe recognizes us as a state. If it recognizes us, the Muslims will give up. They will have a moral justification and they can tell their people: We tried, but it went wrong; they have recognized them. We want peace; we have no interest in breaking the truce. We occupy more territory than we consider we should fairly possess. We are willing to give part of it back. We have a right to at least 64 percent. We can make do with even less.

[Farina] How much less?

[Karadzic] Fifty-fifty. It is not the quantity that is at issue but the quality. If they give me Sarajevo and Tuzla, I will waive claim to a lot of territory. The percentage is meaningless. The problem is choosing territories.

[Farina] Otherwise, the war goes on?

[Karadzic] As far as we are concerned, the war could already be over. We have no interest in engaging hostilities. We shall only mount counteroffensives against our attackers. Psychologically speaking, we have been ready for peace for a long time. The time has come to bring matters to a close. Italy should recognize us; it would be a contribution to peace.

[Farina, joking] And what is in it for us? [Farina ends]

Karadzic was not joking. He ran his fingers through his enormous, banana-shaped forelock:

[Karadzic] Dalmatia. You can consider the possibility of returning to Dalmatia. But, first and foremost, you have to do so because it is the right thing to do.

[Farina] And why is it right? Bosnia is a state, but you are not. That is what the legal experts say.

[Karadzic] To be reconized as a state you need three elements: people, territory, and a proper government. We have these three elements, but Bosnia does not. The European Community has behaved like Caligula, who made his horse a senator. It has recognized a state that does not exist and is pretending that one that does exist is not there. Until it recognizes us, Italy should at least treat us like the Croats and the Muslims. It should establish a mission here in Pale with a diplomat, a military attache, and a press officer.

[Farina] But you have taken this territory in war.

[Karadzic] The international community, flying in the face of all rights, has created the conditions for eliminating Yugoslavia by recognizing the breakaway republics as states and, what is more, accepting the borders drawn by communism. The Srpska republic, which I represent here, was born as an unwanted baby, unwanted even by us. Now it exists, and it needs to be cuddled, otherwise it will cry. Indeed, we are toddling now, and nobody will manage to kill us off.

[Farina] But Italy... [Farina ends]

He interrupted me.

[Karadzic, proudly, and somewhat vainly] Speaking of Italy, do you know that an Italian paper is going to publish 10 poems by me? Ah, yes. I have written five books, four of which have won prizes. The first one dates back to 1988. [Karadzic ends]

I have a vision of him hovering above Sarajevo, lyre in hand.

[Farina] Europe may be like Caligula, but you are like Nero. [Farina ends]

He took it well and laughed: TIME wrote the same thing. Like all tyrants, this Karadzic writes poetry.

[Karadzic] But they are wrong. I have not written poetry since I entered politics. As you see, the comparison with Nero does not hold up. Anyway, to get back to more serious matters, Kissinger, who is no fool, said: "Bosnia has never been a state, nor will it ever be one."

[Farina] Nevertheless, you and your cause are somewhat unpopular abroad. Have you not made mistakes?

[Karadzic] I have made more mistakes at home than on the international front. [Karadzic ends]

He stroked his hair in satisfaction.

[Farina] Well, you have certainly made a mistake in your choice of hairdresser.

[Karadzic] My hairdresser is wonderful. Her hame is Ljudica, and she is a Catholic Croat. Sad to say, although she lives in Serb territory, I am now out of reach of her comb. [Karadzic ends]

Flippancy is out of place in a war situation, but we are only human. And the war raises its head again.

[Farina] Did you expect war? Did you think it would be like this?

[Karadzic] At a rational level, I knew that it had to come, but I rejected the idea on an emotional plane, even to the point of leaving everything I possess, including my beloved 5,000 books, at my home in Sarajevo. I have lost everything. I could have saved them by moving everything onto Serb territory. A poet once wrote: "He knew he had to die/but he hoped not to die." Then war comes. It was not there a moment before, and there it is a moment later. My spirit recoils before the new cemetries

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and the orphans that this war has brought. I can bear the invalids and the destruction, but not the new cemetries and the orphans. And to think that now we are going to reach an agreement on a division to which all three sides agreed in Lisbon before the war. Then U.S. Ambassador Warren Zimmermann persuaded the Muslims to say no. Actually, it would be sufficient for us Serbs and the Americans to reach an agreement.

[Farina] You are a psychiatrist. How is your people's mental health?

[Karadzic] As a scientist, I see that psychosis and depressive states have almost disappeared. Pathological conditions will appear after the war. Only then will people realize how much the war has cost, that their children have died. At the moment we are all so optimistic. We are winning, we are strong, and the state is growing.

[Farina] What sort of life will be possible alongside the Muslims afterward?

[Karadzic] First we must reach an agreement. It is definitely impossible to live side by side with the Muslims. The Lebanon, Cyprus, and India show that. We will live as separate and, hopefully, friendly states. Business will bring us closer together. We have no hate. Those who are afraid hate. If there is a will for peace, it can be achieved in two months. [Karadzic ends]

He smiled at me and stroked his hair in jest. "You are the one with the wrong hairdresser." Behind the hills lay Sarajevo.

Agreement To Reopen Road Out of Sarajevo

AU2301135595 Paris AFP in English 1340 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 23 (AFP)—Warring parties in Bosnia Monday reached agreement on reopening a road linking Sarajevo to the outside world, a senior UN official said.

Viktor Andreyev, head of the UN Protection Force civil affairs department, said the agreement, to come into effect in a week's time, would allow Bosnian civilians travelling in groups to cross the UN-held Sarajevo Airport to travel between the besieged town and government-held territory in the centre of the country.

Serb-Muslim Truce Signed at Sarajevo Airport

LD2301172295 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1528 GMT 23 Jan 95

[Item received by fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 23 Jan (SRNA)—At 1330 today at Sarajevo Airport, Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the People's Assembly of the Srpska republic, and Hasan Muratovic, minister for relations with UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] in the Muslim Government, signed a protocol on the implementation of the agreement of 31 December on the complete cessation of hostilities and the agreement of 17 March of last year on the freedom of movement.

"The talks give hope for optimism. I believe that we will soon be able to hope for peace," Krajisnik said at the end of five hours of negotiations.

The agreement sets out that 31 January is the deadline for the opening of the "blue routes" for civilian traffic and the movement of humanitarian goods. The Serb side insisted on the immediate opening of roads through Sarajevo, but the Muslim negotiators rejected this proposal.

The Muslim side requested that it be given the necessary time to fulfill the conditions and comply with the provisions of an additional clause, according to which Merhamet and Caritas [Muslim and Catholic aid organizations, respectively] be allowed—alongside the internationally recognized humanitarian organizations—to effect the commercial movement of goods across Sarajevo Airport.

"The greatest achievement of today's meeting is the freedom of movement and free choice of place of residence while the agreement on the cessation of hostilities is in force", Krajisnik said.

According to him, all citizens of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina will, as of today, be able to change their place of residence as they please. In case such a move is denied them, all complaints and grievances will be forwarded to special international committees soon to be established for this purpose.

One of the points of the agreement envisages the evacuation of medical and other cases from Gorazde. According to Dragan Bulajic, chairman of the Srpska republic exchange commission, who was also present at the talks, a POW swap according to the all-for-all principle will be carried out after 31 January.

The exchange will be effected in line with a plan to be drawn up by the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC]. The deadline for presenting the plan is the end of January, and it will prescribe that each side releases 600 POW's, regardless of whether they are soldiers or civilians.

As Captain Bulajic said, the Muslims will disband two POW camps in Sarajevo, as well as prisons in Tarcin, Zenica, Lukavac, Tuzla, Gradacac, Mostar, and Travnik. The Serb side will release prisoners held in Kula, Srbinje, Batkovic, Banja Luka, and at Usora prison in Doboj.

It is expected that some 100 Serb soldiers taken prisoner during the recent fighting in Vijenac, Lisaca, the Bihac area, and on Mt. Igman will be included in the ICRC POW list by 31 January.

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UN Commander General Rose Ends Tour in Sarajevo

AU2301151495 Paris AFP in English 1345 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 23 (AFP)—British Lieutenant-General Michael Rose left Sarajevo by plane early Monday afternoon on his way to hand over control of UN forces in Bosnia to his compatriot Lieutenant-General Rupert Smith.

Rose, who has come under fire from the Bosnian Government for his handling of the UN mission in Bosnia, said he would leave behind "many friends in the Bosnian Government."

The British officer is to hand over command of the UN mission in Bosnia to Smith, in the Croatian capital Zagreb on Tuesday. Smith is expected in Sarajevo Wednesday.

Silajdzic Receives EU Mission Ambassador

LD2201153795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 22 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic today received the newly appointed head of the EU [European Union] observer mission Ambassador [name indistinct] and associates.

They discussed the current phase in the peace process. Prime Minister Silajdzic stressed that the Bosnia-Herzegovina side accepted the Contact Group peace plan and all the agreements offered so far, and that the Bosnia-Herzegovina parliament had defined a line, below which there can be no negotiations—that is the sovereign and internationally recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina. The international community made a huge mistake by imposing the arms embargo, which has been in force for the past three years, because it thus tied the victim's hands—it has already cost us 200,000 lives, including 17,000 children, Prime Minister Silajdzic said. [passage omitted]

EU: Croats Blocking Agreement in Mostar

LD2301173895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1709 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 23 (TANJUG)—The European Union [EU] administration in Mostar has accused Bosnian Croats of blocking all agreements on normalizing the situation in the city, the local Muslim radio said.

Muslim-controlled Mostar Radio on Monday cited the E.U. officials' report on their work in Mostar since July last year, when the city was placed under E.U. administration.

Even after Saturday's visit to Mostar by a Croatian delegation, headed by Prime Minister Nikica Valentic, Bosnian Croat authorities continued to block distribution of electricity to the eastern, Muslim-controlled part of Mostar, the radio said.

The E.U. administration said Mostar was still a divided city and movement of civilians was still limited because only 250 persons were allowed to cross from one part of the city into the other in a day.

Mostar Radio said the Croat side continued to oppose the forming of a joint police force, so that armed gangs were operating in the western, Croat-controlled part of the city, where "they are killing, robbing and expelling Muslims."

Mostar emerged from a one-year war between Bosnian Muslims and Croats as an almost totally destroyed city. Even the famous 16th-century old bridge, a masterpiece of Ottoman architecture, was blown up.

Before engaging in mutual fighting, however, the Bosnian Muslims and Croats had together expelled from Mostar and the surrounding area about 45,000 Serbs, and burnt or razed their settlements and churches.

Social Democrats Support Mostar Administrator

AU2301202795 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats in a statement expresses its full support to EU Mostar Administrator Hans Koschnik and his aides in their efforts to normalize life in this town as quickly as possible.

In the interest of its residents, the party is also demanding from the ruling parties, primarily the Croatian Democratic Community, to stop blocking the process of Mostar's reintegration and reconstruction.

Carter's Help Sought in Lifting Sanctions

LD2301135495 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1227 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 23 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA correspondents in the United States have called on former U.S. President Jimmy Carter to prompt the lifting of the sanctions against Yugoslavia and the isolation of Bosnian Serbs.

In a letter to Carter, the SRNA correspondents said the U.S. foreign policy violated the Serb people's right to self-determination and deprived it of the right to negotiate. They explained that peace in the Balkans could not be achieved without the Serbs.

The correspondents said their personal tragedy was that their families living in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could not receive even medicine they were being sent, and the tragedy of their kin and friends living in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina was in the fact that the United States was terming them "aggressors".

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The U.N. Security Council in May 1992 imposed comprehensive sanctions against the Yugoslav Federation of Serbia and Montenegro over Yugoslavia's alleged involvement in the Bosnian civil war.

The Security Council on Sept. 23, 1994, adopted the Resolution 942, extending the sanctions on the Bosnian Serb republic and banning international negotiations with its leadership. The resolution came after the Bosnian Serbs failed to accept the map on territorial division of Bosnia-Herzegovina designed by the five-nation "Contact Group".

At the invitation by Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic, Carter in December 1994 went on a mediating mission to Bosnia, resulting in an agreement on a four-month cessation of hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which took effect on Jan. 1. The Bosnian Serb authorities told Carter they were ready for a resumption of peace talks on the basis of the Contact Group plan.

Sarajevo Receiving 'Minimal' Natural Gas

AU2401100095 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] There has been no change in the supplies of natural gas in Sarajevo. Minimal amounts of gas are entering the city and the pressure is very low. Therefore, there are serious difficulties in supplying gas to the outskirts and hillside areas of Stari Grad and Centar, even though all the available gas is being sent to these districts.

This afternoon gas will be sent to Novi Grad and Novo Sarajevo, but consumers in these districts may find themselves facing similar problems. Owing to the unstable pressure level in the gas system, there is an increased danger of leakages, so all consumers are warned to exercise extreme caution. The main security measures are to turn off all the valves the moment the gas supply fades and air the rooms well when the gas appears again before lighting it. Before going to bed, make absolutely sure that you turn off all the valves. This has been stated by Sarajevo Gas.

Abdic Forces, 5th Corps Clashes Intensify

LD2301195595 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1802 GMT 23 Jan 95

[Item received by fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 23 Jan (SRNA)—The intensity of clashes between the units of Izetbegovic's 5th Corps and Fikret Abdic's People's Defense was stepped up today, especially in the vicinity of Velika Kladusa in the Bihac pocket.

Graham Day, UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] spokesman in the Cazin Krajina, confirmed that UN military observers had registered 195 explosions in the vicinity of Velika Kladusa this morning. Velika Kladusa has been in the hands of the People's Defense, the regular army of western Bosnia, since December.

The peace forces' spokesman also said that powerful explosions were heard this afternoon near Buzim in the northern part of the Bihac pocket. He said that a UNPROFOR team of observers had been sent to establish from where the explosions originated.

'All-Out Offensive'

AU2301155295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 23 Jan 95

[Report by Muhamed Mulic from Bihac]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The joint aggressors are not giving up their all-out offensive on the Bihac District, which can be seen in the enemy's combined artillery and infantry attacks on the Buzim and Velika Kladusa fronts today. Along with the fierce shelling of the front defense lines of the fighters of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, in which the enemy fired hundreds of projectiles, populated places were targeted as well.

In the morning hours, three destructive projectiles of an unknown origin were launched on the general region of Buzim from the UN-protected area, from the direction of Zirovac. Several civilians were victims of the attack and great material damage was caused to residential buildings. [passage omitted]

Inter-Muslim Fighting Resumes

LD2401101695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 0935 GMT 24 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Petrovac, 24 Jan (TANJUG)—After a relatively peaceful weekend, inter-Muslim fighting has resumed in Western Bosnia, Radio Velkaton in Velika Kladusa announced today. The same source says this was confirmed by the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] representative in Zagreb.

Radio Velkaton claims that over the past 24 hours heavy fighting has been registered in the Velika Kladusa and Buzim areas. The fiercest fighting is on the Buzim front, where "extremists of the 505th Buzim Brigade are trying desperately to break through the lines of the national defense of western Bosnia," Radio Velkaton claims, adding that losses have been suffered by both sides.

According to the same source, the latest attack on western Bosnia by the 5th Corps of the Muslim army, loyal to Alija Izetbegovic, is linked to the latest statement by the 5th Corps commander, Atif Dudakovic, who says that "in two weeks' time he will be in Velika Kladusa."

Serb Army Command: Croats, Muslims Violate Truce

LD2301215095 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2139 GMT 23 Jan 95

["Pool" item]

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[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bileca, Jan. 23 (TANJUG)—A Bosnian Serb Army command said Monday that Muslim troops and troops from Croatia had attacked Bosnian Serb positions in the southern region of Herzegovina.

Forces loyal to Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic were opening strong anti-aircraft and small-arms fire on Bosnian Serb positions in the area of Konjic, a town 40 km southwest of Sarajevo, the command said in a statement.

Croatian forces were shelling from anti-aircraft guns Bosnian Serb villages west of the town of Trebinje, the southernmost town of the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the border with Croatia, but caused no casualties, the statement said.

Bosnia's three warring sides—Muslims, Serbs and Croats—signed an agreement for a four-month cessation of hostilities and implemented it on Jan. 1.

Well-informed Bosnian Serb military sources in Banja Luka said that Croatian and Bosnian Croat troops in the area of Grahovo and Livno were getting reinforcements in personnel and material.

Joint Croatian and Bosnian Croat forces launched an offensive on the Grahovo-Livno front on Nov. 30, 1994, occupying and razing to the ground 13 Bosnian Serb localities and displacing nearly 10,000 persons, according to Bosnian Serb figures.

The Bosnian Serb army estimates that the offensive tied at least 8,000 Croatian and Bosnian Croat troops, the brunt of them from the Croatian towns of Split, Sinj, Nasice, Slavonski Brod and Dubrovnik.

Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic, addressing the United Nations in New York in mid-December, confirmed the presence of Croatian troops in civil war in Bosnia.

Bosnian Serb leaders have requested more than once that the United Nations and its Protection Force stop and condemn Croatia's involvement in the Bosnian civil war.

Muslim Attacks on Serbs

LD2301144995 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1357 GMT 23 Jan 95

[Received via fax]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bileca, 23 Jan (SRNA)—This morning passed peacefully in Herzegovina. This was not the case yesterday when Muslim units carried out strong attacks on Serb positions in the northern sector of the front, the information service of the Herzegovina Corps of the Serb army in Bileca has announced.

Members of the 4th Muslim Corps attacked Serb lines in the area of Bukovih Glava, east of Konjic, from several directions yesterday afternoon. The Muslim infantry attack was supported by strong mortar fire using 60 and 82 mm-caliber mortars.

Soldiers of the Herzegovina Corps of the Serb army repelled the attack by Muslim units without suffering losses in their own ranks. [passage omitted]

Serbs Violate Cease-Fire on Gorazde Front

AU2401102295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 24 Jan 95

[Report by Fahrudin Becic from Gorazde]

[FBIS Translated Text] The aggressor's occasional activities on the Gorazde front did not fail to materialize again last night. Still, they were only sporadic on the demarcation line toward Foca. From their positions on Kovaceva Ravan, the chetniks fired an antiaircraft machine gun, while on the other side of the front, in the Hubjeri area above Potok, they have been reinforcing their troops.

It is very hard to predict what course events here will take, but they have been daily violating the cease-fire along the front lines, be it with sniper fire or automatic weapons' fire, which only adds to the uncertainty.

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RSK's Martic, U.S. Galbraith on Talks in Knin

LD2301193495 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1825 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 23 Jan (TANJUG)—Peter Galbraith, U.S. ambassador to Croatia, said in Knin today that the time has come to make headway in the negotiations on economic and political issues between Croatia and Krajina.

"Frankly speaking, if no progress is achieved, the situation could become extremely dangerous. If peace is not established, only one thing is certain—casualties," Galbraith told reporters after meeting with Milan Babic, foreign minister of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK].

Galbraith said that America's partners—the European Union and Russia—also believe this is an important moment in the peace process between Knin and Zagreb. He added that he personally believes no one can win in the present situation, whatever happens.

Asked about the U.S. position on Croatia's decision to cancel the peacekeepers' mandate, Galbraith replied that his government has expressed its disagreement and regret over this, but that Zagreb, he stressed, is firmly determined to abide by its decision.

In this situation, peace negotiations should be stepped up to achieve significant results, Galbraith said. His talks with Babic today, which he described as useful, were held to this end, he said.

Milan Babic said that Galbraith has displayed a high degree of understanding for the RSK's position, despite the views of the United States and the UN Security Council permanent members on the recognition of Croatia's territorial integrity.

"I reiterated our fundamental position—that the RSK is not an integral part of Croatia, that both the government and the people are committed to resolving all outstanding issues with Croatia and of the wider region in a peaceful way and through negotiations," Babic said.

In Babic's view, there is no reason to question the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mandate since the RSK has demonstrated its commitment to achieving results in consolidating peace in the region through negotiations. Babic added that he told Galbraith that "it would be easier to start and conduct political negotiations if the RSK maintains its status as a UN protected zone."

"Otherwise, political negotiations will be conducted in a far more difficult situation, difficult circumstances, and under more tense relations," Babic stressed.

Slocombe Conveys U.S. Concern to Tudjman

LD2301173695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1716 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Jan. 23 (TANJUG)—Assistant U.S. Defense Secretary Walter Slocombe on Monday told Croatian President Franjo Tudjman the U.S. administration was concerned over Croatia's decision to deny further hospitality to U.N. troops.

A statement issued after the meeting said that Tudjman and Slocombe had discussed the situation following Croatia's decision to deny further hospitality to the U.N. Protection Force [UNPROFOR]. Tudjman on Jan. 12 said that Croatia would call off its hospitality to UNPROFOR when its current six-month mandate expired on March 31.

Under a U.N. Security Council decision, UNPROFOR was deployed in Croatia in March 1992 to separate the warring Croatians and Krajina Serbs and maintain peace until finding a generally acceptable political solution to the Croatia-Serb Krajina dispute. Serb Krajina and Croatia engaged in direct talks in March 1994, when they signed an agreement on separation of troops. They signed an economic agreement in December 1994.

The beginning of the talks on the most sensitive, political issues is not yet in sight. Serbs in Croatia set up their own state, the republic of Serb Krajina, in 1991, after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former six-member Yugoslav federation and removed Serb national rights from the Croatian constitution.

Despite the deployment of U.N. troops in its territory, Serb Krajina was the target of four Croatian military offensives. A delegation by the U.S. Department of Defense arrived in Zagreb on Sunday. It is scheduled to visit Sarajevo on Monday.

Tudjman: No War With Serbia Over Krajina

AU2301134795 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 23 Jan 95 pp 131-132

[Interview with President Franjo Tudjman by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "The United Nations Disturbs Us"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [DER SPIEGEL] Mr. President, you have called upon the UN peacekeeping troops in Croatia's Serb-controlled territories to withdraw. Are you steering toward a second war between Serbia and Croatia?

[Tudjman] There will be no war. Serbia's President Milosevic is isolated. His army has not succeeded in three years in capturing Croatia. He even admits that he is no longer reckoning on Croatian territory.

[DER SPIEGEL] Why does Milosevic insist on refusing to recognize Croatia?

[Tudjman] This is a bluff. Ambassadors will be exchanged—in the near future.

[DER SPIEGEL] What will happen if not? Will you use force to recapture Krajina?

[Tudjman] If it should be necessary, we will not shy away from this. The Krajina Serbs and the leadership in

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Belgrade know that we are in a position to free our country through force of arms. The whole world supports us on this issue.

[DER SPIEGEL] I would not be so sure. You might be condemned as a warmonger.

[Tudjman] Do you think so? The Western world watches Yeltsin settling up with the Chechens but would be shocked about a Croatian liberation strike?

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you not overestimate your strength? In the event of war, Milosevic cannot deny his Serbian brothers support.

[Tudjman] I am convinced that Milosevic will not interfere. Things are different as far as the Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic is concerned. Yet the fight over the Muslim enclave of Bihac shows that his army has been weakened and that he can risk no further war adventures. The situation is very favorable for us. The Croatian Army is stationed close to the Krajina stronghold of Knin.

[DER SPIEGEL] Thus, you are definitely insisting on the withdrawal of the blue helmet soldiers.

[Tudjman] Definitely, yes. We are pursuing an independent policy; we are not the servants of the international community. The United Nations disturbs us. It has preserved the status quo instead of forcing a peace agreement on the Serbs. Its mission has been counterproductive. The paramilitary units were not disarmed. In addition to the officially registered 390,000 Croatian refugees, a further 20,000 were expelled during the UN mandate. The Serbs exploited the UN presence to consolidate their occupation. And we were prevented from carrying out military operations.

[DER SPIEGEL] Tensions are also increasing on another front. The alliance between the Croats and the Muslims is fragile....

[Tudjman] Who says?

[DER SPIEGEL] The problems in Mostar alone show that. Your Croatian compatriots want to maintain the separation. The Muslims are living in the destroyed eastern part as though in a ghetto.

[Tudjman] The Muslims wanted to rule the whole of Mostar, advance to the sea, and finally found an Islamic state. Our Croats defended themselves against that. Simply because the Muslims are the demographic majority in Bosnia, they believe they can subject a citizens' republic to Islamic laws. This is the reason for the quarrel.

[DER SPIEGEL] So why did you agree to a Muslim-Croatian Federation in the first place?

[Tudjman] The reason for this coalition was that the West wanted to prevent an Islamic state in the heart of Europe. For what other reason should this alliance have been suggested? Europe wanted to avoid a cultural struggle between the Islamic and the Western worlds in Bosnia. We were assigned a strategic task here. We can only fulfill it if the West exerts pressure on Sarajevo.

[DER SPIEGEL] According to the Geneva peace plan, the country is to be divided—51 percent for the Croats and Muslims and 49 percent for the Serbs. Is this realistic?

[Tudjman] We are not only talking about the territorial division of Bosnia among the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims but about a separation of the civilizations. Just remember the disintegration of the Roman Empire into an eastern and a western part, and the spheres of influence of the superpowers during the world wars, including Churchill's and Stalin's idea to divide Europe into two spheres of influence. The Balkans have always been a meeting point of different cultures....

[DER SPIEGEL] ...and a battlefield.

[Tudjman] For this reason, it is so difficult to untie the Bosnian knot. Russia, no matter whether Peter the Great, Stalin, or Yeltsin rule there, has always viewed itself as a Eurasian superpower. Their objective will always be to influence the Orthodox countries and to advance to the Mediterranean via the Balkans.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you consider Croatia a barrier in this respect?

[Tudjman] As early as 20 years ago, I predicted the scandinavization of southeastern Europe. For this reason, relations among the Yugoslav successor states must be normalized. In West Europe, too, peace was only achieved after the reconciliation between France and Germany. Thus, the normalization of relations between Croatia and Serbia is a historical necessity. Milosevic is now also aware of that. He knows that he can no longer achieve his greater Serbian goals.

Serbs Warn of Consequences of UN Departure

LD2301184995 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1751 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 23 Jan (TANJUG)—The Supreme Defense Council of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] today described the decision by Croatia to cancel the UN Protection Force's [UNPROFOR] mandate as "a unilateral move which will complicate the security situation in the area."

In a statement issued after its session in Knin today, the council says that the possible departure of peace forces from the region of former Yugoslavia will "disrupt the balance between war and peace, which took a great deal of effort to establish." The council endorsed the stand of the RSK authorities that the peace forces should continue their peace mission in the region and reiterated Krajina's readiness to offer UNPROFOR hospitality, accomodation, and logistical support on its territory.

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The Supreme Defense Council stresses that "although it is committed to a lasting peace policy, the RSK is ready and capable to defend its sovereignty and the freedom of its citizens if threatened."

Ambassador to France: No Compromise on Krajina

BR2301142295 Paris LE FIGARO in French 21 Jan 95

[Article by "P.S.E.": "Croatia on War Footing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Croatian ambassador to France, Branko Salaj, warned yesterday that if the problem of Serb secession is not settled quickly Zagreb will look for a solution through "a balance of power." "We now have means that are not only defensive, but also offensive," he explained to the press. "We are hardly prepared to accept a compromise." On 12 January Croatian President Franjo Tudjman warned the United Nations that his government would not renew—on 31 March—the mandate of the 15,000 Blue Helmets that have been deployed since March 1992 in Krajina, a region of Croatia under Serb control. According to the Croatian ambassador, Zagreb did indeed open negotiations with the Serb secessionists in Krajina, but the negotiations are not making progress "and today we are looking at things in a radically different way." The main stumbling block lies in the status to be given to Krajina. "There can be no (negotiated) solution if the Serbs insist on having their 'republic of Krajina' recognized."

Party Leaders Discuss UN Mandate Termination

AU1701175695 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 7 Jan 95 pp 6-7

[Article by Slavica Lukic: "UNPROFOR: 'Go Home' or 'Stay Here'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to a resolution that the Chamber of Representatives adopted on 23 September 1994, it is time for Croatia to say whether it wants UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] to remain on its territory or not. Let me remind you that the said resolution specifies that Croatia will make it clear that the peacekeeping forces outstayed their welcome if there are no results regarding the implementation of the Vance plan by 10 January 1995. After the resolution was passed, Croatian authorities and Serb representatives from UNPA [United Nations Protected Area] zones signed an agreement on economic cooperation, and the opening of the Zagreb-Lipovac Highway section was supposed to be the first step in the realization of that agreement. Croatia will soon determine whether those steps are the expected "visible signs of the realization of the Vance plan," sufficient for expressing the political will to extend the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia. Let us remember that Croatia cannot one-sidedly terminate the UNPROFOR mandate, but its view that peacekeeping forces are no longer welcome in Croatia will be very important to the Security Council.

Should UNPROFOR withdraw from Croatia after 10 January—this was the question we asked leaders of Croatian parliamentary parties who adopted the parliamentary resolution of 23 September 1994. We also asked representatives of the Community of Refugees and UNPROFOR the same question. The representatives of the blue helmets, however, refrained from commenting on their future in Croatia, in anticipation of the report about their mandate that Butrus Butrus-Ghali is supposed to present to the Security Council on 20 January.

I Do Not Think UNPROFOR Will Leave

Radimir Cacic, president of the Croatian National Party:

"The HNS [Croatian National Party] contends that UNPROFOR does not get in the way of settling the crisis, even if it should involve the use of weapons. We think a warning that Croatia will terminate the UNPROFOR mandate has no other purpose but to render UNPROFOR a truly peacemaking factor rather than keep it alive with no purpose at all. Our party believes that, if Croatia makes it clear that a military solution cannot be avoided, it can get the support of international factors. Furthermore, abandoning every kind of international mediation in settling the crisis on the territory of Croatia would be an act of political dilettantism. Consequently, we maintain that UN forces must act in accordance with the Vance plan and relevant Security Council resolutions, with the encouragement and wholehearted support from our side. The peace forces must establish and keep peace and the Croatian political public must not interpret that as paving the way for the fortification of the rebel creation but as the first step toward fulfilling Croatian initiatives. Though aware of some characteristics of peace forces that are not to our advantage, the Croatian leadership must convincingly and with a clear head thwart the tactical briskness of the rebel Serbs, their Belgrade superiors, and their patrons from London and Paris. Only in that way can we help those international factors that more or less favor us and arouse compassion of those who are openly or secretly acting against us. Unfortunately, Croatian policy has hitherto been in awe of international factors, deprived of the feeling of importance of its own inventiveness, flexibility, and principled clarity. Furthermore, it was burdened by a superficial dogma that Croatian Serbs were Milosevic's problem. The HNS can offer an initiative that would pull Croatia out of strategic inferiority and make it a convincing partner of international factors. Our party does not believe that the UN forces will leave Croatia until the centers of power agree on a new security structure on the territory of the former Yugoslavia."

Without Real Discussion

Mira Ljubic-Lorger, president of the Dalmatian Action:

"So far, UNPROFOR has quite successfully guarded the military conquest of the Serbs and contained the war. Nevertheless, we cannot say that their mandate was

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absolutely useless, since it protected both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina from more losses at the beginning and gave them a badly needed break to organize their defense. Consequently, a discussion on the UNPROFOR mandate has no political significance today, since the only important question for Croatia is whether it will opt for the peaceful reintegration of occupied areas or the military option.

"Unfortunately, the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] did not allow a parliamentary discussion on the real problem. We could not get any information or voice our opinions on the consequences of a possible war option. First of all, such a decision obviously depends on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where a four-month cease-fire has just been signed, allowing the Serbs to regroup and transfer their forces toward Croatian territory. Moreover, we know that the international community does not approve of the military option. However, the Croatian Parliament does not have any reliable information on the situation in the Croatian Army, even though it is very important. The secondhand information we get and what we can gather from the most recent wave of mass mobilization in Dalmatia is absolutely discouraging, for defense cannot be successful unless it is common to the entire country and not just to some regions.

"At any rate, Croatian parliamentary parties were not given a chance to say what they thought about those real problems. Although they are allowed to speak their minds regarding false problems, such as the forced discussion on the UNPROFOR mandate. It is, of course, possible, considering the fact that negotiations on a political solution are led by the HDZ alone, without the consent or knowledge of other parliamentary parties—that the HDZ, for election purposes, is trying to work out an agreement on exchanging areas and present it as the peaceful option. However, since they are making all the decisions on their own, the HDZ will in the long run be held responsible for such attempts."

Politically Harmful

Frane Vrkljan, member of the Board of Directors of the Croatian Community of Refugees (County of Zadar and Knin)

[Lukic] Do you think UNPROFOR should withdraw from Croatia after 10 January?

[Vrkljan] No, since they cannot leave by that date in the first place. Furthermore, it would be politically harmful to order UNPROFOR out at this point. Croatia accepted the peaceful option and negotiations designed to reintegrate its occupied areas, and that is very good. However, it is not good that it accepted the terms that could prolong the negotiations indefinitely, while constantly "making progress," although without concrete progress to the benefit of Croatia. The return of refugees is the most crucial problem for Croatia and the most important argument in all negotiations, both from legal and human rights aspects. That must be the first and foremost Croatian demand in all talks. Solving problems of secondary importance, which is mostly favorable for those who committed genocide (at a time that best suits them) creates an impression on the international political scene that progress is being made with regard to the peace process, while every Croatian move deviating from that framework would be condemned, regardless of the fact that it may be justified. We must, therefore, relinquish the negotiation "pattern" that is harmful for Croatia, but that does not mean that we should give up negotiating altogether.

[Lukic] How much significance has the recent opening of the highway had with regard to the mandate of peace forces in Croatia?

[Vrkljan] It is hard to say what the real mandate of peace forces is. So far, they mostly concentrated on preserving the results of chetnik crimes. I do not think the opening of the highway is particularly significant in setting the scene for the return of refugees.

Deadline Without Commitment

Miko Tripalo, president of the Action of Social Democrats of Croatia:

"Let me first clear up a misunderstanding: The current UNPROFOR mandate for Croatia is effective until 31 March, and on no account could peace forces withdraw a single soldier from Croatia before that date. 10 January is a deadline that was unilaterally set by Croatia, and may I remind you that, not so long ago, a high-level UNPROFOR official stated that the deadline is not obliging to peace forces in any way and emphasized that, as far as UNPROFOR was concerned, apart from 31 March, the only alternative deadline is 20 January, when the UN secretary general will submit a report to the Security Council on the implementation of the mandate, at which point the view of the Croatian Government will also be taken into consideration. Now that we have cleared that up, let me answer your question.

There is much reason for criticizing the peace forces; there is no doubt about that. Furthermore, they are legitimate objections and the Croatian authorities, as well as all relevant factors on the Croatian political scene, not only have the right but indeed must demand that the present situation be changed and UNPROFOR become more efficient. However, it is impermissible and immature to manipulate people, raise false hopes and nurse unrealistic expectations, suppress important facts, and try to instrumentalize refugees as a means of exerting pressure on UNPROFOR forcing it to implement its own disoriented policy.

In the present situation, whether UNPROFOR will leave or stay will have an impact on the future of Croatia and determine whether there will be another war or whether peace will be preserved. Those who do not see that are either politically blind or are acting against the interests of Croatia."

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Pass the Parcel

Tonino Picula, international secretary of the Social Democratic Party of Croatia:

"Apart from the fact that it did a bad job supervising the withdrawal of the former Yugoslav National Army from Croatia, UNPROFOR did not manage to realize any other goal in keeping with the 1992 agreement: demilitarization of UNPA zones, supervising parts of local police, and prompt the return of refugees.

"If the Security Council does not expand the UNPROFOR mandate, it will be terminated by a parliamentary resolution. We believe that such an outcome would pose a serious threat to the peaceful reintegration of UNPA zones and to the return of refugees. Paradoxically, in that case, the United Nations would have to take most of the blame for a possibility of renewed hostilities in Croatia and the neighboring countries, no matter how much it is trying to freeze the results of the aggression since it is incapable of annulling it. Croatian state leaders, as well as the rest of us for that matter, must resolve a dilemma: whether UNPROFOR is irrevocably standing in the way of Croatian sovereignty or whether it can still serve as a tactical weapon of Croatian interests. With regard to that, the SDP [Social Democratic Party] believes that we should wait for the results of the so-called Z-4 Group—that is, their plan of the reintegration of UNPA zones into the constitutional and legal system of the Republic of Croatia. (Un)acceptability of that plan will be the most important criterion for our future policy both toward UNPROFOR and toward all 'peace efforts' of the international community. Moreover, it will be useful to hear the report of Butrus Butrus-Ghali, which he is supposed to present by 20 January. We are particularly eager to hear his opinion about the implementation of the 'tentative plan' for the return of refugees mentioned in Article 13 of Resolution No. 947. The game of pass the parcel that we have been playing with the international community is primarily the responsibility of the Croatian president and the government, for they accepted international obligations on behalf of Croatia and then tried to share the responsibility for their ambiguous aspects with the opposition, which they did not even consult before making those decisions."

We Do Not Want the Cyprianization of Croatia

Anto Djapic, vice president of the Croatian Party of Rights Headquarters:

"Croatia and the international public was informed of our views on UNPROFOR a long time ago. Our views have been confirmed many times and affirmed by the actions and inefficiency of the blue helmets, which are part of a large game designed to thwart the stabilization and strengthening of the Croatian state. A parliamentary resolution adopted in September last year, which specifies that, unless the process of peaceful reintegration of occupied areas is completed, the UNPROFOR mandate will be terminated on 10 January 1995, is another corroboration that our views are realistic. Notwithstanding the fact that, since the resolution was adopted, UNPROFOR performed a handful of transparent tricks, of which the opening of the highway was most widely publicized, the HSP has been against extending the UNPROFOR mandate, or rather against the Cyprianization of Croatia. We expect that, at the upcoming session of the parliament, an overwhelming majority of parliamentary deputies, regardless of their party affiliation, will stand behind the views that they already expressed at the said parliamentary resolution. If that does not happen, we think it would be a moral and political duty to disband the parliament and organize elections."

Wait Before Making the Decision

Ivic Pasalic, member of the Croatian Democratic Community Presidency:

"I can answer your question in a few days, since I will then be able to see more clearly the results of the so-called economic agreement with the local Serbs and whether we will reach an agreement on defining and setting a date for the opening of the Zagreb-Slavonski Brod railway line via Okucani, the Zagreb-Knin-Split railway line, and on deadlines for opening of the oil pipeline, water supply, and transmission line. Of course, we must also ensure normal traffic along the highway through UNPA Sector West in keeping with the agreement, which means that the highway must be safe for traffic and open 24 hours a day, that all traffic signs and billboards of the so-called Krajina must be removed, and that members of the local 'militia' do not police the highway. In other words, if by that time everything that is feasible from the so-called economic agreement is carried out and if a concrete agreement on fulfilling the said demands is reached, there will be no reason to terminate the mandate of UNPROFOR. If that is not done, the Croatian state leadership will decide to terminate its mandate."

Consensus on Terminating the Mandate

Zlatko Tomcic, president of Croatian Peasants Party:

"The problem of UNPROFOR and extending its mandate are matters of paramount importance for the Croatian state and Croatian national interests. We think that those problems should be solved by means of consensus of all democratic political forces, although some may think that they should be solved by those who have the power to make decisions.

"The Croatian Parliament proved it is highly politically responsible by passing a unanimous resolution on UNPROFOR on 23 September 1994. Consequently, we expect that the same maturity and responsible behavior of parliamentary deputies will result in a consensus regarding the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia, and that their views will be unambiguously expressed on 20 January. The view of the HSS [Croatian Peasants Party]

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president, based on the parliamentary resolution and the achievements in the period between 23 September 1994 and 4 January 1995, is clear: UNPROFOR has not made any significant steps toward the peaceful reintegration of occupied areas in the Republic of Croatia, which means that there are no grounds for extending its mandate. We do not believe that in the next couple of days, UNPROFOR will manage to produce spectacular results and do what it was mandated to do."

Undermining Peace Efforts

Milan Djukic, president of the Serbian National Party:

"I think it is absolutely impossible to reintegrate UNPA zones in any other way but through peaceful negotiations on an equal level and without prejudiced solutions. It would be counterproductive to insist on the parliamentary decision to terminate the UNPROFOR mandate, as it would impede the peace process. Peace cannot be established without the mediation of UN forces, and the success of their role depends primarily on the political will of both sides for a lasting peace, as well as on the wisdom and patience of both policies and both nations. The warring parties must respect all Security Council resolutions, as well as their bilateral agreements. Indeed, a peaceful solution to Croatian UNPA zones is largely dependent on the normalization of relations between Croatia and Serbia. However, viewing the role of Serbia in finding a solution, we should not consider it solely a factor trying to create a greater Serbia in which all Serbs would be united, since such an approach raises a question whether Croatia wants to create a greater Croatia. Croatia has a moral right to care about the Croats wherever they are, but the same applies to Serbia, too. I understand that the Croatian Parliament has a moral right to insist on decisions made four months ago, but they also have an obligation to finally discuss the position of the Serbs in Croatia, after four years. Consequently, we cannot tackle the problem of reintegration from the viewpoint of aggression, but concentrating on an open problem of the Serbian question. Furthermore, we cannot handle the problem from the position of national euphoria; rather, we must realize that the nation in question must solve the problem of its national entity. I therefore hope that reason will prevail at the next session of the parliament and that UNPROFOR will stay in Croatia. Terminating the mandate of peace forces would undermine all previous and ongoing peace efforts."

Highway—Not Enough

Bozo Kovacevic, secretary general of Croatian Social Liberal Party:

"Our party believes that there is no reason to change the provisions of the resolution passed by the Chamber of Representatives on 23 September 1994. Serbian paramilitary forces have not been disarmed as yet, not a single refugee returned home, and UNPROFOR does not control the borders of the Republic of Croatia in UNPA zones. Consequently, UNPROFOR has not begun implementing key points of its mandate as set by the Vance plan, nor has it fulfilled its promise that it would disarm paramilitary groups. I therefore think that there are no grounds for extending its mandate in Croatia. So far, it has not managed to thwart a single Serb attempt to seize weapons from its warehouses, nor has it prevented any infantry, artillery, or air assault from UNPA. The aggression against Bihac is a prime example. The withdrawal of UNPROFOR would not necessarily exacerbate the fighting, since its presence has never managed to fend off Serbian attacks.

"We are pleased to see unobstructed flow of traffic on the highway between Zagreb and Lipovac. However, we think that fact alone is not enough to extend the mandate of UNPROFOR. If all railway lines and roads between Dalmatia and the hinterland were open, that would mean that the agreement on opening roads is carried out. Instead, a highway was opened for traffic and though to the benefit of many citizens, it is the 'authorities' in occupied Croatian areas who profit from it the most. The opening of the highway ended their dependence on the Bosnian corridor, as they can now freely move along the highway."

Haste Leads to Mistakes

Josip Manolic, vice president of the Croatian Independent Democrats:

"The parliamentary decision that designated the 10 January deadline is quite unambiguous, but with the proviso that UNPROFOR mandate will be terminated if there is no progress in solving the problem of occupied areas. Thanks to the proviso, all three sides—the Croatian state, the local Serbs, and UNPROFOR—worked hard to reach an agreement. Indeed, every side for their own reasons and interests. It became impossible for the Croatian policy to defend its status and it is now trying to find solutions for some of its problems, though only partially. It is thought that we can first solve economic problems, primarily with regard to opening traffic routes.

The Serbs, or better yet Milosevic, needs the agreement in order to be able to portray himself as a peacemaker, while UNPROFOR and forces behind it needed even such a small step in order to justify their stay. The local Serbs were the only side that was not too enthusiastic about the agreement, which indicates that there will be hindrances to the implementation of the said agreement.

Since all three signators-witnessess were in a hurry to sign the agreement, Croatia accepted some conditions that it should not have accepted (control of highway to Zagreb), and it has also made a political mistake in that parliamentary deputies, even though they were in session at that time, could not discuss that provision of the agreement. The chairman of the Chamber of Representatives, in order to avoid a discussion on the issue, used the commotion in the parliament to adjourn the session.

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Martic: Izetbegovic Leading People to 'Disaster'

LD2301124195 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1202 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, 23, Jan. (TANJUG)—Serb Krajina leader asked Monday Muslim countries worldwide to stop abundant financing and military assistance to Bosnian Muslim Leader Alija Izetbegovic because he was leading his own people into disaster.

Republic of Serb Krajina president Milan Martic said Izetbegovic should be stopped and not helped to carry out such intentions.

In a letter circulated to the Muslim countries' diplomatic and consular missions in Belgrade, President Martic said, among other things, that such conduct only helped carry out the plans the U.S. and Western European countries had in store for Bosnian Muslims.

The letter pointed out that it would be 'along with their (current Bosnian Muslim leaders) blessing that the Muslim population (would) be killed in such numbers that they won't have much power left to establish their own state.'

Martic pointed out that the only Muslim leader who could see through this plot and was still alive was moderate Muslim politician Fikret Abdic in west Bosnia. 'Other Muslims who had the similar point of view were killed in Sarajevo, Tuzla and other cities,' he said.

The reason Abdic survived was because of his being in the enclave, surrounded by the Serbian states establishing amicable relations with Krajina and the Bosnian Serb republic, said the letter.

'In order to understand this statement one dosen't require a vast knowledge of Balkan history. In the last century, great European powers, involving both opposing camps, had planned and tried to form an ethnically clean Croatian state on the territories of the former Yugoslav republics, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina during the World Wars I and II,' President Martic recalled in the letter.

He said that during World War II, Croatian leaders put these plans into effect i.e. they were turning Muslims into Croats and tried to exterminate the Serbs completely. 'If they had succeeded in the extermination of Serbs, they would have then done the same to Muslims too,' the letter said.

He said their next chance came in 1991 as Croatia persisted in making an ethnically clean state out of Croatia. 'It was Croatia which pushed the Muslims into the war against the Serbs, using Alija Izetbegovic for this purpose.'

Serbs in Croatia, set up their own state, the republic of Serb Krajina, in 1991, after Croatia launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslavia and removed Serb national rights from the Croatia Constitution.

Croatian forces attacked Serb Krajina but were largely driven back. The territory of Serb Krajina was placed under United Nations protection in the spring of 1992, but has since been the target of four new Croatian military offensives.

President Martic said that peaceful relations between the Serbs and Muslims did not suit Alija Izetbegovic and that consequently he sent his army against his brothers, Muslims in west Bosnia. His army proceeded to commit despicable crimes and exiled 60,000 Muslims.

He said that parallel to this, Western Europe and the U.S. succeeded in hiding this fact before the world and nothing leaked out into the public about this abominable mass slaughter and expatriation.

For its part, Croatia closed its borders to these refugees, while Western European countries denied them visas and asylum, he said. 'UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] tried to put these exiled Muslims under the rule of Alija Izetbegovic and in order to achieve that, they supplied them only with minimal quantities of food, clothes and medicine. The Serbs from the republic of Serbian Krajina were the only ones who issued visas to 60,000 refugees,' the letter said.

The Krajina Serbs provided them with food and medicine although they themselves were under an embargo and banned from importing anything. Martic said that just how much Izetbegovic was in the hands of great powers and how much he was working against the physical survival of his people was borne out by the fact that he was sending troops to war even against Croatia.

In illustration, Martic noted that tens of thousands of Muslims had been killed in 1993 and 1994 before the signing of the Washington Agreement with Croatia. It is evident nowdays, he said, that the 'aim of this reconciliation was to use of all Muslim units in the battles against Serbs.'

He said that now, when Muslims have suffered great losses from the Serbian Army, when they've become weak, the Croatian Army was preparing to 'attack them and the new war between Muslims and Croatia is about to break out...smaller battles have already been started by Croats around Bugojno, Gornji Vakuf and Mostar.'

In the end, Martic set out that if in turn, 'sensible Muslims were helped, then that would save the Muslim people. They are the only ones who can reconcile Muslims with Serbs.'

Continued Intense Pressure on Serbs To Leave

LD2301150195 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1344 GMT 23 Jan 95

[Article by Nikola Stanojevic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Jan. 23 (TANJUG)—Serbs continue pressured to move out of Croatia with the

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regime terming each public mention about Serb suffering in Croatia as a "call to mutiny."

The Croatian authorities have so far expelled 300,000 Serbs, sacked and evicted thousands of them, destroyed Serb churches and houses outside the war zones, taken Serbs in for questionings from which they never returned and forcibly converted about 10,000 Serb children to Catholicism.

The Serb people's party leaders, although advocating an integral Croatia, have come under strong attacks both by Croatian politicians and media for revealing such incidents.

International organizations, including the United Nations, have verified the data about Serb plight in Croatia with slight differences in figures. Croatian politicians and media have termed the Serb people's party disclosure of these figures as a "call to mutiny."

Croatian politicians and media are, instead of arguments, using qualifications such as that the "shepherds [Serbs] spare no means to see through their loathsome historical tricks," and that the Croats "as a civilized people, are unable to collect enough funds to market documented testimonies about the Serb strategy of crime."

Director of the Catholic news agency and former editor-in-chief of the Catholic paper GLAS KONCILA Zivko Kustic is using similar qualifications saying that "the greater Serbian clique is using lies for political ends." Kustic and other defenders of the Croatian cause have said that the Serbs have "invented" figures that 700,000 Serbs had been killed in the notorious ustasha death camp of Jasenovac in World War II and that one of the first crimes in the independent state of Croatia was a massacre of 198 Serbs in the village of gudovac on April 28, 1941. The Croatian ustasha movement was a clerico-Fascist paramilitary force responsible for killing hundreds of thousands of Serbs, Jews and gypsies in World War II. The independent state of Croatia was set up under the patronage of Nazi Germany.

The Croatian authorities and media deny Croatian crimes against the Serbs committed during Croatia's war of secession from the former Yugoslavia in 1991 as well as current crimes committed by the present Croatian authorities. The Croatian authorities ignore also the fact that 279 Serb orthodox churches have been destroyed or damaged in Croatia. Six Serb churches and five bishoprics including that in Zagreb have been blown up in the Zagreb-Ljubljana Diocese alone.

Serb houses have been torched in western Slavonija after the Serbs' exodus and blown up in Zagreb's suburbs of Zitnjak and Klara. This is the reason why at this time between 100,000 and 150,000 Serbs remained in Croatia, as they continue moving out. In Zagreb alone, about 300 Serb families have asked for assistance of international organizations to move out of Croatia.

The Serbs are forced to leave Croatia because they face discrimination at work, sackings and various forms of threats.

Labor Unrest Expected To Increase This Year

AU1701115495 Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 6 Jan 95 pp 18-19

[Article by Marko Franjic: "Are the Unions Growing Mustaches?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Strikes are becoming everyday events in Croatia—the teachers' strike, the brief general warning strike, and the railroad workers' strike, which ended only recently, are only some of the stronger expressions of the workers' dissatisfaction with the present situation. The union scene has become very active lately. This is not only because of the labor bill, which has entered the final adoption stage, but also, as some of the union leaders have pointed out, because the patience they had for the government and its policy of implementing the stabilization program has run out.

The unions have been more and more clearly expressing dissatisfaction with the proposal for the labor bill. They have also refused to sign the long-expected General National Economic Agreement, which is to be the introduction to the signing of collective agreements on which the unions had firmly insisted.

The government and the Croatian Employers' Association, as the third partner, have signed the General National Agreement. Although it seemed that as far as collective agreements are concerned the employers' and the unions' positions were closer—the unions even announced the signing of the collective agreements without the third partner—this was not in fact the case, so the government and the employers ended up on one side, which is not surprising, since the state is the largest employer after all, and thus the largest partner to the unions. The final consequence of the radicalization of positions on the part of both the unions and the government are the many strikes that are the ultimate measure of the allowed and guaranteed union struggle in Croatia, and are undoubtedly harmful for both.

The Firm Positions of the Railroad Workers

Strikes are conducted and organized according to the rules saying that strikes usually start when the possibilities for negotiations are exhausted, and, as a rule, they have to be announced beforehand. Therefore, both the government and the public knew most of the times that a strike was to start—as was the case with the recent railroad workers' strike—which means that they are partly responsible. The railroad workers announced their strike, demanding primarily that the safety of railroad traffic be considered. According to the statements of the Strike Committee leaders, the rail cars, rails, facilities, and the working conditions are below the minimum safety level for both passengers and personnel. The

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workers described the current situation in the railroads very vividly in one sentence: "We do not want to ride trains with one foot in the grave and the other in jail." Moreover, the unions pointed out the disastrous state of business, contracts that were harmful for Croatian Railroads, for which someone must be held responsible (according to their committee's estimates, as many as 290 out of the 300 contracts are harmful). Another reason for the railroad workers' dissatisfactions were salaries, and they claimed that Croatian Railroads had the lowest salaries of all the 10 public companies. The workers claimed that the average salary was below 1,000 kunas, whereas Minister Mudrinic had claimed on Croatian television that it was 1,500 kunas.

The fact is that in October Minister Mudrinic signed an agreement with the Strike Committee, according to which the joint committee undertook to examine the consequence of the Croatian Government's unequal salaries policy in relation to the budget beneficiaries and public companies. The committee established that salaries in Croatian Railroads were 15 to 20 percent lower than in other public companies, and calculated that each worker had been "stinted" by almost 2,000 kunas in 1994. The Government did not, however, confirm this. On the other hand, the Government often used the argument concerning the large subsidies for the railroads, which amounted to about 300 million German marks in 1994, and over 250 million has been anticipated for 1995. The Government claimed that the income was decreasing all the time, and that preparations were made for the financial rehabilitation of the railroads, which would include dismissing surplus workers, so that the others could have normal salaries. Before the war 42,000 people worked for Croatian Railroads, while now there are 22,000, and the unions have pointed out that they are short of professionals needed for railroad operations to be carried out properly.

While the strike was on, the negotiations were at a standstill for a few days—the Government's position was probably that it did not want to yield to the strikers' demands because there were no possibilities for that, and at the same time it was a way to soften the strikers.

As this did not happen, however, the Government introduced the compulsory work order in the case of the railroad workers, which most people see as an extremely undemocratic solution. The key problem is that the railroad workers' strike has caused great damage to the economy, which is in a difficult position anyway. According to estimates, the damage that can be represented in money was 1.5 million kunas per day, but the indirect damage that the strike has caused is a much greater problem. This mainly applies to the business of the port of Rijeka and cargo transit through Croatia.

The port has suffered great losses because most of the goods that arrive by ship are transported further by rail. For a while now there has been a lot of construction of modern highways in neighboring Slovenia, but the railroads are also being modernized so that cargo transit can be switched to the Slovene port of Kopar, which is becoming a direct competitor of Rijeka's.

This puts not only the future of the port of Rijeka in danger, but also the railroads in Croatia, which are in a disastrous condition as it is.

This is why calculations of "softening" the opponent or stalling had no place in these negotiations—what was necessary was to negotiate and find a solution. However, the Government unfortunately did not behave that way, and the railroad workers also assumed intransigent positions.

In that, the government methods in resolving the strike perhaps had an impact on the public, since there were many reactions from people who did not support the strike (not even the retired railroad workers supported it), primarily because of the great government pressure in the state media (Croatian television), which described the strike as manipulation with people, conducted from the outside, and proclaimed it a political strike intended to put pressure on the government before the passing of the labor bill. Naturally, the authorities have the right to present their opinions on the strike, but the other side was not given an adequate chance to explain the reasons for the strike. By introducing compulsory work orders, the government finally decided to break the strike. The opposition parties hold the government responsible for the damage the strike has caused.

A Social Bomb

The largest opposition party, the Croatian Social Liberal Party, believes that "the unions have usually found inadequate answers from the Croatian Government—arrangements and decisions were made, even agreements, but most of the time the government did not abide by them. It was often the case that the government avoided negotiations for as long as seven or eight days (even at the time of the strike). The unions appealed to the government to take matters seriously. The Croatian Government displayed arrogance in its contacts with the railroad unions, and it employed a markedly demagogic method in presenting the strike situation in the media. Incorrect information was given to the public during the reports on the strike. We therefore believe that the Croatian Government is directly responsible for the great material damage and other consequences that will follow from this strike."

Davorko Vidovic of the SDP [Social Democrat Party] considers the strike justified, but well-conducted, and criticizes the actions of the authorities, since he believes that the authorities easily qualify each strike as an attempt not only to put the authorities in danger, but also the existence of the state. According to him, because of the monopoly on the television, the public did not even hear the strikers' demands. He said: "The state readily reaches for the compulsory work order and thus misuses this institution, turning it into a stick for the disobedient." Prime Minister Valentic himself said at

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the press conference that many things had been brewing, mentioning the opposition parties and the support for the strike. Although the issue is the opposition parties that took the opportunity to criticize the authorities, their positions concerning the government's actions and responsibility for the strike and its consequences are almost identical.

The largest union centers' general warning strike has also heralded more drastic consequences for the Croatian economy and the social peace in the country. Social consensus was to be one of the preconditions for implementing the stabilization program, but the unions have been expressing more and more tension. The only extenuating thing for the government is the fact that the unions are divided, but that is little comfort. Moreover, the person at the key ministry for maintaining social peace, Ivan Parac, does not seem to be up to the task of curbing the unions if they indeed decide to fight for their status.

The unions are spreading the rumor in the lobbies that even arrests of some union leaders were about to happen, which even Valentic had to react to, saying that there would certainly be no arrests. The Government will have to show a better attitude in dealing with union issues than Valentic's comments that "some union leaders have started growing mustaches, trying to be Walesa, or to provoke arrests."

The fact that the Economic Social Council, the body in which the social partners were supposed to reach agreements in order to maintain social peace, is not functioning, in addition to low salaries, high unemployment, the workers' dissatisfaction with the transformation, the dissatisfaction of the unions with the key labor bill, and lack of security are only a few of the fuses in the social timebomb that could explode in Croatia. Prime Minister Valentic tried to explain the social tensions by the war psychosis being relieved, by low salaries and crowded shop windows, claiming that the social problems are becoming greater because of the division into enterpreneurs and job-holders, which has been the case in all the postcommunist countries. This is essentially the problem, and it is not only about pressure on the government for as good a position of the unions in the labor bill as possible—Valentic has already said that the union demands were unacceptable—but the position that will largely determine the future of the workers. The workers and the unions are becoming increasingly frustrated with the present situation and position, and there will probably follow a fierce struggle in order for this to be changed.

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Leaders Want To Discuss Purchases of U.S. Arms

LD2301211195 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2014 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 23 Jan (TANJUG)—Walter Slocombe, U.S. under secretary of defense, arrived in Skopje this evening.

It was announced today that the U.S. military delegation is scheduled to meet Kiro Gligorov, president of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], on 24 January and is also expected to hold talks with Defense Minister Blagoje Hadziski and Colonel General Dragoljub Bocinov, chief of the general staff.

Macedonian Defense Ministry spokesman Petar Atanasov said today that the objective of this visit was "to reassert Macedonian-U.S. military cooperation" initiated by a memorandum signed in Skopje in November 1994.

The Skopje media are extensively announcing the possibility of the purchase of considerable quantities of U.S.-made arms, such as tanks, Patriot intercepting missiles, armored carriers, high-caliber cannons, and helicopters—despite the still binding UN Security Council embargo on arms exports to the republics of the former Yugoslavia.

Tomorrow the delegation will visit the U.S. peacekeepers engaged in so-called "preventive diplomacy," who are deployed at observation points along the still undefined border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The U.S. delegation headed by Slocombe will also visit Geneva, Zurich, Zagreb, and Sarajevo on its European mini-tour.

Handziski, Albania Discusses Defense Cooperation

AU2301180695 Skopje MIC in English 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Macedonia's Minister of Defense Blagoj Handziski yesterday received the Ambassador of the Republic of Albania to Macedonia Mr. Shaban Murati.

During the meeting, Minister Handziski expressed satisfaction with the development of the relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Albania and emphasized the mutual interest for strengthening of the cooperation in the field of defense, at all levels, following the policy of non-involvement in the internal affairs and respecting the sovereignty of the two independent states. Minister Handziski pointed out that peace and stability are in the interest of both countries.

The Albanian ambassador in the discussion said that the two countries have a clear vision in regards to the future cooperation, whereby he said that the membership in NATO and the European integrative processes are imperative for both countries. Ambassador Murati emphasized that the participation of the Albanians in the political structure of the Republic of Macedonia have a positive influence on the relations between the two countries.

The two officials agreed that an agreement for cooperation between the two defense ministries should be signed as soon as possible, whereby minister Handziski announced the first promotion into general of a member of the Macedonian Army from the ranks of the Albanian nationality, for the next couple of days.

VMRO-DPMNE Leader Views Party's Future

AU2401111695 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 21, 22 Jan 95 p 5

[Commentary by Sonja Kramarska: "New Tactics for Local Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The second parliamentary and first presidential elections are behind us, and that is where Macedonia's [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] opposition, which is now no longer in parliament, also remained. Let us recall: The VMRO-DPMNE [Macedonian Internal Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity], together with some other opposition parties, made a very unpopular decision right in the middle of the elections—not to finish the election race.

As Ljupco Georgievski, its president, agreed, the objective possibilities at that time were to win 15 parliament seats, but that did not suit the party. After the self-inflicted decision to quit the political scene, or at least the parliament as a "showdown location" in which to wage political battle, the epilogue is known: There is little said about parties outside the parliament. In this context, the VMRO-DPMNE is no longer in the public eye, but Georgievski is sure that they are still the largest opposition party. "A large number of citizens voted for us," he says "and we have their support. This fact cannot be ignored in any normal democratic state. However, here in Macedonia we know why we have been ignored."

As for communicating with the public, the president of the VMRO- DPMNE says that the broad public does not have access to the party's stances. "Our stances do not reach the public easily," he says, "particularly concerning the 'Albanian university,' bilingual identity cards, or the new economic policy," which he says was adopted "behind closed television cameras."

Giving Up Five Years of Experience

"Under the circumstances, the VMRO-DPMNE is forced to consider new tactics," Georgievski explains. "We were the most conspicuous political party in Macedonia for five years and we have stances on questions that have placed us in an awkward position both inside and outside the country. Our party had a Messianic role in Macedonia for five years and there was not a single important question of national interest to which we did not react, for instance on the question of sovereignty,

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interethnic relations, economic positions... we were simply the first," Georgievski said, reviewing the party's prior activities. "Now," he continued "we are abandoning five years of experience of constantly defending national interests, because we have turned out to be the greatest enemy and destabilizer of Macedonia."

A very atypical stance promoted by the VMRO-DPMNE leader is that there are several responsible factors in a state. He explicitly stressed that the VMRO-DPMNE will no longer react to irregularities on key issues; the solution and responsibility will have to remain in the hands of the government. "We," Georgievski continued, "do not intend to head the 15,000 discontented workers who will soon be fired, or those who will share that destiny in a couple of months, because we simply believe that these people should organize themselves." All in all, according to the party president, the VMRO-DPMNE is going to try to eradicate the label it has been given—destabilizer of the state.

Political Struggle

As we know, Ljupco Georgievski and Dosta Dimovska will get a stipend from the parliament for a year, which means that in the beginning there will be no professional engagement, and so the question arises: Will they continue their struggle outside parliament? This party is strongly counting on early and extraordinary elections. The party cannot provoke early elections because the parliament will decide on that. Georgievski is fully aware of this, but he thinks that international pressure is possible, and he also puts great hope in social dissatisfaction. In case these two factors do not come to light, Georgievski announces that his party is ready to initiate action to collect 150,000 signatures for new elections.

The coming local elections are of equal importance. We are not the United States and therefore cannot expect extensive changes, but it is interesting to hear the VMRO-DPMNE's opinion on this. There are a couple of reasons: One is that the elections could more or less rehabilitate the party in the eyes of its members and fans, and the other equally important reason is to "withstand" the boycott of the legislature, as has been declared by other parties also, that is—to suspend participation in the institutions of the system. The VMRO-DPMNE, its president informed us, has decided on the first variant. They will participate in local elections because they believe this is the only way to "revive" the party's membership. The high VMRO-DPMNE leadership cites frequent contacts with diplomatic representatives in Macedonia, through which, Georgievski said: We apprise them of our views on the situation in the state. The VMRO-DPMNE has no contacts with the government, and Georgievski told us that he monitors parliamentary sessions according to personal inclination, as is the case with the rest of the public, adding that in his opinion parliamentary debates are interesting only if there is a clash of opinions.

Weekly Sees Tirana Behind University Issue

AU2301110095 Skopje PULS in Macedonian 20 Jan 95 pp 10-14

[Editorial by Mirka Velinovska: "Operation Phantom"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Why did the Tetovo "university" affair occur in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], or rather why is it that the Albanian political parties, both inside and outside Macedonia, produce a crisis regularly once a year, which is then followed by interethnic tensions? What other surprises could menace the state in the future and could they become a threat to its stability? These are the two most topical questions occupying the domestic public, while the so-called world community—which is composed of intermeshed and conflicting interests—is more interested in whether and to what extent the Macedonian authorities can keep control over the situation. This is purely pragmatical and has the aim of developing policies toward this region in good time (activating one of the elaborate variants usually called scenarios, but which are regarded as pure fantasy by some of our politicians) or, God help us, of descending on us with their "assistance" projects.

As for how long this is going to last, it is clear that the issue of the Albanians and their collective rights will remain until there is a final reshaping of the Albanian position and the strategy of "all Albanians in one state." Or at least until those Macedonian political parties that represent this minority accept that Macedonia is their fatherland, one in which they must strive for equal and improved lives rather than the break-up of the country.

Not surprisingly, the author of the idea of an "all-Albanian state" is the national state that is our neighbor. Not only is this idea not new, but it has been repeatedly resuscitated at different periods or, depending on the international network of relations, modified and played down whenever circumstances were unfavorable. However, it is here and here it will remain for as long as the Balkans retain the political and national romanticism of the 19th century and as long as they do not abandon megalomaniacal ideas. Albanian President Sali Berisha, who not long ago the world believed to be a real democratic blessing for his country, which he is not, has reconfirmed in his latest statement that it is his intention to continue the "romantic" policy; he informed diplomatic circles in Tirana that he "is committed to the achievement of the right to self-determination in Kosovo," in addition to his usual pleas for a stable Balkans (reading between the lines, one can see that this means that stability is intimately linked to the resolution of the all-Albanian question), adding the inevitable remark that his "country is a factor of peace and stability" (this is a title that every Balkan country awards itself, although officially bestowed by the world on Macedonia).

For the time being, though, we must get used to the idea that our attention will be occupied by the "university" or

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by the many real aspects of it, which some describe as a deflated balloon and others as sounding the death knell for the Macedonian state, as it has been given as much media publicity as was the ethnic Albanian paramilitary army. On this occasion we are trying to penetrate to the very essence of the project and to raise a number of ideas that could be food for thought.

First of all, the idea was conceived and brought into play in an area that is in principle a noble activity, namely, education; this followed the revelations about the paramilitary army and the census, which the Albanians regarded as a hostile activity, and two other things: First, following the example of Bosnia and Croatia, the Albanian political leaders decided that pressure and state policy could be used to internationalize and then resolve the all-Albanian question in the Balkans, but for this it would be necessary to reach an apparent level of ethnic homogeneity at a certain period in Macedonia and Kosovo. However, the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] in our country became split on this, as happened to the Democratic League of Kosovo of Ibrahim Rugova.

The "university" seemed to be a way in which a movement for healing the division among the ethnic Albanians could be created. Nevertheless, we are more interested to know where it came from and why it was planted in Macedonia. This time we will leave aside the standard assumption that this involves the hand of Milosevic, who needs to distract world attention away from Kosovo so as to be able to solve his internal problems more easily, and Greece, which has been trying to find proof for its main assertion for four years now, namely that the existence of the Macedonian state is a destabilizing factor in the Balkan powder keg. There are analysts who think that the idea of exploiting education to internationalize the Albanian question came from Tirana, whose image had been seriously compromised in the eyes of the world with the catastrophic paramilitary army affair and whose initiative had failed regarding the size of the Albanian population in Macedonia; it was frightened that the incipient internal political division might weaken the all-Albanian idea, particularly because the old PDP leadership was not displaying a suitable level of obedience, and this caused Tirana to promote its own favorites (Taci and Dzaferi) with the ultimate aim of discrediting the old PDP leadership as insufficiently Albanian, constantly exposing it to the test of radicalism, a regular feature of "young Turks."

If we may put it so, the main goals behind the idea of the university are as follows: to establish a new consensus in Albanian politics as a basis for serious action. If this is achieved, Berisha's position at home will be strengthened because he will have done something for the diaspora; and to provoke Macedonia into making a fierce response, that is, to force Macedonia to agree to playing the game according to Albanian rules, and to discredit the country if it makes a serious mistake (which is possible) that could seriously damage its political image and thus the international position that we have been building up with great difficulty and which is our only protection. Finally, the aim is to complete the process of removing part of the PDP leadership. In other words, if we scrutinize the political messages, there have been a number of threats by a certain Fadil Sulejmani—proclaimed "director" of Tetovo university—that the Albanians will boycott the system in the second phase of pressure against Macedonia, and the phantom university will serve as a pretext for this. If this happens, then a "referendum," "Illirida," and similarly the "historic" dates that have decorated the Albanian political scene since the independence of Macedonia will be resurrected. Apparently, PDP President Abdurahman Aliti has accepted his own radicals' game so as to maintain his influence over his deputies and has told the Kosovar public that his party is considering boycotting the system, with the tiny comment that, if so, they will have to know exactly what to do then.

It is exactly this issue, that of incorporating the Albanian minorities in Macedonia and Serbia, that is causing Albania to receive negative signals from the world. The world's decisionmakers are not ready to act to solve the Albanian question with one all- encompassing package. Ibrahim Rugova was the first to receive confirmation of this from the United States and the European Union, or rather Germany, which was then holding the chair of the Union. Well informed sources say that Rugova asked for United States support for his minimum political aim—a high degree of independence for Kosovo—and had this but has now lost it, or that he demanded that Kosovo become an international protectorate. However, it seems that he was told that Kosovo is being regarded as an internal Serbian matter and this same view was expressed in Germany. Rugova came back empty-handed, but media close to him claimed that the "visit was successful," emphasizing the opening of an information center in the United States. In any case, this element must be taken into account in connection with the fuss made about "Tetovo university" and the deportation of some Kosovar activists who had taken refuge in Macedonia for the past few years, which Rugova mentioned in an interview with REUTER. It is obvious that pragmatism will force him to negotiate with the Serbian authorities (some claim that this has already begun), and Rugova, who is not so famous in Tirana because of his Ghandi-like political approach (Tirana prefers the radical Rexhep Qosja), wants to secure a more favorable negotiating position in this. That is why we can say that the idea of an ethnic university was aimed at dragging Macedonia into provocations, because the whole idea was seen as extremely fragile and was therefore meant to be the first shot at achieving more maneuvering space. This means that if Macedonia is led to make a mistake, anything could happen. Otherwise, the idea will die down after a while, causing worse consequences for Tirana as yet another scar on its policy. This is why we think that the actions that Macedonia takes over the next few weeks are of crucial importance.

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There is another unknown quantity for us as we try to develop a theory on the way events may unfold. What are the positions of Europe and the United States toward Macedonia? If we judge by what we constantly hear from the U.S. side on the integrity and sovereignty of our country, there should be no doubts. In the case of the paramilitary army, and even the deportation of the Kosovar activists, who had been abusing our hospitality and, no matter whether or not their stay had been previously agreed, it was nevertheless an interference in the internal affairs of another country, the United States, according to one of our sources, has shown full understanding and support for these measures, and we may expect this trend to continue. It is known that the United States respects those countries and policies that appreciate and take care of their own national interests. Nevertheless, in view of its inexplicable reluctance to establish full diplomatic relations with Macedonia, it is very important that we remain cautious about U.S. policy and actions. For there are some analysts who claim that U.S. policy often changes (particularly in relation to the Balkans), and since this has been clearly seen in the crisis in former Yugoslavia and since there is a race for the global re-assertion of influence over the region on the part of the European Union, Russia, and the United States, there are all sorts of variants and we in Macedonia should not put our money on anybody.

Can we bet on ourselves and our ability to play this game? And on being able to overcome the crisis as we have so many times before, by revealing the whole truth about the founding of this Albanian university and leave no doubt about who is pushing for this so urgently at this moment and under these circumstances, and why? The answer is that we cannot be sure, because although we have received serious warnings about Tirana's interference and that of the Albanian Embassy in Skopje in these "projects" (and there are others, too), although a senior Albanian Education Ministry official is in charge of "Tetovo university" (to be more precise, he is in charge of making it stand outside the system), and although some diplomats are collecting money, membership fees, and so on, our government and ministry has not even sent a protest note. They even refused to comment to Berisha, who stated at his meeting with Holbrook that "Albania and Macedonia have good relations."

We could mention the arguments of Interior Minister Frckovski about the stay of the Kosovar activists in Macedonia: "While it was convenient for Macedonia, they could stay, but they were deported as soon as it was not convenient." From a police aspect these arguments may be appropriate, but from a political point of view, we must know whose idea it was (Kiro Gligorov had had a few meetings with Ibrahim Rugova) and what was the purpose of approving the stay of a whole range of political activists from Kosovo, if the result was various emissaries visiting our country to offer solutions so as to see what stage we have reached and to come in with assistance. Van der Stuhl, who was very clear in stating that not even the Albanian representatives could understand it differently, irritated the majority of the Macedonian population. [sentence as published] Not because he is unwelcome or misinterpreted, but because he opened the way for further possible provocations: Arben Xhaferi, after his discussions with the OSCE commissioner for minority questions, and after admitting that the initiative for the ethnic university was illegal, went a step further and claimed that "in Macedonia there is a military regime enforced by the interior Ministry regarding the activities of the ethnic university," emphasizing that the main reason for interethnic tension was the nation state concept. He proposed a solution: "To define Macedonia as a bi-national state that guarantees rights to minorities." Although this was stated by a eminent intellectual, we were surprised by the stupidity and contentiousness involved, which can only be logical if it is taken as an attempt at fresh provocation and politicization in Macedonia, and as such we do not intend to analyze it. The only part that can cause confusion is that Xhaferi considers it time to start "negotiations between the Albanians and the Macedonian authorities." As far as we know, the Albanians as a minority in Macedonia are not in a Kosovo-type position, nor are they a partner to the state, but have equal participation in its management. It follows that we can say that the authorities cannot negotiate with themselves on an ethnic basis. Whether this indicates desperation in trying to catch the last train for the idea of all the Albanians in one state—no matter how realistic this might be at this time or whether what has happened to the former Yugoslav region are the only way for such an idea to come about—time alone will tell. For us at this point, it is of the utmost importance not to fall for the provocation and resort to repression, which the series of provocative activities by the Albanians has constantly tried to prompt, because that will be the best way to safeguard dignity and peace in the state and to reveal clearly those romantic Balkan ideas on the international political scene.

Weekly Views Role of Religions in Politics

AU1801104895 Skopje PULS in Macedonian 13 Jan 95 p 18

[Commentary by Mirce Tomovski: "The Smell of Incense and Politics"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This year, it seems that the merchants of dry oak branches and the bakers of Christmas ritual bread made the greatest profit on the markets in Skopje. This comeback of the traditional celebration of Christmas was quite pleasant and relaxing. Particularly because last autumn was marked by a high degree of politicization among the citizens. It had also penetrated the relations among the people, affecting privacy, too. Nevertheless, it seems that we cannot do without politics even during celebrations. It appears that it is not easy to escape from the Balkan

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stereotype of introducing politics even at times when the scent of the incense is felt and when the oak branch is decorated.

This Christmas, we could see that the believers were not the only ones who needed religion. The activities of the state and the political parties were also impressive. It was another occasion for the Macedonian Orthodox Church to expose itself in the political arena. After his presence at the Christmas liturgy in the church of "Saint Climent of Ohrid" we can expect the president of the state, Kiro Gligorov, being the "president of all the citizens in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia]," to attend the Islamic feasts, the Catholic All Saints' mass.... The political parties like the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia], the VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity], the Democratic Party, the Socialist Party, the Christian Democratic Party, and so on, are parties that always point out that they represent all nations and religions in the country. This means that they will have to observe the holidays of the citizens who are non-Macedonians and non-Orthodox now that they have conveyed their modest congratulations to the Orthodox section of society. The SDSM and its youth will have to think of another "action" in addition to the "red Christmas carol" of another religious provenance than the Orthodox.... The head of the Orthodox Church, Mihail, after his Christmas address to the Orthodox Macedonians, owes an answer to the questions: "Are the atheists Macedonians? Are the Muslim Macedonians?"

The phenomenon of religion has made a respected comeback at the end of this century. The analysts of social change in Europe see it as an inevitable factor of the democratic process. The famous U.S. scientist Francis Fukoyama supports the thesis that "democracy and religion are not in conflict," that is that "religion is not an obstacle to democracy." In Russia, after the breakdown of the USSR, the people are attending churches and they are performing religious rituals en masse. In Albania, the comeback of the church is taken as a sign of freedom and democracy. The Vatican power is reborn again. In some countries of Central Europe, church representatives are placed on a political seesaw between the citizens and the state mechanisms. Ideas—even concrete political initiatives—have arrived from Russia and Serbia for an Orthodox, statehood connection of Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Russia... in a form of Orthodox federations or confederations. However, this religious comeback does not remain within the secular frameworks. On the contrary, these frameworks are overcome, and there is an energetic entry into politics.

In this time of transition, which Macedonia entered with its own democratic processes, society has opened itself to religion. Its institutions have been renewed; the believers are no longer frightened of being accused for their faith; the people are motivated to make a moral choice. The Constitution of Macedonia highly protects individual privacy in which confession is included, as a personal matter of the believer and his relationship to his own God. In order to protect itself and the Church, the state projected European solutions in the Constitution: The Church is strictly separated from the state. The Church has its sovereignty in the realm of religion and in the "other world," and the state is sovereign in the profane and material world. There is no state religion. The individual is independent in Macedonian society, and he has the right to make his own choice in a multi-confessional environment. Nevertheless, the state, politics, and the Church do not forget these European standards in their mutual relations and in their own positions. As a raison d'etre for such a manner there is the historic importance of the independence of the Macedonian state and the denial of the autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. This is the reason why we now have politicians as modest believers and priests as passionate political speakers!

The political parties are placed behind "their" believers and thus they equate religious affiliation with national affiliation. The same style is protected, as if it were a fashion, by the Orthodox and Islamic clergymen—they stand behind "their" parties. Simply, politics and religion remain within party and church propaganda, even for "outside" use.

The parties of the Macedonian national bloc, and even of the democratic and civil bloc, address the Orthodox believers, they take the traditions and celebrations as "their own," they step shyly into the temples of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. Their priests schedule their presence at party congresses, they praise party meetings in their church services... Bishop Petar prefers the meetings of the VMRO-DPMNE. The political parties of the Albanians, the Turks, and the Muslims take Islam as "their own," as well as the Islamic believers (by introducing them to the daily politics or by introducing their members in the religion), who are connected with the Islamic Religious Community. Its first leader, Sulejman Redjepi, is not only inclined to political addresses and speeches, but he rarely misses a meeting of the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] or the NDP [People's Democratic Party]. The Islamic community, instead of being engaged in spreading religion, was actually very active in the foundation of the Albanian-language university in Tetovo, and it even lent its headquarters to the rector's office of this self-proclaimed university!

The representatives of the PDP and the NDP in the former parliament took the liberty of asking the government to put Islamic monuments on the state banknotes, and thus they equated the party and this religion! We no longer have celebrations of political meetings or victories, but we now have long scenes on television of the church meetings that can never pass without the participation of the local priests or the heads of the church hierarchy.

This situation can easily lead to antidemocracy. It can even divide the people into believers and non-believers,

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into Orthodox and Muslims, into Orthodox and Catholics, into Catholics and Muslims. This party-confessional and national-religious amalgamation does not exclude conflicts. It can sicken the mult ethnic democracy in the country and the policy of coexistence that implies the common life of the believers, that is of the citizens regardless of their confessional affiliation. Even religious intolerance and national aggression are not far from this "patriotism," because everybody likes "his own folks" and not "foreigners."

The cause of human rights has acquired the highest value in Macedonia. The civil power is not a power without them. The whole Constitution is based on them. They contain the right to choose freely, and religious faith is a private matter for every individual. Danger signals are present in the absence of a secular culture. Secularism in modern European countries is taken and applied affirmatively in order to determine the separation of the Church and the state, religion and politics. The interference of the "kingdom of confession" into the "earthly kingdom" and of the "sovereignty of God" into the "sovereignty of the state" will not be easily reconciled with the universal equality of man and with freedom of thought. Such an interference generates tendencies toward regulating some spheres of the life of the individual, either private or public, and the authority of religion becomes incorporated into relations, into politics. The road to Europeanization is paved with the secular citizen and his own worship; with a secular state, a secular Church. The constant speeches for peace by the clergymen will only engender the highest respect if they are engaged in their professional work—the ecumenical and not the political. The politicians and the authorities will also be respected only if they are engaged in their profession—political and state affairs.

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SKD, LDS Agree on Thaler as Foreign Minister

AU2301135495 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 0600 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The negotiating teams of the Slovene Christian Democrats [SKD] and the Liberal Democrats [LDS] last night coordinated the candidacy of Zoran Thaler for the new foreign minister. The SKD executive council is supposed to take a stance toward the candidate in a little more than an hour. Prime Minister Drnovsek is expected to put forward his nomination in parliament today.

Drnovsek Explains Nomination

AU2301181095 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 23 Jan 95

[Article by Bojan Veselinovic on news conference by Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek in Ljubljana on 23 January—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Drnovsek] In terms of cadre, the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia [LDS] and the Slovene Christian Democrats (SKD] have reached an agreement, that is, that the LDS is gaining the Foreign Ministry and the SKD gets the Department for Economic Relations and Development. About an hour ago, I recommended that the State Chamber elect Zoran Thaler, hitherto head of the State Chamber Foreign Affairs' Commission and deputy foreign minister in the times when Foreign Ministry was headed by Mr. Rupel, to the post of foreign minister.

[Veselinovic] According to Drnovsek, Thaler, despite his relative youth [33], meets all the criteria for taking over Slovene diplomacy. In agreement with Prime Minister Drnovsek, Davorin Kracun is consentaneously resigning from the post of the minister for economic relations and development. When asked whether Kracun and Mojca Drcar Murko were less suitable candidates and whether he had decided to propose a third man, Zoran Thaler, for the new foreign minister for this reason, Drnovsek replied:

[Drnovsek] This, of course, does not mean that other candidates that made it into the final selection were not good. I believe that their candidacies were pretty much equal, this especially refers to Mojca Drcar Murko, however, I believe that this choice is equally good, that is, that both candidates are very suitable for this post. It is true, though, that a general consensus among the coalition partners could only be reached on the first candidate, that is, the candidate whom I proposed today.

I proposed Mr. Janko Dezelak, hitherto director of the Agency for Rehabilitation of Banks, for the minister for economic relations and development, to the State Chamber. If Janko Dezelak is elected to the head of the Ministry for Economic Relations and Development instead of Davorin Kracun, he will, at the same time, also be the government's vice president.

[Veselinovic] Regarding an ample list of other demands that the Christian Democrats demanded in return for the foreign minister's post, Drnovsek said that they did not purposefully decide to replace state secretaries, therefore, [Foreign Ministry State Secretaries] Golob and Vencelj both remain in the Foreign Ministry. The Ministry for Economic Relations and Development will also maintain all state secretary appointments without cadre changes.

According to Drnovsek, the SKD candidates can run for additional state secretaries's posts, although allegedly the decision on their their appointments will be based on their expertise alone. Drnovsek said that the SKD is supposed to get the post of the state secretary for tourism, on which the government itself decides. If Zoran Thaler is elected the new foreign minister, his hitherto post of the head of the Parliamentary Commission for International Relations will be assumed by SKD leader Lojze Peterle. The vacant post of director of the Agency for Rehabilitation of Banks, which is currently led by the new ministerial candidate, Janko Dezelak, is not a subject of coalition agreement, according to prime minister. It will again depend on candidate's expertise as to who will assume management of this institution, although he said that, for the time being, the LDS is not thinking of taking this post.

When asked how the United list had reacted to this agreement between the LDS and SKD, Drnovsek says that United List President Janez Kocjancic agrees with it, but that:

[Drnovsek] This additional proposal to the coalition agreement between the LDS and the SKD will not influence anything. All these relations, therefore, remain unchanged. The United List will not gain or lose anything.

[Veselinovic] As to how he broke the news to Mojca Drcar Murko, who was until yesterday considered the most serious candidate for taking over the lead of Slovene diplomacy, Drnovsek says:

[Drnovsek] I called her and spoke to her. Of course, I explained this decision to her, a decision that was not entirely unexpected because I spoke to her often in the meantime, that is, during the negotiations. I think that such a decision was received with understanding. I believe that we maintained all the necessary correctness in mutual relations until the end.

[Veselinovic] Drnovsek expressed the hope that Murko would remain his adviser on relations with Italy in the future. She is also expected to be active in the foreign policy strategic council. [end recording]

Kacin Survives Proposal of No-Confidence Vote

AU2301161995 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 0600 GMT 21 Jan 95

[FBIS Translated Text] After a day of stormy debate, the State Chamber deputies did not support a proposal for a vote of no confidence in Defense Minister Jelko Kacin last night. Forty-three deputies voted against the no-confidence motion while 40 were in favor.

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Federal

Jovanovic on Croatian Decision on UNPROFOR

AU2401095895 Novi Sad DNEVNIK in Serbo-Croatian 21 Jan 95 p 1

[Report by M. Culibrk: "Zagreb's Damaging Decision"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 20 Jan—The decision made by top Croatian bodies to discontinue the UNPROFOR mandate as of 31 March cannot be considered a constructive step. On the contrary, it is in fact causing uncertainty and unease to drift into the promising negotiating process, which has just yielded positive results, as well as bringing a dark cloud of uncertainty over the developments concerning the republic of Serbia Krajina and the other, parallel peace process concerning the crisis in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is what Federal Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic has said exclusively for DNEVNIK.

Not wanting to deal with the reasons and motives for such a decision, the Yugoslav foreign minister pointed out that "we can only with regret, dissent, and great concern point out that such a gesture is damaging, inappropriate, and subject to various suspicions, including that of the real intentions of the Croatian side in deciding on such a step.

"We expect the Security Council and the United Nations to be up to their responsibility in such an uncertain and risky situation, not to be influenced by the one-sided interests and profit of any of the sides, and to act on the basis of the mandate given to them and the responsibility that they have taken on themselves by accepting the Vance plan, which is to preserve peace and the security of all the citizens living in the so-called UN protected zones." Jovanovic pointed out. "We also expect the reaction of the international community—which is virtually unanimously opposed to Zagreb's latest step—to have a corrective impact on Croatian side's thinking and to produce, if not a formal, then at least a real process with the Croatian side to reexamine this position and to coordinate future policy and practice, along with the need to maintain the negotiating process and further strengthen it."

Bank Governor: Country Over Economic Disaster

LD2301130395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1245 GMT 23 Jan 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 23 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav National Bank Governor Dragoslav Avramovic has said that Yugoslavia overcame an economic disaster last year, despite the international sanctions.

Avramovic made the statement on Radio Belgrade on Sunday [22 January] on the first anniversary of his programme of monetary restructuring and economic recovery, which has won international recognition.

The program was inaugurated on Jan. 24 in the conditions of the comprehensive U.N. Security Council sanctions due to which the Yugoslav economy had suffered at least 45 billion dollars in losses in the May 1992-August 1994 period, according to Yugoslav Goverment figures.

It is thanks to Avramovic's program that hyperinflation, which had stood at 300 million percent for the month of December in 1993, had been practically eliminated in the first months of 1994.

The program pegged the Yugoslav dinar to the German mark at a rate 1-1 on the basis of a coverage in gold and foreign-currency reserves. It secured elementary conditions for economic activity, which led to a high increase in industrial production.

Avramovic said on Radio Belgrade that the Yugoslav economy was now in a better position than a year ago, especially in terms of industrial production growth and also plans and expectations. Avramovic said that 'everything will be better' this year and forecasted a further rise in industrial production.

Serbia

Minister Djukic on Growth of Private Firms

LD2301162395 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1501 GMT 23 Jan 95

["Ecopool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kragujevac, Jan. 23 (TANJUG)—Serbian Minister of Private Entrepreneurship Radoje Djukic on Sunday said the 400,000 or so private firms in Serbia employed about one million people.

Djukic said on Radio Kragujevac, a local radio station in the central Serbian town of Kragujevac, that about 6,500 of Serbia's private firms had grown into medium-sized ones. Djukic said private firms had good and competitive programs, with accent on market behaviour. He said the private firms accounted for 30 percent of the social product. The minister said large private production facilities manufactured goods ranging from pharamceuticals to ammunition.

Djukic had earlier said that private firms had shouldered much of the burden of Yugoslavia's total economic blockade in the past two and half years, succeeding to manufacture at least 10,000 types of products which Yugoslavia had previously had to import. The minister said private firms continued to expand. He said the private firms had last year invested at least one million dollars into their production facilities, and that foreign capital had accounted for 20 percent of the sum. Djukic said private firms were expected to provide jobs for at least 50,000 more people in the near future.

Contribution to Economic Recovery

AU2401090495 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 23 Jan 95

[Report by Nevenka Djordjevic-Matijevic]

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[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The 400,000 private firms in Serbia generate 30 percent of the GNP [drustveni proizvod]. This was stated by Radoje Djukic, minister for private businesses in the Serbian Government, at a news conference for foreign and domestic correspondents during his visit to the most successful firms that was organized in cooperation with the republican Ministry of Information. Nevenka Djordjevic-Matijevic reports:

[Nevenka Djordjevic-Matijevic] Addressing domestic and foreign correspondents permanently accredited to the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], Radoje Djukic, minister for private businesses in the Serbian Government, particularly stressed the place and importance of private capital in the strategy of the country's recovery and the realization of the economic program this year.

This is best illustrated by the fact that 6,500 small firms have grown into medium-size firms capable of competing with the companies big businesses. Such an example is the family firm Djukic, which, despite the sanctions, has managed to increase its production, improve technology, programs, and employ more staff. It has opened a new textile plant whose good quality products are recognized in the European and world markets. [passage omitted]

Percevic Views Country, Possible Balkan Union

AU2301193495 Belgrade INTERVJU in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jan 95 pp 10,11,66

[Interview with SPS Deputy Chairman Goran Percevic by Biljana Sacic; place and date not given: "We Have Preserved Peace in Serbia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the age of 29 Goran Percevic, deputy chairman of the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS], does not have great political ambitions. As he himself says, he has accomplished the majority of his ambitions through his intensive political work ever since the 8th Session [of the League of Communists]. Instead of a university career, he began to build a political career, so instead of being engaged in constitutional rights and working in an office, owing to the discipline that he chose to be his guideline he is doing that work in the Yugoslav Assembly.

[Sacic] The SPS has managed in various ways to weaken the rival parties, even to such a degree that, according to some, no real opposition capable of endangering the position of the SPS exists in Serbia. Do you feel that the SPS does not have a real rival?

[Percevic] It is certain that, individually, the opposition parties do not stand a chance in competition with the SPS. If we take them as a whole, all the opposition parties give an impression of quite a multifarious group. There are constant efforts aimed at unification, but this will not come about in my view, because they are unable to form a compact whole. First, there is the human factor, that is, the political ambitions of each of the parties' leaders, and I do not see who would be strong enough to impose himself as the leader of the entire opposition, and who would be a serious alternative to the chairman of our party.

It is all about the diversity of the opposition parties. They change their political attitudes all the time, which may be the only thing that they have in common. There exists no common political platform around which the opposition parties could cluster, except for one based on a negative basis, that is, a priori taking attitudes opposite to those of the SPS. However, that negative approach does not have a chance to succeed politically because politics is supposed to benefit the citizens and it has to produce something positive. It is normal that every political party develops its individuality, because even if there exists a tendency toward some sort of uniformity among several parties, then a compromise is sought, which brings about something that would not represent a recognizable common denominator, but rather a conglomerate of all and sundry things, which again is unacceptable.

How the Authorities Exterminated the Opposition

[Sacic] Does the SPS have its people in other parties, so-called moles, as some opposition leaders claim, referring to the case of Dusan Mihajlovic, whose New Democracy entered the government immediately after the elections, thereby ensuring a majority for the ruling party in the Serbian Assembly?

[Percevic] I think that those are absolutely unfounded stories. The SPS does not have members in other parties, nor does it have such ambitions. The SPS is open to all those who want to join it.

[Sacic] You certainly remember Seselj [Radical party leader] claiming that the SPS has its people installed everywhere, which helps it to obtain various information....

[Percevic] In the opposition parties there have been internal conflicts and mutual accusations, and even interparty conflicts regarding who is more supportive and who is less supportive of the Socialists and who has been installed by the SPS, but this has nothing to do with the SPS, but rather with the level of political culture and democratic relations, and with the situation in certain opposition parties in general. As for New Democracy, it is an independent political party that publicly, openly, and legitimately entered the government of national unity, following the invitation of the president of the Republic, and which consequently got a corresponding number of portfolios in the government. I do not think that New Democracy made a mistake, just as I think that some leaders regret not having done the same. That was a moment for mobilizing all the constructive forces that we have in Serbia for the implementation of the program of economic and social reconstruction in Serbia.

The majority of the opposition parties expressed their conviction at the very beginning that the program would

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fail. They assessed that in several months the situation would be even worse, and that in such a situation they could gain more through political bargaining, that is, a few portfolios or at least more popularity for their own party, which could ensure a better position in some future government. Fortunately, all those petty interests have eventually come to light.

[Sacic] Will the SPS and JUL [Yugoslav United Left] coalition unite in the future?

[Percevic] There is no reason for unification. On the contrary, that would be a wrong approach, which would bring about monism on the left of the political spectrum. I think it is good that JUL exists, and that there is a spectrum of political views on the left.

SPS Is a Democratic Party

[Sacic] Where is the SPS placed on that spectrum?

[Percevic] The SPS is undoubtedly a party of the democratic left, while our orientation is defined by the SPS platform. We define ourselves as a party of the modern left and our policy guidelines are close to those of the political parties in the Socialist International. Despite a certain identity crisis among left-wing parties, this organization still represents a positive European or even global alternative. Today, for instance, in the European Parliament the Socialists have a majority. On the other hand, JUL is a leftist group that is already a union. We base our attitude toward the JUL on our policy that our cooperation is primarily orientated toward the leftist parties. A positive aspect of JUL is that it adds diversity to the left wing. If a normal political spectrum in any country with a developed democracy is analyzed, it can be seen that on the left wing, in addition to one moderately left-wing party there always exists one or two leftist parties that are somewhat more so. Just as we have pluralism in Greece, where in addition to the PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement] leftist party, that is also a member of the International, there exists also a party of the new left, Sinaspismos, and also the Communist Party, or, for instance, in France, where in addition to the Socialist Party there is also a very strong Communist Party, or in Spain, where in addition to the Socialist Party led by Felipe Gonzales there is also the United Left of Spain. JUL has a place and a future on our political stage.

[Sacic] Is there a reason for the SPS to be afraid of JUL?

[Percevic] I do not think that the SPS need not be afraid of any political party, and that the future of the SPS depends on itself. That is my deepest conviction. The SPS must have continuous contacts with the people, it must be constantly creative, carrying in itself the spirit of changes, and be open to new and younger people. In short, the SPS is a party of the future. I believe in the long-term perspective of the SPS. Why? Because the SPS has a stable social basis, made up of workers, farmers, and intellectuals, that is, people who live off their own work, and such people are prevalent in any society. It is the greatest political organization in the Balkans, numbering half a million members. It is led by an extraordinary leader. It is a party that has its boards throughout Serbia. It is a political party of more than 100,000 young people.

In the party there are people who have been through every possible challenge and electoral battle. We have the unity of a party built around the personality of its chairman and the consistency of its policy, which is what people value the most—stability in political convictions.

If you consider all this, I think it is clear why I believe in the future of SPS.

[Sacic] In your party there are few women; so imagine the situation if women join the JUL, if JUL becomes more active on the political stage and offers a platform that appeals to romantic souls. Can you imagine such competition?

[Percevic] I think it is good for competition to exist.

[Sacic] Yes, but the JUL ideologist [Milosevic's wife] is also a very strong personality.

[Percevic] I do not think that the future of political orientation among the electorate can be subject to division based on the difference of sexes. It is an absolutely unknown phenomenon in political life.

Will We End Up in a Matriarchy?

[Sacic] Well, precisely for that reason it might be dangerous.

[Percevic] I think that when voting voters take some other criteria into consideration than what appeals to which sex. I think that research shows that the SPS is precisely the party that a great number of women have voted for.

[Sacic] Yes, but at the time JUL did not exist on the scene!

[Percevic] There is no example in the world of a party attracting only women, or only men! Usually opposites attract!

[Sacic] Yes, as is the case with the ideologists of JUL and the SPS!

[Percevic] In our party the starting point is that men and women are equal.

[Sacic] Radmilo Bogdanovic, for instance, has recently stated that he has nothing against matriarchy....

[Percevic] Well, I do not believe in matriarchy, because I believe in the equality of the sexes and that everybody should work according to his or her abilities, regardless of sex. But if you look at some data regarding our party, you will notice that we have more than 150,000 women in our membership, you will notice that the chairman of the Young Socialists of Serbia is a girl, that the chairman

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of the Young Socialists of Belgrade is a girl, and that there are SPS women-members in the Serbian Assembly and all of them are chairwomen of boards. I agree that it would be good if a greater number of women were engaged in political life. I believe that women should be engaged in politics, but on an equal basis. Even our statute anticipates that at least 20 percent of members in any body must be women.

[Sacic] That is not many!

[Percevic] I say this is a minimum, but it is based on a reality regarding the number of politically active women. Perhaps a greater engagement of women in politics would bring new quality into the political life of Serbia.

[Sacic] What would you say to the assumption that, by arresting Seselj, the SPS has upgraded his rating artificially, just as Draskovic's rating improved last year due to his arrest?

[Percevic] It is not the SPS that sent Seselj to jail. Seselj is in jail because he violated the law. We, as a party, are not supposed to interfere in the work of magistrates, and it would also not be in agreement with the principles of legal rule and the distribution of authority. Any person who violates the law ought to be brought to justice, regardless of his partisan membership or his function.

[Sacic] Socialists are also on the political stage in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary.... Does the SPS have developed cooperation with those parties, and what experiences from that cooperation is your party ready to apply in Serbia?

[Percevic] We can notice that, when speaking of the Balkans, the left is in power in almost all Balkan countries. In Greece, PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement] is the ruling party; the Socialist Party has recently won in the elections in Bulgaria; in Romania, the ruling party is the Socialist Democratic Party; in Hungary, the Socialist Party is the ruling party; in Montenegro, the socialists are in power. That is to say, the left dominates in the Balkans today. In Albania, the right suffered a great defeat in the recent referendum, which is a great chance for the Balkans, as well as for the affirmation of the Balkan policy that we are supporting, the essence of which is expressed by the slogan: "The Balkans belongs to the Balkan nations!" This is also the idea that was promoted by the English statesman, Gladstone, in the 19th century, while the essence of such a policy is in the truth that whenever the Balkan nations alone made decisions on the Balkans, there was peace, while whenever some foreign factors made decisions, there were conflicts and wars. Our party's political vision pictures the Balkans as a region of stable, independent states that will be interconnected by economic, cultural, and political ties, which is, in fact, the opposite to the other vision supported by some extreme political circles and based on the principle of neo-imperialism. Those circles are trying to turn the whole region into a zone where a great number of small, nationalistic, banana states will oppose one another. There would be constant conflicts, wars, and disputes, and they would be easy prey for the foreign political and economic influences, under which sanctions would be a constant means of arbitration. We have opposed this policy of the disintegration of the Balkans from the very beginning.

The sanctions imposed on us are a form of economic retardation meant for the entire region. Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Ukraine, and many other countries are suffering damage because of them. I think that the ruling left in the Balkans, being aware of the need for concord and coexistance in the Balkans, may resort one day—please, no euphoria—to some form of alliance. In the Balkans, there are a great number of small states, and it is certain that, when those states find an appropriate form of alliance or a mutual language regarding their interests and attitudes toward some bigger alliances or states in the world, they will be able to accomplish their interests in international circumstances easier and better than if they acted individually, as small and weak states. In that sense, the role of Yugoslavia is crucial and, because of its position, it is the factor of peace, stability, and integration in the Balkans. The SPS has accomplished much regarding that issue in the past two years. In the most difficult moments, when the blockade was at its severest, we managed to accomplish political contacts with all the leftist parties in the Balkans. I personally spoke with several people from the leaderships of PASOK, the Bulgarian Socialist Party, and the Romanian Socialist-Democratic Party. Those contacts are a great asset and a precondition for the cooperation in the future. Our relations with the Hungarian Socialist Party are improving day by day, while we have also established political contacts with the leftist parties in Italy.

When speaking of East Europe, we shall see that what is happening in Bulgaria and Hungary today has already happened in Poland. The fact is that in Russia itself, the Agrarian and the Communist Party make up a relative majority in the Russia Duma. One can see that the pendulum that swung to the extreme right some time ago is now swinging back to the left, which is not accidental. The idea that, by introducing capitalism in East Europe, all its countries would become England or the United States overnight was a deceitful dream.

I pointed out in my first political speech that I gave at the university, I believe as early as in 1988, that a multiparty system and market economy should be introduced, but nobody can guarantee that we shall not get an Argentina-style inflation and a Lebanon-style democracy along with them.

We Shall Wrench Ourselves Free From South-American-Style Capitalism

[Sacic] Since we have already touched on the subject of our inflation dancing an Argentinian tango, while the civil war is still going on....

[Percevic] The dream that one can become the United States or England overnight was, of course, absolutely

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unrealistic. A sort of capitalism exists also in Latin America, where people live on the edge of existence. The idea that introducing parliamentarism would solve all problems like a magic wand has brought about catastrophic results in Europe. Objectively, the left may also find the right measure in the transition from one system to the other and keep what was positive in the past system in Yugoslavia, which is the level of social justice, social security, the availability of education to everybody, a high level of health care and so forth. Those are the things that must also be preserved in the conditions of political pluralism and a developing market economy. The market economy should not be understood in the sense that everything owned by society or the state is put up for sale, but rather as the equality of various forms of ownership. We do support the market economy, but one that will benefit the working class. We cannot allow that the level of participation or decision-making by the working class falls below the level that exists in the countries of West Europe, despite the left being in power.

[Sacic] So this is the platform that you intend to implement in 1995 and a basic goal that you should accomplish?

[Percevic] The precondition for everything is the preservation of the main goal that has already been accomplished, which is peace in Serbia! The attempts to export the war to the territory of our republic have failed, and I believe they will never succeed. In addition, the priority is to have the economic sanctions lifted, which is a good precondition for the continuation of the implementation of the program of economic and social recovery. A task that awaits our party is the creation of a clear concept of the implementation of our platform. There are two criteria for a party's success, and both are exact: One of them is bound up with elections, and in that respect our party is undoubtedly successful, because it has won all the elections so far.

The Dinar Is the Foundation of the State

[Sacic] Perhaps your good publicity has contributed to that? Who does your publicity for you?

[Percevic] The victory of our party is not the result of publicity, but it is rather the result of the feeling among the voters that our party's and chairman's actions have been in line with the truth and reality, and that there has been consistency, frankness, and stability in our policy. No publicity can create such an impression and feeling! In politics, it is deeds that count, not words! People will always believe in deeds, rather than in some story! Our people has shown this in the elections. The second criteria of any party's success is primarily to what extent it has implemented its platform! This is what we ought to work on in 1995. One should not forget that the SPS has supported the program of the country's economic recovery, it has backed it. For us, being a party of the left, a great problem is something that requires serious consideration: the danger that enormous social differences develop during our time in power. This is the main challenge for our party: the struggle to implement the principles of social justice. Perhaps those social differences are partly a result of criminality, the violation of laws, and there is a bunch of measures that we ought to take, give political support, and initiate. We will have to be consistent in that, and all those who have violated the law will have to be punished. I think that the conditions are now ripe for a final settling of accounts with the criminal underworld, because there were some objective reasons for its boom. Those who are involved in criminology will know very well what I mean: If there is a war going on over the border, it is one of the sources of war profiteering. If there is an economic blockade, it brings about a black market, which is fertile soil for the development of crime.

Under such conditions, the state is not capable of fighting all the different forms of speculation, and third, if there is huge hyperinflation, then it is also impossible to pursue an orderly economic policy and to prevent the creation of huge social differences. I think that the struggle against social differences must be waged through taxation in the first place. Owing to the policy of a stable dinar, we are now in a position to work out a system of taxation through which the redistribution of social assets will be carried out.

[Sacic] You are certain of the dinar's stability, and on that stability you are building a new, fairer taxation system. Is that what you are saying?

[Percevic] Well, only in conditions where there is no inflation, particularly no hyperinflation, is it possible to have a serious taxation system. We are not pessimistic regarding the dinar's stability, but we should also not be overly optimistic about it. The basis for realistic optimism certainly exists. The situation is much better than at the beginning of last year. If the sanctions are lifted completely, then some new, better perspectives for the development of the economic program and for the prevention of the criminalization of our society will emerge. The fact is that one of the causes of crime is also the transition from one system to another. Many cases of rapid wealth acquisition are based on the transformation of state ownership, the pouring of the state-owned money into private pockets. I think that the Law on Revalorization of that transformation will establish a realistic framework and that the current situation will improve. I also think that one of the causes of social differences is the fact that the loans obtained during the hyperinflation were paid back at absurdly low levels. Revalorization should be made in this respect as well. Everything should be done to accomplish the principle of social justice, not in the sense of total egalitarianism, but rather in the sense that everybody has at least a similar starting position and that those who are capable are given the possibility to contribute and earn money for themselves, for the others, and for the state. In brief, individuals must be prevented from earning enormous amounts of money in just a year or two. That is possible

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due to either an error on the part of the state or on the part of the system of taxation, or due to criminal activities.

Where Did the Fight Against Crime Get Stuck?

[Sacic] Last year, the state was not at its best in fighting crime and in providing for the most basic needs of the citizens. Do you, as the deputy chairman of the ruling party, feel responsible for that?

[Percevic] The experience of the modern leftist parties in the West shows that those parties mostly failed because they deviated too much to the right, endeavoring to resemble some other, rightist parties as closely as possible and thereby losing their original identity, because they were upset by internal scandals in connection with corruption or such things, or because their internal unity was endangered. Therefore, I think that the fight against crime ought to be taken most seriously. In that sense, we shall do anything we can politically to bring to an end the fight against crime successfully. All those involved in any sort of criminal activity must be brought to justice! Nothing will protect them, be it their membership of any of the opposition parties, membership of the SPS, or possible state functions. This was already been shown when some ministers were brought to trial because of their sins, despite their being high state officials. If we fail to establish individual responsibility, then it becomes collective, and nobody is willing to answer for what other people have done.

[Sacic] Although the SPS is the ruling party in Serbia, it is still vehemently struggling to maintain its position at the local levels, in all municipalities.... Why?

[Percevic] The development of democracy is not complete when parliamentary democracy is accomplished, but it also includes the development of direct democracy as well as local self-government. I believe that local self-government should be developed and that it is important because, among other things, it is deeply ingrained in the tradition of our people. For instance, principalities and other forms of local self-government during the Turkish rule were the main factor for the preservation of our national identity. The reputation of our party is confirmed also through the settlement of local problems. The time is coming when the success of a policy will be measured by its capacity to solve everyday problems in the lives of our citizens, rather than by the number of demagogic slogans.

How Great is Serbia?

[Sacic] What do you think how the Serbian state should look like in terms of its territory? Should it be larger than the current Yugoslavia? How feasible is the idea of all Serbs in one state?

[Percevic] I have to say that the slogan "All Serbs in one state!" is often falsely said to have been invented by the SPS. Any serious analyst will see, if he looks back at what we were saying over the past three or four years, that it has never been an SPS slogan. I think that the Serbian people had its state in the former Yugoslavia, which actually comprised the entire Serbian people, and so we were against the disintegration of Yugoslavia. We have preserved and redefined the FRY, while struggling to ensure a right to self-determination for the Serbian people in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and the former Croatia, chiefly through a right to freedom and equality and a right to make decisions on their own destiny. When speaking of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Serbian people has accomplished its main goal, it has ensured freedom, equality and statehood. Any realistic person, when looking at the Contact Group plan, will see that the Srpska republic is affirmed as a state by the plan, because it has a clearly stated right to its assembly, its territory comprising one half of former Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a right to have its own army and police in that territory, which is, according to the definition of sovereignty—a state! Even if there is some form of affiliation similar to a union, it excludes any possibility of the majorization of the Serbian people. I think that the goals of the Serbian people in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina have been accomplished; proof of this is in the fact that a right to a confederal union between the Srpska republic and the FRY has been recognized. By definition, confederation is a contract between two states. This shows clearly that the statehood of the Srpska republic has been recognized; perhaps not the full international and legal sovereignty, but the main goals have been accomplished, and the accomplishment of some further goals is now a matter of future diplomatic work. The future of the republic of Serbia Krajina [RSK] should be resolved through direct negotiations between Zagreb and Knin, and I think it is a problem that will not be resolved soon, because the Republic of Croatia insists on the so-called reintegration of the occupied regions within the boundaries of the former Croatia that used to exist. Obviously, the Serbian people in the RSK does not even dream of living in something like the Independent State of Croatia [Croatian state during World War II]. I think that a solution ought to be sought within the right of the Serbian people to self- determination. I think that any solution making it possible for the Serbian people in the RSK to be the sole authority on its own territory, to have actual authority in any region where it makes up a majority, would be acceptable. That means that it has to have its own police, army, and state bodies.

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